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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background and Motivation
Renewable energies are considered to play an important role in achieving greenhouse
gas emission reduction targets. In addition, the European Commission states that the
promotion of renewable energies contributes to “promoting the security of energy sup-
ply, promoting technological development and innovation and providing opportunities
for employment and regional development (. . . )”(EU Directive 2009/28/EC). For these
reasons, the share of renewable energy in primary energy consumption and, in particular,
in electricity consumption should increase in the coming years and decades, according to
political plans. Up to 2020, binding targets for the renewable energy share in electricity
(RES-E) consumption have been defined in all member states of the European Union, in
compliance with Directive 2009/28/EC. Overall, on a European level, the RES-E share
is set to increase up to 34% by 2020, compared to 19.9% in 2010 (BMU (2012) and
EREC (2011)). Post 2020, RES-E targets have only been defined in some European
countries thus far. For example, Germany envisages reaching a RES-E share of 80% by
2050 (BMWi/BMU (2010)). In addition, renewable energies may potentially play an
important role in realizing European decarbonization plans up to 2050 (EC (2011b) and
Ja¨gemann et al. (2013)).
Two major challenges come along with an increasing RES-E share. First, most renewable
energies are not (yet) competitive with other energies and would not be built without
support mechanisms. Thus, with an increasing RES-E share, support expenditures also
increase. For example, in Germany, support expenditures increased from 0.9 bn. EUR in
2000, when the German renewable energy support system (EEG) was introduced, up to
1
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15.4 bn. EUR in 2012 (U¨bertragungsnetzbetreiber (2012)).1 Second, renewable energies
have to be integrated in the electricity system. In particular, many renewable energies,
such as wind and solar, depend on hourly meteorological conditions. The intermittency
of renewable energy infeed has important consequences on the electricity system. First,
hourly residual demand becomes more volatile and the balancing of hourly demand and
supply becomes more challenging than in electricity systems with mainly dispatchable
power plants. Second, the yearly utilization times that can be achieved by thermal
power plants are affected by an increasing RES-E share (e.g., de Miera et al. (2008)):
In many hours of the year, a large part of demand is met by renewable energies, while
in some hours residual demand remains high when the wind is not blowing and the sun
is not shining. Depending on their yearly utilization times, different power plant types
(characterized by different capital/operation cost ratios) are cost-efficient. Therefore,
an increasing RES-E penetration affects optimal investment decisions of thermal power
plants (e.g., Nicolosi (2012)). Moreover, a further challenge of RES-E integration is to
physically connect supply and demand because many favorable renewable energy sites
are located far from demand centers and have to be connected to the electricity grid.
From an economic point of view, these challenges should be tackled by building and us-
ing those technologies in those regions which allow reaching the political target at lowest
system costs. In the context of renewable energy deployment in the European Union,
RES-E plants have thus far mainly been built in countries with high promotion payments
rather than in regions where meteorological conditions are favorable and generation costs
are low (EWI (2010)). In fact, given large variances in RES-E generation costs across
different European regions, the national 2020 RES-E targets do not necessarily have to
be reached by national RES-E production only. Instead, Directive 2009/28/EC explic-
itly provides the option of reaching the national targets through cooperation between
different member states or with third countries. These cooperation mechanisms defined
by the Directive include joint projects, joint support systems and statistical transfers of
renewable energy generation. Cooperation between European countries would signifi-
cantly reduce the costs of increasing the RES-E share in the European electricity system
(e.g., EWI (2010) and Aune et al. (2012)). Nevertheless, cooperation mechanisms have
been hardly used thus far.
This conflict between the potential economic benefits of cooperation on the one hand and
the observed reluctance to cooperate on the other hand motivates the first main topic of
this thesis. Within three essays, the benefits and challenges of cross-border cooperation
in RES-E support are investigated. In doing so, the impact of cooperation is analyzed
both on the electricity system level and on the level of individual groups. In fact, as
1In the same period, the renewable energy share in gross electricity consumption increased from 6.8%
in 2000 to 23.5% in 2012 (BMU (2013)).
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also shown in general trade theory, an overall cost-efficient measure does not necessarily
result in the best outcome from the single groups’ perspectives. Consequently, financial
redistribution effects resulting from an overall economic efficient measure (such as the
introduction of trade or cooperation, which can be interpreted as a trade in RES-E
targets) can be an obstacle to the implementation of this measure. Therefore, in this
thesis, the economic benefit of cooperation is further investigated compared to previous
analyses. In addition, redistribution effects arising from cooperation are analyzed both
theoretically and numerically.
The second main topic of this thesis deals with optimal investment and dispatch decisions
of conventional power plants and storage units under uncertainty about future renewable
energy deployment paths. The motivation for this part of the thesis is that RES-E
deployment paths have been difficult to forecast in the past and that a broad range
of scenarios and forecasts exists regarding future developments. For example, due to
social acceptance issues and uncertainties about technological developments of renewable
energies and the progress of grid extensions, the pace of future RES-E deployment
paths is difficult to predict. In addition, political uncertainty about future developments
in renewable energy promotion can render future RES-E penetration levels uncertain.
As the RES-E penetration level in an electricity system affects the optimal capacity
mix of dispatchable power plants, unknown future RES-E deployment paths induce
uncertainty about optimal investment decisions of thermal power plants and storage
units. In the second part of this thesis, a dynamic stochastic optimization model is
developed to optimize investment and dispatch decisions given that future renewable
energy deployment paths are unknown.
To summarize, this thesis sheds further light on the question, how an increasing re-
newable energy share in the European power system can be cost-efficiently reached. In
particular, this thesis investigates two aspects of this question: First, it investigates the
benefit of cooperation in European RES-E deployment as well as resulting redistribu-
tion effects, which are possible obstacles to the practical implementation of cooperation.
Second, it analyzes the optimal development of the conventional power plant fleet, given
that future RES-E deployment paths cannot be perfectly foreseen.
1.2 Methodological approach of this thesis
In order to analyze cost-efficient RES-E deployment and integration pathways as well
as redistribution effects of cooperation in RES-E support different methodologies could
be applied: On the one hand, theoretical models can be used to determine the signs of
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effects under quite general assumptions. On the other hand, based on numerical analy-
ses, the magnitude of effects can be quantified. Furthermore, if effects are undetermined
in theoretical models based on general assumptions, the sign of the effects can be de-
termined in numerical analyses based on real-world data. Important numerical analysis
methods in energy economics are empirical methods as well as optimization and equilib-
rium models, covering the technological and economic fundamentals of energy markets
in large detail.2 Empirical analyses are mostly used for an ex-post quantification of
effects. Optimization and equilibrium models, in contrast, are widely used for modeling
future developments of, e.g., the electricity system.
The aim of this thesis is to analyze the benefits of European cooperation in achieving
high renewable energy shares in electricity consumption, the resulting redistribution
effects between different groups and the optimal investment and dispatch decisions under
uncertainty about future RES-E penetration levels. In Chapter 2 of this thesis, the
benefits of cooperation in RES-E support are calculated, in terms of a decrease in total
system costs. In doing so, an electricity optimization model of the European power
system is used, allowing for the quantification of the magnitude of this benefit and its
robustness with regard to various developments in the electricity system. In Chapter 3,
redistribution effects of cooperation are theoretically investigated using a mathematical
two-country model, and in Chapter 4, these effects are numerically analyzed by applying
the same optimization model of the European electricity system as in Chapter 2. In
Chapter 5, a stochastic optimization model is developed to investigate the impact of
uncertain renewable energy deployment paths on optimal investment decisions in the
conventional power market. First, a simplified version of the model is used to investigate
general effects of this uncertainty. Next, the detailed model, parameterized for the
Central European power market, is used to quantify the magnitude of effects in a real-
world electricity market setting.
To summarize, in this thesis, I use optimization under perfect foresight, stochastic opti-
mization and a theoretical model of cross-border cooperation in RES-E support. In the
following, general principles of optimization and, in particular, of stochastic optimiza-
tion are briefly outlined. In addition, economic principles of efficiency and distribution
are recaptured.
2In optimization models, one target function is minimized or maximized (while satisfying additional
restrictions), while equilibrium models require a set of conditions to be satisfied in an equilibrium. This
set of equations, which has to be satisfied in equilibrium, can for example represent the target functions
of different market participants. Note that an optimization model can be reformulated as an equilibrium
model. In fact, equilibrium models generalize optimization models (Gabriel et al. (2013), Minot (2009)).
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Optimization
Optimization methods generally minimize or maximize a target function under sev-
eral restrictions. In this thesis, I use linear optimization models, which imply that all
variables in the target function and the restriction equations are linear (Neumann and
Morlock (2002)). The main advantage of linear optimization is that problems are easier
to computationally solve and thus applicable to large-scale models, including a large
number of variables. However, using linear optimization also implies, e.g., that demand
has to be assumed to be inelastic and that perfect competition as well as exogenous
cost developments have to be assumed. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, demand in
electricity markets is relatively inelastic, especially in the short term. The degree of
competitiveness, and the right instruments to measure it in electricity markets, is a con-
tentious issue (Newberry (2009)). Furthermore, the impact of learning curve effects on
the investment cost developments of power plants is controversial. The learning curve
concept suggests that with each doubling of the world-wide installed capacity of a tech-
nology, the costs of this technology are reduced by a certain percentage. As discussed
in Ja¨gemann et al. (2013), a caveat to the learning curve concept is that past trends are
extrapolated to the future, which is not always appropriate. Moreover, when regional
electricity systems (and not the world-wide electricity system) are optimized, including
endogenous learning curves is difficult and requires an assumption about the relation
between regional and world-wide technology expansions.
In stochastic optimization, a target function is also minimized or maximized under
certain restrictions. In addition to deterministic optimization, stochastic optimization
takes into account that the realization of one or several parameters is uncertain. In
electricity systems, investment decisions for new power plants are typically characterized
by long planning, construction, amortization and technical lifetimes. Future revenues
and production costs are, however, unknown because, e.g., the development of fuel costs,
electricity demand and political decisions is uncertain from an investor’s perspective
(Weber (2005)). The aim of stochastic optimization is to find an optimal decision (e.g.,
for a power plant investment) given that the future is uncertain. This optimal decision
may include postponing decisions until new information is revealed or hedging against
realizations of the random parameters, for example, by considering a more balanced
technology mix than the one which is optimal given perfect foresight (see e.g., Gardner
(1996), Gardner and Rogers (1999), Hobbs and Maheshwari (1990) and Patino-Echeverri
et al. (2009)). In general, the optimal solution under uncertainty differs from the optimal
solution(s) given perfect foresight and, in particular, also from the optimal solution given
an average realization of the random parameter. In fact, a solution which is optimal
when assuming an expected value of the uncertain parameter may be very costly once
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extreme values of the uncertain parameter are realized (Birge (1997), Conejo et al.
(2010)).
In order to take into account uncertainty in an optimization model, an assumption on the
distribution of the uncertain parameters is needed (Birge (1997)). Within the stochas-
tic optimization process, perfect information about the distribution of uncertainty is
assumed. Making an adequate assumption about the distribution of the uncertain pa-
rameter(s) is challenging in many cases. Only in some cases, e.g., when modeling uncer-
tainty about realizations of meteorological phenomena, such as wind speeds and solar
radiation, can the distributions be estimated based on historical data. In contrast, when
modeling uncertainty about the development of demand, fuel costs and, in particular,
technological progress or political decisions, occurrence probabilities of different realiza-
tions of the random parameters are difficult to estimate. Therefore, when interpreting
the results of a stochastic optimization model, it is important to keep in mind which kind
of uncertainty has been taken into account and which assumptions on the probability
distributions have been made in the modeling process.
In stochastic programming, uncertainty is often taken into account either by two-stage
or by multi-stage stochastic programs.3 In two-stage programs, a decision for the so-
called ‘first-stage’ or ‘here-and-now’ variables has to be made first under uncertainty
about the realization of the random parameters. In the second stage, information about
the uncertain parameters is revealed and the so-called ‘second-stage’ or ‘wait-and-see’
variables are optimized as a best response to this revealed information (Birge (1997)
and Conejo et al. (2010)). For example, in investment planning, the first-stage variables
are the investment variables and the second-stage variables the dispatch variables. In a
multi-stage program, decisions under uncertainty are made in several subsequent stages,
taking into account that the transition probabilities between different nodes as well
as the realization of the random parameters in different stages are interdependent. For
example, in the context of weather uncertainty, a two-stage stochastic program is applied
by Nagl et al. (2013) and a multi-stage stochastic program by Sun et al. (2008). Nagl
et al. (2013) analyze the impact of weather uncertainty on investment decisions and
electricity system costs. In their model, investment decisions have to be made in the first
stage without knowing the weather realization during the lifetime of the plants. Thus,
only one decision under uncertainty has to be made, before constructing a plant. In
contrast, Sun et al. (2008) analyze the influence of short-term uncertainties surrounding
the infeed of wind in a stochastic dispatch optimization model. In their model, decisions
under uncertainty have to be made in each state, taking into account that wind infeed
3An additional strand of stochastic optimization is chance-constrained programming. Chance-
constrained programming is applied if certain constraints should “hold with some probability or re-
liability level” and can not be applied if all constraints have to hold under all possible outcomes of the
random parameters (Birge (1997)).
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levels between different stages are strongly correlated. In a similar fashion, Chapter
5 of this thesis presents how a multi-stage stochastic program is developed to account
for implementation risks in RES-E deployment when optimizing the development of the
conventional power plant fleet. By using a multi-stage model, it is taken into account
that the installed RES-E capacities (and therefore the RES-E penetration level) in one
stage depends on the deployment realized in previous stages. Moreover, the multi-stage
model represents the fact that more and more information about the progress in RES-E
deployment is revealed over time.
One challenge facing stochastic optimization is that problems can become very large
and difficult to solve (Sen (2001), Birge (1997)). Due to high computational times of
stochastic models, not all parameters which are uncertain in reality can also be rep-
resented as uncertain parameters in the model. Thus, one aim of stochastic modeling
is to identify the direction and the magnitude of the effect of including the uncertain
nature of different parameters. Thereby, those parameters can be identified which have
a large effect on model results and thus should be included as uncertain parameters in
optimization calculus (Hobbs and Maheshwari (1990)). Moreover, knowledge about the
impact of different uncertainties on optimal decisions can help the results of determin-
istic optimization models to be interpreted more accurately (e.g., as lower bounds for
cost calculations).
Measures to analyze the impact of uncertainty on model results are the Expected Value
of Perfect Information (EVPI) and the Value of the Stochastic Solution (VSS). The
EVPI estimates the costs induced by uncertainty or, expressed differently, the “value of
knowing the future with certainty” (Birge (1997)). It is calculated as the additional costs
resulting from stochastic optimization, compared to the probability-weighted additional
costs resulting from the deterministic optimization problems, given perfect foresight,
of different realizations of the parameter. Thus, the EVPI measures the impact of
uncertainty given that stochasticity is taken into account in the optimization process
(see Figure 1.1).
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• Perfect information
• Deterministic optimization
EVPI
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• Uncertainty
• Stochastic optimization
• Uncertainty
• Deterministic optimization, assuming
an expected value of the random
parameter
Figure 1.1: The calculation of EVPI and VSS
Source: Own illustration. If not indicated otherwise,
all figures in this thesis are own illustrations.
In contrast, the VSS measures the benefit of using stochastic programming when the
future is uncertain. The VSS is calculated as the probability-weighted additional costs,
arising under different realizations of the random parameter, if the optimization is per-
formed assuming the expected value of the random parameter is realized, compared to
the costs arising under stochastic planning. A large VSS indicates that it is worth it
to use stochastic optimization because the optimization for the expected value of the
random parameter leads to significantly different results (Birge (1997)). Both measures,
the EVPI and the VSS, help to identify those uncertain parameters, which have a large
impact on model results (Hobbs and Maheshwari (1990)).
Efficiency and distributional effects
The objective of the electricity market optimization models used in this thesis (namely,
the newly developed multi-stage model in Chapter 5 and the deterministic optimization
model DIMENSION in Chapters 2 and 4) is to minimize total costs of electricity supply
under the restriction of meeting electricity demand as well as under a set of additional
restrictions (e.g., environmental targets). Under the assumption of a price-inelastic elec-
tricity demand, this cost minimization problem is equivalent to the welfare maximization
problem of the social planner (Sauma and Oren (2005)).
Weakening restrictions in the optimization model implies that overall welfare can be
increased and that electricity demand can be satisfied at lower costs. However, welfare
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of individual groups does not necessarily increase. As an example, the introduction
or facilitation of trade between different regions in the electricity system corresponds
to a weakening of trading restrictions. Without the possibility of trade (e.g., trading of
electricity, CO2 -emission certificates or RES-E targets), demand or political targets have
to be met in each region individually. When trade is possible, differences in generation
costs or CO2 mitigation costs between regions can be exploited. Figure 1.2 illustrates the
effects of electricity trade between two regions with different supply curves for electricity
generation. It can be seen that overall welfare increases compared to the situation under
autarky (by c+e+f). However, due to the convergence of electricity prices, consumers in
region A, the ‘low price region’ before trade, are worse off than without trade (consumer
rents decrease by a+ b), while producers benefit from trade (producer rents increase by
a+ b+ c). In contrast, in region B, the ‘high price region’ before trade, consumer rents
increase by (d+ e+ f) and producer rents decrease by d.
pA
pB
QA
pTA
QAT PROD
a b c
SA
DA
SB
DB
p p
Q Q
pTB
QBQBT PROD QBT CONS QA
T CONS 
d
T= Export
T= Import
e f
pA, pB: Pre-trade electricity price
pTA, pTB: Electricity price with trade
SA ,SB: Electricity supply curve
DA, DB: Electricity demand curve
QA, QB: Produced and consumed electricity without trade
QAT CONS, QBT CONS : Electricity consumption with trade
QAT PROD, QBT PROD: Electricity production with trade
Figure 1.2: Welfare effects of electricity trade
Source: Adapted from Kapff and Pelkmans (2010).
Likewise, in general trade theory, it has been shown that international trade increases
overall welfare but is not beneficial for all groups. For example, in the neoclassical trade
theory model of Heckscher and Ohlin, it is shown that trade between regions with a
different factor endowment increases overall welfare (see, e.g., Krugman and Obstfeld
(2009)). The model assumes that different goods have different input factor intensities.
When international trade is possible, regions specialize in the production of the good
which is intensive in the factor that is relatively abundant in comparison to the other
factor. Figure 1.3 illustrates the effect of different factor endowments on the production
possibility frontier (PPF) in two regions, as well as the effect of trade on the welfare in
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both regions.4 Assume that the production of product A is intensive in the input factor
1, which is relatively abundant in country A. Vice versa, assume that the product B
is intensive in the input factor 2, which is relatively abundant in country B. With the
possibility of trade, country A will specialize in the production of product A, country B
in the production of product B. The relative output prices of the two products converge
on the international level and, in both countries, a higher community indifference curve
(CIC*) can be reached (and thus, also overall welfare increases).
xA xA
xB xB
Region A Region B
Production possibility frontier
International
price ratio
CIC*
CIC*
CIC1
CIC1
Z Y
W
CIC1: Community Indifference Curve without trade
CIC*: Community Indifference Curve with trade
XA: Production of good A
XB: Production of good B
Z
Y
W
W: Production and consumption without trade
Y: Consumption with trade
Z:  Production with trade
Figure 1.3: Effects of international trade in the Heckscher-Ohlin model
Source: Based on Stro¨bele and Wacker (1995) and Zweifel and Heller (1992).
However, as shown in the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the output price changes also
affect the relative factor prices in both countries such that owners of the factor which
is relatively abundant (scarce) in a country benefit (lose) from trade (see, e.g., Zweifel
and Heller (1992)).5 Consequently, the introduction of trade is normally not a pareto-
improvement, which would require that at least one individual benefits from trade while
no individual is worse off than without trade (Breyer (2004)). However, if the win-
ners are able to compensate the losers and would still be better off than without trade,
the introduction of trade, accompanied with transfers, could potentially be a pareto-
improvement (‘Kaldor-Hicks criteria’; see, e.g., Gravelle and Rees (2004)). In other
terms, as pointed out by Sauma and Oren (2005), whether an increase of social wel-
fare is a pareto-improvement essentially depends on the ”availability of adequate and
4A production possibility frontier (PPF) represents the opportunity costs of producing one good in
terms of sacrificing output of the other good. As all input factors available in the economy are completely
used for all production combinations of the two goods, which are located on the PPF, a higher production
of one good necessarily leads to a lower production of the other good (see, e.g., Breyer (2004)).
5In the context of electricity systems, different regions have different endowments, e.g., in sites with
high wind speeds or different production possibilities for conventional electricity, e.g., due to different
endowments in lignite.
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costless (without transaction costs) transfer mechanisms”. In practice, such compensa-
tion mechanisms are difficult to implement (Breyer (2004), Gravelle and Rees (2004),
Sauma and Oren (2005)). Thus, redistribution effects, which come along with policies
that improve overall welfare, play an important role in their practical implementation.
Therefore, in Chapters 3 and 4, I theoretically and numerically analyze redistribution
effects resulting from the introduction of cross-border cooperation in RES-E support,
which can essentially be interpreted as a cross-border trade of renewable energy targets.
1.3 Thesis outline
This thesis consists of four essays, dealing with two main topics. Chapters 2, 3 and 4
analyze the effects of cross-border cooperation in the support of renewable energies and
Chapter 5 analyzes optimal investment and dispatch decisions of conventional power
plants under uncertain future renewable energy deployment paths.
While each chapter of this thesis can be read separately, Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are closely
interrelated. In Chapter 2, the effect of European-wide cooperation in renewable energy
support on electricity system costs is quantified for the period 2020 to 2030. In addi-
tion, this chapter qualitatively investigates why European member states mostly rely on
national renewable energy production in order to achieve their renewable energy targets
instead of cooperating with other countries. As a result from this qualitative analysis, we
find that undesired redistribution effects resulting from cross-border cooperation seem to
be a major reason impeding the use of cooperation mechanisms in practice. Therefore,
within Chapters 3 and 4, redistribution effects arising from cross-border cooperation are
analyzed in-depth. Chapter 3 provides a theoretical analysis of redistribution effects,
taking into account effects of different regional RES-E deployments on regional power
markets and regional renewable energy markets. Chapter 4 directly builds on the the-
oretical analysis in Chapter 3 and quantifies the effects shown in the theoretical model
for the case of the European power system.
Chapter 5 deals with a distinctive subject, namely the optimization of power plant
investments under uncertainty. In the following, the content of each chapter is briefly
summarized.
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1.3.1 Promotion of electricity from renewable energy in Europe post
2020 - the economic benefits of cooperation
The analysis presented in Chapter 2 quantifies the economic benefits of European-wide
cooperation in RES-E support and qualitatively investigates obstacles to the implemen-
tation of cooperation mechanisms. It has been published in the Working Paper Series
of the Institute of Energy Economics at the University of Cologne (Fu¨rsch and Linden-
berger (2013)). The paper has been written in co-authorship with Dietmar Lindenberger
and I am the leading author of this paper. The motivation for this paper is that the
availability of renewable energies differs significantly across European regions. Conse-
quently, European cooperation in the deployment of renewable energy potentially yields
substantial efficiency gains. However, for achieving the 2020 renewable energy targets,
most countries purely rely on domestic production. In this paper, we analyze the bene-
fits of cooperation compared to continuing with national renewable energy support after
2020. We use an optimization model of the European electricity system and find that
compared to a 2030 CO2 -only target (-40% compared to 1990), electricity system costs
increase by 5 to 7% when a European-wide renewable energy target for electricity gen-
eration (of 55%) is additionally implemented. However, these additional costs are 41 to
45% lower than the additional costs which would arise if the renewable energy target
was reached through national support schemes (without cooperation). Furthermore, the
cost reduction achieved by cooperation is quite robust with regard to the assumptions on
interconnector extensions and investment cost developments of renewable energy tech-
nologies. In practice, however, administrative issues and questions concerning the fair
sharing of costs and benefits between the member states represent major obstacles that
need to be tackled in order to reach renewable energy targets at the lowest possible cost.
1.3.2 Redistribution effects resulting from cross-border cooperation in
support for renewable energy
In Chapter 3, I theoretically analyze redistribution effects resulting from cross-border
cooperation in support for renewable energy. This analysis has not yet been published
and I am the sole author of this analysis. The background for this analysis is that inter-
national cooperation in achieving renewable energy targets, e.g., via a common tradable
green certificate market, increases overall welfare. However, cooperation in the support
of electricity from renewable energy sources also leads to regional price effects, from
which some groups benefit while others lose. On a regional level, the introduction of
cross-border cooperation in RES-E support generally has an opposite effect on support
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expenditures and wholesale electricity prices, as long as grid congestion between the dif-
ferent regions exists. In this paper, the redistribution effects resulting from cooperation
in RES-E support are analyzed in terms of consumer rents and producer profits per
country. A theoretical model is used to show under which conditions different groups
benefit or suffer from the introduction of cooperation. Findings of the analysis include
that effects on consumers and total producers per country can only be clearly determined
if no grid congestions between the countries exist. If bottlenecks in the transmission sys-
tem exist, the relationship between the slopes of the renewable and the non-renewable
marginal generation cost curves for electricity generation as well as the level of the
RES-E target essentially determine whether these groups benefit or lose from the intro-
duction of green certificate trading. In contrast, system-wide welfare always increases
once cooperation in RES-E support is introduced. Similarly, welfare on the country level
always increases (compared to a situation without RES-E cooperation) if the countries
are perfectly or not at all physically interconnected. In the case of congested intercon-
nectors, the sum of producer and consumer rents in a country may also decrease under
certain conditions. However, in this case the level of congestion rents is also influenced
by the introduction of RES-E cooperation. Therefore, in this case, there always exists a
possible distribution of congestion rents between the countries which ensures that each
country benefits from the introduction of certificate trade.
1.3.3 Who benefits from cooperation? - A numerical analysis of redis-
tribution effects resulting from cooperation in European RES-E
support
In Chapter 4, I numerically quantify redistribution effects potentially arising from coop-
eration in RES-E support in the European power system. This analysis has not yet been
published and I am the sole author of this analysis. The quantification of redistribution
effects builds on the theoretical analysis presented in Chapter 3. A dynamic investment
and dispatch optimization model of the European electricity system is used to investigate
which groups potentially benefit from cooperation and which groups would be worse off
compared to a situation in which national RES-E targets are reached solely by domestic
RES-E production. In the analysis, cooperation in RES-E support is implemented as a
European-wide green certificate trading scheme. Main findings of the analysis include
that in the European electricity system, effects of the change in the certificate price in
most countries would overcompensate for the effects of the change in the wholesale elec-
tricity price. Thus, in most countries with comparatively high (low) generation costs for
renewable energies, consumer rents increase (decrease) due to cooperation and producers
yield lower (higher) profits. In addition, it is found that the magnitude of redistribution
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effects between the individual groups is quite large: In some countries, the change in
consumer rents or producer profits resulting from cooperation is nearly twice as high
as the overall welfare effect of cooperation in the whole European electricity system.
Moreover, the benefit different countries have from cooperation varies substantially. In
our analysis, we find that Germany would by far have the largest (absolute) benefit of
cooperation, achieved by significant reductions of RES-E target compliance costs via
certificate imports. Finally, we find that the sign of redistribution effects is quite ro-
bust to different developments of interconnector extensions, the CO2 price and RES-E
investment costs. The magnitude of redistribution effects, in contrast, is in some coun-
tries sensitive to these assumptions (especially with regard to the assumption on the
CO2 price).
1.3.4 Optimization of power plant investments under uncertain re-
newable energy deployment paths: A multi-stage stochastic pro-
gramming approach
The analysis presented in Chapter 5 has been published in Fu¨rsch et al. (2013b). The
essay has been written in co-authorship with Stephan Nagl and Dietmar Lindenberger
and I am the leading author of the paper. The paper investigates the impact of un-
certain renewable energy deployment paths on investment planning for conventional
power plants and storage units. Electricity generation from renewable energy sources
(RES-E) is planned to increase significantly within the coming decades. However, due
to uncertainty surrounding the progress of necessary infrastructure investments, public
acceptance and cost developments of renewable energies, the achievement of political
plans is unclear. Implementation risks of renewable energy targets are challenging for
investment planning, because different shares of RES-E fundamentally change the opti-
mal mix of dispatchable power plants. Specifically, uncertain future RES-E deployment
paths induce uncertainty about the level and the steepness of the residual load duration
curve and the hourly residual load structure. In this paper, we show how uncertain
future RES-E penetration levels impact the electricity system and try to quantify effects
for the Central European power market. We develop a multi-stage stochastic invest-
ment and dispatch model to analyze effects on investment choices, electricity generation
and system costs. Our main findings include that uncertainty about the achievement of
RES-E targets significantly affects optimal investment and dispatch decisions. In par-
ticular, plants with a medium capital/operating cost ratio have a higher value under
uncertainty. We find that this technology choice is mainly driven by the uncertainty
about the level rather than about the structure of the residual load. Furthermore, given
larger investments in plants with medium capital/operating cost ratio under uncertainty,
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optimal investments in storage units are lower than under perfect foresight. In the case
of the Central European power market, costs induced by the implementation risk of
renewable energies are rather small compared to total system costs.

Chapter 2
Promotion of electricity from
renewable energy in Europe post
2020 - the economic benefits of
cooperation
2.1 Introduction and background
For the year 2020, the European Union (EU) has agreed upon a target of 20% for the
share of renewable energy sources (RES) in gross final energy consumption, comprising
the electricity, heating and cooling and transportation sectors. A sectoral breakdown of
the national targets was defined by each EU member state in the National Renewable
Energy Action Plans (NREAP). In addition, the member states were asked to notify via
their NREAPs, whether they plan to make use of the cooperation mechanisms defined
in the European Directive 2009/28/EC. The purpose of these cooperation mechanisms
is to facilitate a cost reduction in achieving national targets by promoting RES in a
different member state or in a third country in which generation costs are lower. Across
different European regions, full load hours of fluctuating renewables such as wind and
solar technologies vary by factors up to 100% (Fu¨rsch et al. (2013a)) such that sub-
stantial potential benefits from cross-border cooperation arise (see, e.g., EWI (2010)).
Nevertheless, the national schemes for target achievement stated in the NREAPs rely
almost purely on domestic RES production and hardly envisage the use of cooperation
mechanisms.
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Beyond 2020, a European renewable energy target has not yet been defined. However,
in October 2009, the European Council agreed upon the target to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions by 80-95% by 2050 compared to 1990 levels. Within the European ”Roadmap
for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050” an emission reduction of 40%
by 2030 was identified as an important milestone (EC (2011a)). Furthermore, in the
EU Energy Roadmap, possible decarbonization pathways to reach the 2050 target were
analyzed. All decarbonization pathways outlined in the Roadmap include substantial
deployments of renewable energies within the coming decades, reaching RES-E shares
between 50% and 60% in 2030 (EC (2011b)).
In this paper, we analyze the benefits of a larger use of cooperation mechanisms beyond
2020, compared to effects of continuing with national RES support as currently envis-
aged by almost all member states for the period up to 2020. We focus on the electricity
sector and use a large-scale linear optimization model of the European power system,
including investment and dispatch decisions for thermal, renewable and storage tech-
nologies. This modeling approach allows us to take into account the interdependencies
between regional renewable deployment and its effects on the power system. On the
one hand, cooperation may possibly lead to higher RES-E integration costs because of a
higher regional concentration of RES-E generation on sites with favorable meteorological
conditions, which, however, are often located far from demand centers. On the other
hand, in electricity systems with grid congestions between market regions, cooperation
may possibly also induce cost-savings in the non-RES-E sector. In this case, coopera-
tion in RES-E support enables an overall optimization of electricity generation, including
renewable and non-renewable sources. Furthermore, we analyze the robustness of coop-
eration gains with regard to interconnector capacity extensions and RES-E investment
cost developments, which has thus far been neglected in almost all numerical analy-
ses of cooperation gains. Interconnector extensions in Europe currently progress very
slowly (EWI and energynautics (2011)). If planned interconnector extensions are not
realized, gains from cooperation may be lower since electricity cannot be transported
from favorable sites to demand centers. Also, cooperation gains may be sensitive to
RES-E investment cost developments, especially in terms of the resulting cost-difference
between RES-E technologies available in all countries (e.g., biomass, photovoltaics) and
those renewable energy sources that are regionally concentrated (e.g., wind offshore).
Our main findings include that compared to a CO2 -only target for 2030 (-40% compared
to 1990 emission levels), electricity system costs increase by 5 to 7% when a European-
wide renewable energy target for electricity generation (of around 55%) is additionally
implemented. However, these additional costs are 41 to 45% lower than the additional
electricity system costs which would arise if the renewable energy target was reached
through national support systems (without cooperation). Furthermore, we find that the
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cooperation gains (i.e., the cost reduction achieved by cooperation) are quite robust.
Though the optimal regional and technological generation mix is influenced by different
levels of interconnector extensions and varying investment costs for RES-E technologies,
cooperation gains decrease only slightly when interconnectors are not further extended
(compared to today) and depend only slightly on assumptions on investment cost devel-
opments of renewable energy technologies. With regard to the practical implementation
of cooperation, however, unclear administrative issues and questions concerning the fair
sharing of costs and benefits between the member states represent major obstacles that
need to be tackled in order to reach renewable energy targets at the lowest possible cost.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2.2 we provide an
overview of related literature. In Section 2.3 we describe the methodological approach
of our analysis and present the most important assumptions underlying the scenario
analysis. Section 2.4 covers model results and interpretations. In Section 2.5 we ad-
dress possible obstacles to cooperation, which need to be tackled in order to increase
cooperation between member states. Conclusions are drawn in Section 2.6.
2.2 Related literature and contribution of the current work
The discussion surrounding stronger cooperation in renewable energy support in Europe
has a history spanning more than a decade. Already in the context of the 2001 EU
Renewables Directive (2001/77/EC), which defines (indicative) renewable targets for
2010, have many authors discussed the potential benefits of European-wide harmonized
support systems (e.g., Voogt et al. (2001) and Del R´ıo (2005)) or the suitability of
different support scheme designs for a harmonized approach (e.g., Lauber (2004), Munoz
et al. (2007) and So¨derholm (2008)). For the target year 2020, possible gains from
harmonization have been quantified, e.g., by Ragwitz et al. (2007), EWI (2010), Capros
et al. (2011), Aune et al. (2012) and Ja¨gemann et al. (2013). Although the authors use
different model types, which in turn have different regional and technological coverage,
all authors find that cooperation in RES may yield substantial cost savings. An overview
of the models used for these analyses and the quantified cooperation gains is provided
in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1: Overview of related literature
Authors Model used Cooperation gains
are quantified in
terms of:
Resulting coopera-
tion gains
Voogt et al. (2001) REBUS additional costs of
RES-E supply
- 15 to - 70% (de-
pending on target
distribution)
Ragwitz et al. (2007) Green-X support expendi-
tures for RES-E
(EUR/MWh)
- 33 to - 37% or up to
+ 12% (depending on
support design)
EWI (2010) LORELEI total costs of RES-E
generation
-20% (cumulated
2008-2020)
& DIME
Capros et al. (2011) PRIMES total energy system
costs
-16 to -25% (depend-
ing on other policy
options, e.g., the
implementation of
CDM)
Aune et al. (2012) LIBEMOD additional energy
system costs (due to
RES target)
-70% (yearly costs)
Ja¨gemann et al.
(2013)
DIMENSION total costs of electric-
ity generation
- 10% (cumulated
2010-2050)
While Voogt et al. (2001) quantify the benefits of a EU-wide cooperation for the achieve-
ment of the 2010 RES-E targets, all other papers analyze cooperation gains in the context
of the 2020 targets. Voogt et al. (2001) and EWI (2010) analyze cooperation gains in
terms of cost savings for electricity supply from RES, either in terms of absolute costs
(EWI (2010)) or in terms of additional costs with regard to electricity market prices
(Voogt et al. (2001)). In contrast, Ragwitz et al. (2007) compare support expenditures
for RES-E under different promotion systems. Capros et al. (2011) and Aune et al.
(2012) apply multi-market models and determine cost savings in terms of energy system
costs, including electricity supply costs as well as costs in other energy markets (e.g.,
natural gas). Ja¨gemann et al. (2013) use a large-scale dynamic optimization model of
the European electricity generation sector, which covers thermal, renewable and stor-
age technologies. The authors determine the excess costs of technology-specific national
RES-E targets for 2020, as defined in the NREAPs, compared to a technology-neutral
European-wide RES-E target for 2020.
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We use the same general modeling framework as Ja¨gemann et al. (2013) to determine
the benefits of European cooperation in the decade 2021 to 2030 and to analyze the
robustness of cooperation gains with regard to interconnector extensions and RES-E
investment costs. Cooperation gains in the decade 2021 to 2030, a period that is cur-
rently in the focus of the political debate, have thus far hardly been analyzed. To our
knowledge, only one other analysis of cooperation gains arising in the period post 2020
has been published. The study conducted by Booze & Company et al. (2013) mainly
deals with the effects of larger European electricity and gas market integration in gen-
eral. In addition, Booze & Company et al. (2013) calculate the cost savings achieved by
a reallocation of photovoltaic and wind capacities (that are installed in the year 2030 in
a scenario taken from the EU Energy Roadmap (EC (2011b))) to regions where higher
load factors can be achieved.6 In their analysis, generation levels taken from the EU
Roadmap scenario are held constant when reallocating the photovoltaic and wind capac-
ities. A cost reduction is achieved, because less capacities are required to generate the
same amount of wind-based and photovoltaic-based electricity (compared to the original
allocation of capacities). In contrast, our approach of optimizing investment and dis-
patch decisions of power plants, both in the cases with and without cooperation, takes
into account that not only a different regional allocation but also a different technological
generation mix may be optimal when European-wide cooperation is possible.
In addition, the influence of different interconnector capacity restrictions and of different
RES-E investment cost developments on possible gains from cooperation has thus far
been neglected in almost all numerical analyses of cooperation gains. To our knowledge,
only Booze & Company et al. (2013) indicate a range of cost savings from using favor-
able renewable energy production sites in Europe, depending on different photovoltaic
costs.7 Moreover, the influence of limited interconnector extensions on coordinated RES-
E supply has recently been addressed in a theoretical two-country model by Laffont and
Sand-Zantman (2012). Their key finding is that the optimal level of coordination in
RES-E support depends on the level of transmission capacity between the two coun-
tries. Moreover, Saguan and Meeus (2012) analyze the interaction between cooperation
in renewable energy support and cooperation in transmission planning in a two-region
6Note also that Booze & Company et al. (2013) refer to a Siemens AG presentation in which cost
savings from a reallocation of wind and photovoltaics capacities in the period 2012-2030 are shown.
However, no further information on the applied methodology or the assumed input parameters is provided
in this presentation.
7In the analysis of Booze & Company et al. (2013), the level of photovoltaic investment costs influences
the magnitude of the cost savings, because it determines the value of the photovotaic capacities which
can be reduced through reallocation. In contrast, in our analysis, different investment cost assumptions
influence the optimal generation and capacity levels of various renewable energy technologies (both in
the cases with and without cooperation).
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modeling example. However, for a real-world electricity system, the influence of inter-
connector extensions on the level of cooperation gains, to our knowledge, has not yet
been quantified.
2.3 Methodological approach and assumptions
We use a dynamic linear dispatch and investment model for Europe incorporating ther-
mal, storage and renewable technologies. The model is an extended version of the long-
term investment and dispatch model DIMENSION of the Institute of Energy Economics
(University of Cologne), as presented in Richter (2011). The model in its extended ver-
sion has been recently applied, e.g., by Fu¨rsch et al. (2013a) (who provide a detailed
model description).8 In the following, we briefly summarize the main model characteris-
tics (Section 2.3.1) and give an overview of the input parameters chosen for the analysis
presented (Section 2.3.2).
2.3.1 Model description
The model minimizes total discounted system costs of the European electricity system.
These costs comprise investment, fixed operation and maintenance, variable production
and ramping costs.9 Costs are minimized subject to the conditions of meeting hourly
electricity demand in each market region and of ensuring security of supply. For the
latter condition, securely available generation capacities must be sufficient to cover peak
demand (increased by a security margin). In addition, European-wide CO2 emissions
are limited by an emission cap. RES-E targets must be met either on a national or on
a EU-wide level, depending on the scenario. Furthermore, the electricity infeed and/or
the amount of construction of certain technologies is restricted due to meteorological
conditions (such as wind speed, solar radiation and water inflows to hydro reservoirs),
space potentials (e.g., for wind parks), fuel potentials (e.g., for biomass or lignite) or
political restrictions (such as nuclear phase-out plans). Curtailment of renewable energy
infeed is endogenously chosen by the model as long as this option reduces system costs
(e.g., because ramping costs can be avoided). Electricity import and export streams
are limited by exogenously defined net transfer capacity values between market regions.
8The DIMENSION model is based on the DIME model of the Institute of Energy Economics (Bartels
(2009)). DIME has been applied, e.g., by Nagl et al. (2011b), Paulus and Borggrefe (2011), Grave et al.
(2012) and Fu¨rsch et al. (2012). The extended version of the DIMENSION model, as presented in
Fu¨rsch et al. (2013a), includes most elements of the renewable energy investment model LORELEI
(Wissen (2011)).
9In contrast, combined heat and power plants can earn incomes from the heat market, which are
deducted from the objective value. Thus, the objective value only includes costs induced by the supply
of electricity.
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Within market regions, grid copper plates are assumed. Further model elements are
described in Richter (2011).
Within this analysis, we model all member states of the European Union (with the excep-
tion of Malta and Cyprus), Switzerland and Norway. Different wind and solar conditions
throughout Europe are captured by modeling 47 wind onshore regions, 42 wind offshore
regions and 38 photovotaic regions, which are determined according to meteorological
data (EuroWind (2011)).10 The different hourly, daily and seasonal characteristics of
renewable infeed and electricity demand are captured by modeling four typical days per
model year.
The model incorporates thermal, renewable and storage technologies. The existing Eu-
ropean power plant fleet is represented by different vintage classes, which account for
different technical properties such as conversion efficiencies. Thermal power plants can
be equipped with combined-heat-power-technology (CHP) and/or carbon-capture-and-
storage (CCS) (from 2030 onwards). We assume that, before 2025, only nuclear plants
already under construction today can be commissioned. However, existing plants can be
retrofitted to increase plant lifetime by 10 years. Endogenous storage investments are
only possible for compressed-air-storage technology (CAES), as pump storage and hy-
dro storage potentials are already largely used and further investments are often difficult
due to environmental concerns. Renewable technologies covered by the model include
photovoltaics (base and roof), concentrated solar power (CSP), onshore wind, offshore
wind (deep and shallow water), biomass (solid and gas), hydro (run-of-river and storage)
and geothermal power. In addition, different wind turbine classes, available at different
points in time, are modeled to represent technological progress (see Wissen (2011) and
EWI and energynautics (2011)).
2.3.2 Assumptions
Table 2.2 depicts the assumed final electricity demand development per country up
to 2030. Up until 2020, the demand development is based on the ‘additional energy
efficiency’ scenario of the NREAPs (Beurskens et al. (2011)).11 For the development
after 2030, electricity demand growth rates are based on EWI and energynautics (2011).
In addition, the potential heat generation in CHP plants per country is depicted (based
on EURELECTRIC (2008) and Capros et al. (2010); see also EWI and energynautics
(2011)).
10For an overview of these regions, see EWI and energynautics (2011).
11For Norway and Switzerland, which do not have a NREAP, electricity demand growth rates based
on EWI and energynautics (2011) have been applied.
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Table 2.2: Final electricity demand [TWhel] and potential heat generation in CHP
plants [TWhth]
2010 2020 2030
Austria (AT) 66 (40.7) 74 (41.2) 80 (41.5)
Belgium (BE) 97 (14.5) 111 (14.7) 119 (14.8)
Bulgaria (BG) 36 (6.8) 37 (6.9) 41 (7.0)
Czech Republic (CZ) 70 (54.0) 84 (55.1) 95 (55.7)
Denmark (DK) 36 (54.0) 38 (54.7) 43 (55.1)
Estonia (EE) 10 (1.4) 11 (1.4) 12 (1.4)
Finland (FI) 88 (64.4) 102 (65.2) 109 (65.7)
France (FR) 533 (31.2) 546 (31.6) 585 (31.8)
Germany (DE) 604 (191.0) 562 (192.4) 562 (192.9)
Greece (GR) 59 (17.1) 68 (17.4) 79 (17.7)
Hungary (HU) 43 (13.9) 51 (14.2) 58 (14.4)
Ireland (IE) 29 (3.2) 33 (3.2) 35 (3.3)
Italy (IT) 357 (166.1) 375 (169.2) 433 (171.7)
Latvia (LV) 7 (6.4) 9 (6.5) 10 (6.6)
Lithuania (LT) 7 (4.7) 9 (4.8) 10 (4.9)
Luxembourg (LU) 6 (0.9) 7 (0.9) 7 (0.9)
Netherlands (NL) 124 (112.8) 136 (114.3) 146 (115.1)
Norway (NO) 104 (3.6) 119 (3.6) 127 (3.6)
Poland (PL) 141 (91.5) 170 (93.3) 191 (94.4)
Portugal (PT) 55 (13.6) 65 (13.9) 75 (14.1)
Romania (RO) 62 (91.5) 74 (93.3) 83 (94.4)
Slovakia (SK) 29 (16.7) 33 (17.0) 38 (17.2)
Slovenia (SL) 14 (1.2) 16 (1.2) 18 (1.2)
Spain (ES) 291 (57.9) 375 (59.0) 433 (59.9)
Sweden (SE) 152 (28.9) 155 (29.3) 166 (29.5)
Switzerland (CH) 59 (0.7) 67 (0.7) 72 (0.7)
United Kingdom (UK) 369 (67.2) 377 (68.1) 404 (68.6)
Table 2.3 depicts the investment cost development up to 2030. Assumptions are based
on EWI and energynautics (2011) with the exception of photovoltaic investment costs,
which have been adapted in order to account for recent cost degressions (BSW (2011)).
Furthermore, investment costs for concentrating solar plants have been adapted accord-
ing to data from IRENA (2012), Turchi et al. (2010) and Hinkley et al. (2011).
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Table 2.3: Investment costs [EUR2010/kW ]
2020 2030 2020 2030
Nuclear 3,157 3,157 Biomass gas 2,398 2,395
Nuclear Retrofit 300 300 Biomass gas - CHP 2,597 2595
Hard Coal 1,500 1,500 Biomass solid 3,297 3,293
Hard Coal - innov. 2,250 1,875 Biomass solid - CHP 3,497 3,493
Hard Coal - CCS - 2,000 Geothermal (hot dry rock) 10,504 9,500
Hard Coal - innov. CCS - 2,475 Geothermal (high enthalpy) 1,050 950
Hard Coal - innov. CHP 2,650 2,275 PV ground 1,440 990
Hard Coal - innov. CHP & CCS - 2,875 PV roof 1,600 1,100
Lignite 1,850 1,850 Concentrated solar power 3,423 2,926
Lignite - innov. 1,950 1,950 Wind onshore 6 MW 1,221 -
Lignite - innov. CCS - 2,550 Wind onshore 8 MW - 1,161
OCGT 700 700 Wind offshore 5 MW (shallow) 2,615 -
CCGT 1,250 1,250 Wind offshore 8 MW (shallow) - 2,512
CCGT - CCS - 1,550 Wind offshore 5 MW (deep) 3,105 -
CCGT - CHP 1,500 1,500 Wind offshore 8 MW (deep) - 2956
CCGT - CHP & CCS - 1,700
Pump storage - -
Hydro storage - -
CAES 850 850
Table 2.4 shows the conversion efficiencies, CO2 emission factors, technical availability,
operational and maintenance costs and the technical lifetime for conventional plants
(taken from EWI and energynautics (2011)).
Table 2.4: Economic-technical parameters for conventional and storage technologies
Technologies η(gen) η(load) CO2 factor avail FOM costs Lifetime
[%] [%] [t CO2 /MWhth] [%] [EUR2010/kW ] [a]
Nuclear 33.0 - 0.0 84.50 96.6 60
Hard Coal 46.0 - 0.335 83.75 36.1 45
Hard Coal - innov. 50.0 - 0.335 83.75 36.1 45
Hard Coal - CCS 42.0 - 0.034 83.75 97.0 45
Hard Coal - innov. CCS 45.0 - 0.034 83.75 97.0 45
Hard Coal - CHP 22.5 - 0.335 83.75 55.1 45
Hard Coal - CHP & CCS 18.5 - 0.034 83.75 110.0 45
Lignite 43.0 - 0.406 86.25 43.1 45
Lignite - innov. 46.5 - 0.406 86.25 43.1 45
Lignite - innov. CCS 43.0 - 0.041 86.25 103.0 45
OCGT 40.0 - 0.201 84.50 17.0 25
CCGT 60.0 - 0.201 84.50 28.2 30
CCGT - CHP 36.0 - 0.201 84.50 40.0 30
CCGT - CCS 53.0 - 0.020 84.50 88.2 30
CCGT - CHP & CCS 33.0 - 0.020 84.50 100.0 30
Pump storage 87.0 83.0 0.0 95.00 11.5 100
Hydro storage 87.0 - 0.0 90.00 11.5 100
CAES 86.0 81.0 0.0 95.00 9.2 40
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Table 2.5 reports technological and economic characteristics for renewable energy tech-
nologies (taken from EWI and energynautics (2011)). The availabilities of fluctuating
renewable energy technologies vary on an hourly level and between the different meteo-
rological regions throughout Europe, and are thus not able to be depicted in Table 2.5.
The secured capacity corresponds to the share of capacity that can be assumed to be
securely available at peak demand (see EWI and energynautics (2011)).
Table 2.5: Economic-technical parameters for renewable technologies
Technologies Efficiency Availability Secured capacity FOM costs Lifetime
[%] [%] [%] [EUR2010/kW ] [a]
Biomass gas 40.0 85 85 120 30
Biomass gas - CHP 30.0 85 85 130 30
Biomass solid 30.0 85 85 165 30
Biomass solid - CHP 22.5 85 85 175 30
Geothermal (HDR) 22.5 85 85 300 30
Geothermal 22.5 85 85 30 30
PV ground - - 0 15 25
PV roof - - 0 17 25
Concentrated solar power - - 40 120 25
Wind offshore 6MW (deep) - - 5 152 25
Wind offshore 8MW (deep) - - 5 160 25
Wind offshore 6MW (shallow) - - 5 128 25
Wind offshore 8MW (shallow) - - 5 136 25
Wind onshore 6MW - - 5 41 25
Wind onshore 8MW - - 5 41 25
Run-of-river hydropower - - 50 11.5 100
Table 2.6 depicts the assumed fuel price development up to 2030. Assumptions are
based on IEA (2011) and EWI and energynautics (2011). The CO2 price is determined
endogenously in the model by imposing a CO2 emission reduction (in the power sector)
of 20% (40%) compared to 1990 levels by 2020 (2030).
Table 2.6: Fuel costs in EUR2010/MWhth
2008 2020 2030
Nuclear 3.6 3.3 3.3
Coal 17.28 12.5 12.8
Lignite 1.4 1.4 1.4
Natural gas 25.2 28.1 28.3
Biomass (solid) 15.0-27.7 15.7-34.9 16.7-35.1
Biomass (gas) 0.1-70.0 0.1-67.2 0.1-72.9
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2.4 Scenario Analysis
2.4.1 Scenario definition
We compare the costs of achieving a European RES-E share of 55% by 2030 using na-
tional RES-E support to the costs of achieving the target under EU-wide cooperation.12
The RES-E share of 55% was chosen in line with the decarbonization pathways of the EU
Roadmap, including RES-E shares between 50% and 60% in 2030 (see Section 2.1). Both
national and EU-wide coordinated RES-E support is modeled as a technology-neutral
support, implying that technologies with lowest costs are chosen first - either on a na-
tional or on an EU-wide level. Moreover, in both cases, the technology-specific national
NREAP targets are reached in 2020 (see Beurskens et al. (2011) for an overview), whereas
possible gains from cooperation only refer to the subsequent timeframe 2021-2030. We
analyze possible gains from EU-wide cooperation in RES-E support for different national
target settings as well as for different assumptions regarding interconnector extensions
and RES-E investment cost developments. The setting of the national targets is cru-
cial in determining the magnitude of the cooperation gains as the distribution of the
targets dictates the reference costs against which the cooperation gains are calculated.
The availability of interconnector capacities restricts the use of favorable RES-E sites in
regions with low electricity demand and thus presumably also influences the magnitude
of the cooperation gains. Similary, the development of RES-E investment costs pre-
sumably influences the magnitude of the cooperation gains because cost differences vary
between the generation options available in all countries and those that are regionally
concentrated. Table 2.7 provides an overview of the modeled scenarios.
Table 2.7: Overview of modeled scenarios
Energy Economic Assumptions
Reference Without lower wind lower
TYNDP offshore costs phovoltaic costs
Target Setting Equal Share
Extrapolation national RES-E support vs. EU-wide cooperation
Flatrate Growth
With regard to the setting of national targets, we model the following cases:
• ‘Equal share’: Each member state must increase its RES-E share up to 55% by
2030.
12As the electricity systems of Switzerland and Norway are embedded in the European power system,
these two countries are included in the calculation even though the countries are not part of the EU. Nor-
way and Switzerland can therefore contribute in reaching the common RES-E target in the cooperation
case. However, we assume that, regardless of the national target setting for the EU member states, the
targets for Switzerland and Norway remain close to today´s RES-E shares, which significantly exceed
the EU average.
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• ‘Extrapolation’: The RES-E deployment of each country, as stated by its NREAP
2020 target, is extrapolated to 2030.13
• ‘Flatrate growth’: Each member state must increase its 2020 RES-E share by 20
percentage points by 2030.
The different settings of national targets cover a broad range of possible effort sharing
agreements. The ‘Equal share’ target setting results in a large effort for countries that
have low RES-E shares in 2020, while other countries (such as Sweden and Austria)
already exceed the 55% share in 2020 and thus would not require a further increase
in their share. In the ‘Extrapolation’ case, the greatest effort is demanded from those
countries which also made the greatest effort in the 2010-2020 decade. However, these
are mostly countries with a high GDP per capita and/or favorable RES-E potentials, as
these components were used to determine the 2020 target distribution. The ‘Flatrate
growth’ target setting poses the same burden on all countries as far as the percentage
increase is concerned. However, also in this case, the slope of the RES-E merit order
curve and the demand development in each country essentially determine the burden
imposed by the national targets. An overview of the assumed national RES-E targets
can be found in Appendix A.14
With regard to interconnector extensions and RES-E investment cost developments,
we model the following reference case and sensitivity analyses:
• ‘Reference’: Interconnectors are extended according to ENTSO-E´s Ten-Year-
Network-Development-Plan (TYNDP, see ENTSO-E (2010)). Assumed invest-
ment costs for RES-E correspond to those depicted in Table 2.3.
• ‘w/o TYNDP’: Interconnectors are not extended. Net transfer capacities (NTC)
remain at today´s level. All other assumptions are identical to the ‘Reference’
case.
• ‘Lower Offshore Wind Costs’: Investment costs for offshore plants are 10% lower
than depicted in Table 2.3. All other assumptions are identical to the ‘Reference’
case.
13Note that in order to ensure that a EU-wide target of around 55% is reached by all national target
settings the ‘Extrapolation’ case includes a flatrate increase of 5 percentage points in each country in
addition to the extrapolation.
14Note that we assume a linear pathway for achieving the 2030 targets and thus also set 2025 RES-E
(and CO2 ) targets. These 2025 targets are determined as a linear interpolation between the 2020 and
the 2030 targets.
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• ‘Lower Photovoltaic Costs’: Investment costs for photovotaic systems are 10%
lower than depicted in Table 2.3. All other assumptions are identical to the ‘Ref-
erence’ case.
We model sensitivities with regard to interconnector extensions and to offshore wind
and photovoltaic investment costs for two reasons: First, both network extensions and
cost degressions of renewables are subject to high uncertainty - either because, e.g., op-
position from the local population often leads to delays of planned network extensions or
because technological progress is uncertain. Second, both aspects potentially have a high
influence on the extent of cooperation gains. Lower interconnector capacities presum-
ably lead to lower gains from cooperation because the best RES-E sites in Europe can
be used to a lesser extent. In contrast, lower costs of offshore wind presumably increase
the benefit from cooperation, as favorable potentials for offshore wind are regionally
concentrated in Northern Europe and can be used to a larger extent in a cooperative
European support system. The benefit of using these resources further increases if in-
vestment costs of offshore plants are low. Lower investment costs for photovoltaic, on
the one hand, may similarly increase the benefit from cooperation due to the increased
opportunity of using sites with high solar radiation in the Mediterranean region. On the
other hand, potentials (however not necessarily favorable ones) for photovoltaic systems
exist in all countries, such that this generation option may be used to a larger extent
under a national target scheme. Thus, given lower photovoltaic costs, the achievement
of national targets may be less costly.
In the following, we present results for the reference case (Section 2.4.2) and discuss
the influence of interconnector extensions and RES-E investment cost developments on
potential cooperation gains (Section 2.4.3 and Section 2.4.4, respectively).
2.4.2 Results - Reference case
Table 2.8 depicts differences between the national and the EU-wide RES-E support
scenarios in 2030 in terms of European electricity generation and European generation
capacities. Regardless of the national target setting (Equal Share, Extrapolation or
Flatrate Growth), generation from coal plants, photovoltaic systems and biomass plants
is higher when RES-E targets are achieved on a national level, while generation from
nuclear plants as well as from on- and offshore wind plants is higher when RES-E support
is coordinated on the European level. Capacity differences reflect varying technological
and regional generation patterns under national and cooperative RES-E support. On
average, photovoltaic systems and wind plants (onshore and offshore) have lower energy
outputs in the national support scenarios, because sites with comparatively low solar
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radiation and low wind speeds are also used in achieving national targets. Thus, e.g.,
onshore wind capacities in the ‘Equal Share’ and the ‘Flatrate Growth’ scenarios are
lower when RES-E support is coordinated, although wind onshore generation is higher.
In the following differences between the generation and capacity levels under national
and cooperative support are discussed in more detail.
Table 2.8: Differences in European electricity generation [TWh] and generation ca-
pacities [GW] between national support and cooperation in 2030 (Reference)
Generation [TWh]
Equal Share Extrapolation Flatrate Growth
national coop. diff. national coop. diff. national coop. diff.
Nuclear 866 968 -102 978 1011 -34 947 1000 -54
Lignite 370 362 7 366 367 -1 369 366 4
Coal 480 399 81 473 427 46 439 413 26
Gas 48 56 -8 42 67 -25 63 61 3
Oil 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Storage 78 87 -9 84 81 3 78 85 -7
Hydro 551 552 0 552 552 0 552 552 0
Biomass 208 174 34 178 170 8 186 172 14
Wind onshore 706 711 -5 689 705 -16 704 707 -3
Wind offshore 299 359 -61 299 335 -37 244 345 -101
PV 370 325 45 324 270 54 393 291 102
CSP 49 47 1 49 48 0 49 47 1
Geothermal 94 94 0 94 93 1 94 94 1
Others 56 56 0 56 56 0 56 56 0
Capacity [GW]
Equal Share Extrapolation Flatrate Growth
national coop. diff. national coop. diff. national coop. diff.
Nuclear 141 151 -10 149 154 -5 147 153 -6
Lignite 57 56 2 56 57 -1 57 56 1
Coal 73 65 8 73 66 7 69 65 3
Gas 147 147 -1 147 147 0 151 147 4
Oil 5 5 0 5 5 0 5 5 0
Storage 78 82 -3 78 76 2 74 79 -4
Hydro 154 155 -1 155 155 0 155 155 0
Biomass 29 24 5 25 24 1 26 24 2
Wind onshore 315 311 4 301 308 -6 310 309 2
Wind offshore 89 91 -2 82 85 -3 69 87 -19
PV 311 251 60 273 205 68 330 223 108
CSP 11 11 0 11 11 0 11 11 0
Geothermal 13 13 0 13 13 0 13 13 0
Others 11 11 0 11 11 0 11 11 0
Generation from photovoltaic systems, biomass plants and coal plants is higher in the
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national support scenarios. The reason for higher photovoltaic generation is a higher gen-
eration at sites with low solar radiation (e.g, in Belgium, Germany and even in Sweden
when a national target of 83% must be reached in the ‘Flatrate Growth’ scenario) which
overcompensates for lower generation at sites with high solar radiation (e.g., in Spain
and Portugal), which are used to a higher extent in the cooperative support scenarios.
Higher biomass generation in the national support scenarios can be mainly attributed to
additional generation in Finland and in the Equal Share scenario also to higher biomass
generation in Hungary and Italy. Higher coal generation in the national support sce-
narios essentially replaces nuclear generation. Generation from nuclear plants is lower
on a European level because, in the national support scenarios, RES-E generation in
countries with existing nuclear plants or political plans to construct nuclear plants (FR,
BG, CZ, PL, SK, RO) is usually higher than in the cooperative scenarios. Due to limited
interconnector capacities - despite extensions according to the TYNDP - high nuclear
in addition to high RES-E generation would exceed regional demand and export pos-
sibilites in these countries. The largest difference between nuclear and coal generation
occurs when each country is required to reach a 55% RES-E share (‘Equal Share’). This
target distribution leads to the highest RES-E generation in France, which impedes the
use of French nuclear plants. Generation from wind plants, especially from offshore
wind plants, is substantially higher in the scenarios with cooperative RES-E support
because wind generation at sites with high wind speeds is associated with comparatively
low generation costs. Additional offshore generation in the cooperative (compared to
the national) support scenarios mainly comes from Skandinavia, the Netherlands and
Ireland. However, offshore generation in the national support scenarios is higher in Ger-
many and, depending on the national target setting, in France and the United Kingdom.
In addition, total RES-E generation is higher in the national support scenarios because
RES-E generation exceeds national targets in countries with favorable meteorological
conditions for wind- or solar-based electricity generation and low national targets com-
pared to their RES-E potential (e.g., in Portugal and Ireland). This additional RES-E
generation contributes to a cost-efficient achievement of the CO2 emission reduction tar-
get. In the cooperative support scenarios, RES-E generation from these favorable sites
replaces RES-E generation in other regions and the CO2 emission reduction target is
achieved by a higher generation from nuclear plants.
Additional results of the cost-efficient regional RES-E deployment in the cooperative
support scenarios and the respective deviations in the national support scenarios are
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provided in Table 2.9.15 The table depicts the RES-E generation per country, depend-
ing on the different settings of national targets, both for the national and for the co-
operative support scenarios. In Table 2.9, only about half of the countries modeled are
depicted. The countries listed are those countries which yield the greatest deviation
in RES-E generation from their national targets, when a European-wide cooperation is
implemented.
Table 2.9: RES-E generation in national and cooperative support scenarios in 2030
in selected countries [TWh]
Equal Share Extrapolation Flatrate Growth
national coop. diff. national coop. diff. national coop. diff.
Group A
Belgium 53 32 21 50 32 18 49 32 17
Finland 60 38 22 49 34 15 58 34 24
Germany 309 258 51 364 256 108 329 258 72
Group B
France 322 265 57 254 252 3 275 254 21
Czech Republic 52 24 28 25 23 1 33 24 8
Greece 43 46 -2 56 42 14 47 44 3
Poland 105 68 37 68 68 0 75 68 7
Sweden 105 110 -5 126 110 16 137 110 27
United Kingdom 222 210 13 234 199 36 206 205 1
Group C
Ireland 23 47 -23 27 46 -19 30 47 -17
Netherlands 80 121 -41 103 121 -18 83 121 -38
Norway 127 204 -77 127 193 -65 127 195 -68
Portugal 43 70 -27 55 65 -10 56 65 -9
Spain 238 297 -59 244 295 -51 260 297 -37
Group D
Italy 238 198 40 169 180 -11 201 189 12
The countries depicted have been clustered into four groups: Countries in the ‘A’ group
are characterized by higher RES-E generation in the national support scenarios com-
pared to the cooperative support scenarios, regardless of the national target setting.
Countries in the ‘B’ group are also characterized by a higher RES-E generation in the
national support scenarios under most scenario settings; however, for at least one target
setting, hardly a deviation from the cost-efficient generation in the cooperative support
scenarios occurs. In countries, belonging to the ‘C’ group, RES-E generation in the
15Note that we use the term ‘cost efficient’ in the context of a European-wide RES-E target - with a
CO2 emission reduction target only, a smaller share of RES-E would be cost-efficient. In our scenario
settings, a European RES-E share of 46% is achieved in 2030 if no additional RES-E target is modeled
after 2020. However, this share also includes RES-E generation from plants that were built in order to
achieve the NREAP in 2020.
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national support scenarios is always lower than in the cooperative support scenarios.
These countries are characterized by high wind speeds or high solar radiation. Italy (‘D’
group) is a special case because, depending on the target setting, RES-E generation in
the national support scenarios is either significantly lower or significantly higher than in
the cooperative support scenarios.
As a result of the suboptimal regional and technological RES-E generation in the national
support scenarios (compared to the cooperative support scenarios), the costs of achieving
a RES-E share of 55 % by 2030 are significanty higher in the national support scenarios.
Table 2.10 shows the additional electricity system costs in the decade 2021-2030 that are
induced by national and EU-wide 2030 RES-E targets as opposed to a 2030 CO2 target
only (-40% compared to 1990 levels). Moreover, the resulting gains from cooperation
are shown, expressed as the difference in additional costs of the 2030 RES-E target
(compared to the CO2 target only) with national and with cooperative support. All
costs are cumulated from 2021 to 2030 and discounted by 5% (to the base year 2020).
Table 2.10: Additional costs induced by the 2030 RES-E target and cooperation gains
(2021-2030)
Equal Extra- Flatrate
Share polation Growth
Additional costs of 2030 RES-E target - national
support (bn. EUR2010)
166 125 133
Additional costs of 2030 RES-E target - coopera-
tive support (bn. EUR2010)
93 68 79
Gains from cooperation (bn. EUR2010) 73 57 54
Gains from cooperation (%) 44 45 41
Additional electricity system costs induced by the 2030 RES-E target vary between 68
and 93 bn. EUR2010 if the RES-E target is cost-efficiently reached by using efficient
technologies and sites throughout Europe. The cost differences between the different
cooperative support scenarios result from slightly different 2030 RES-E shares. The ‘Ex-
trapolation’ and the ‘Flatrate Growth’ target distribution result in a European RES-E
target of approximately 55 % (54.5% and 55.4%, respectively). The ‘Equal Share’ target
distribution results in a higher European RES-E target (56.8%) because some countries
already exceed the 55% share in their 2020 NREAP targets. However, it becomes clear
that, given our assumptions, the European RES-E merit order curve is relatively steep
given RES-E shares of approximately 55%: While the RES-E share in the ‘Flatrate
Growth’ scenario is 0.9 percentage points higher than in the ‘Extrapolation’ scenario
(corresponding to 1.6% higher RES-E generation), additional costs of achieving the 2030
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RES-E target increase by 16%.16 Comparing the additional electricity system costs of
the 2030 RES-E target of the national versus the cooperative support scenarios, gains
from cooperation amount to 54-73 bn. EUR2010. In other words, the additional costs
induced by the (national) RES-E targets can be reduced by 41 to 45 % when the best
sites throughout Europe can be used. It is important to note that these cost differ-
ences refer to electricity system costs and not only to the costs of RES-E production.
For example, more regionally concentrated RES-E generation in the cooperative sup-
port scenarios may increase the need for system flexibility. In the Equal Share and the
Flatrate Growth target setting scenarios, it can be seen that more storage units are de-
ployed given cooperative rather than national support. The gains from cooperation thus
already include the indirect costs of RES-E support, i.e., the costs of RES-E integration
in terms of flexibility and security of supply requirements.17 Note also that, as described
above, not exactly the same RES-E quantities are reached under national and cooper-
ative support. Some countries surpass their targets in the national support scenarios
and thereby contribute to the achievement of the European CO2 emission reduction
target.18 The gains from cooperation thus include both the cost advantage of using best
sites throughout Europe to achieve the European RES-E target and the advantage of
using low-cost emission reduction possibilities in the overall electricity sector to achieve
the European CO2 target.
2.4.3 The influence of interconnector extensions on cooperation gains
Table 2.11 depicts the difference in generation between national support and coopera-
tive support scenarios in 2030, both when interconnectors are extended according to the
TYNDP (left columns, see also Table 2.8) and when interconnectors are not extended
(right columns). The overall picture is similar for the scenarios with and without inter-
connector extensions: In the national support scenarios, generation from photovoltaic
systems and fossil-fuel power plants is higher, whereas in the cooperative support sce-
narios, generation from nuclear and wind plants is higher. However, the absence of
interconnector extensions has two major consequences: First, lower import and export
possibilities impede the use of low-cost electricity generation options throughout Europe.
16Similarly, while the RES-E share in the ‘Equal Share’ scenario is 1.4 percentage points higher than
in the ‘Flatrate Growth’ scenario (corresponding to 2.5% higher RES-E generation), additional costs of
the 2030 RES-E target increase by 18%.
17In contrast, costs of the electricity grid are not included in the calculation. However, Fu¨rsch et al.
(2013a) show that substantial extensions of the transmission grid are beneficial in order to access favor-
able RES-E sites and that the induced grid extension costs are rather small compared to cost differences
occurring in the generation system.
18RES-E generation in 2030 is around 1% higher for national compared to cooperative support. In
2025, differences amount to around 5%.
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This includes renewable generation options (i.e., offshore wind) and non-renewable gener-
ation options (i.e., existing nuclear and lignite). Second, lower interconnector capacities
limit the possibility to balance regional demands and fluctuating RES-E infeed. Thus,
the requirement for flexible generation or demand on a national level increases.
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Table 2.11: Differences in European electricity generation [TWh] between national
and cooperative support scenarios in 2030 (with and without TYNDP)
TYNDP w/o TYNDP
national cooperative difference national cooperative difference
Equal Share
Nuclear 866 968 -102 755 890 -135
Lignite 370 362 7 362 357 5
Coal 480 399 81 451 421 30
Gas 48 56 -8 171 108 62
Oil 0 0 0 0 0 0
Storage 78 87 -9 78 105 -28
Hydro 551 552 0 552 552 0
Biomass 208 174 34 208 193 16
Wind onshore 706 711 -5 699 704 -5
Wind offshore 299 359 -61 311 332 -20
PV 370 325 45 374 344 30
CSP 49 47 1 49 46 3
Geothermal 94 94 0 94 94 0
Others 56 56 0 56 56 0
Extrapolation
Nuclear 978 1011 -34 859 913 -54
Lignite 366 367 -1 356 361 -5
Coal 473 427 46 453 429 24
Gas 42 67 -25 174 156 18
Oil 0 0 0 0 0 0
Storage 84 81 3 78 87 -9
Hydro 552 552 0 552 552 0
Biomass 178 170 8 181 189 -8
Wind onshore 689 705 -16 683 696 -13
Wind offshore 299 335 -37 303 303 0
PV 324 270 54 324 293 31
CSP 49 48 0 49 46 3
Geothermal 94 93 1 94 94 0
Others 56 56 0 56 56 0
Flatrate
Growth
Nuclear 947 1000 -54 842 906 -64
Lignite 369 366 4 362 360 3
Coal 439 413 26 431 433 -2
Gas 63 61 3 172 132 40
Oil 0 0 0 0 0 0
Storage 78 85 -7 79 96 -17
Hydro 552 552 0 552 552 0
Biomass 186 172 14 191 192 -1
Wind onshore 704 707 -3 692 699 -7
Wind offshore 244 345 -101 254 311 -56
PV 393 291 102 387 314 73
CSP 49 47 1 49 46 3
Geothermal 94 94 1 95 94 0
Others 56 56 0 56 56 0
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We identify the following effects of interconnector capacities on the optimal generation
mix in the cooperative RES-E support scenarios, compared to national support:
• The best wind availabilities across Europe are better exploited under cooperative
RES-E support. This advantage is greater when interconnector capacities are
larger. Thus, the difference in wind generation between cooperative and national
support is larger if the TYNDP is realized.
• Photovoltaic generation is lower given cooperative support because only best solar
sites are competitive with other RES-E generation options throughout Europe.
When interconnector capacities are larger, more favorable RES-E generation op-
tions across Europe (i.e., wind in Northern Europe) can be used and solar genera-
tion at sites with medium solar generation in Central Europe is smaller. Thus, the
difference in solar generation between cooperative and national support is larger
if the TYNDP is realized.
• Nuclear generation is higher given cooperative support because the use of renew-
able and non-renewable generation options can be optimized on a European-wide
level. With cooperative support, RES-E generation in countries with existing nu-
clear plants or the political will to construct nuclear plants is lower compared to
national support. Thus, a larger use of nuclear generation is possible. When in-
terconnectors are larger, this relative advantage of the cooperative RES-E support
decreases. With larger interconnectors, a higher nuclear, in addition to a high
RES-E generation, is possible on a national level. Thus, the difference in nuclear
generation between cooperative and national support is smaller if the TYNDP is
realized.
• When interconnector capacities are larger, international power flows contribute
significantly to balance demand and fluctuating RES-E infeed. Thus, the need
for flexibility on a national level is smaller, both under cooperative and national
RES-E support. In the cooperative RES-E support scenarios, storage generation
in countries with a high wind penetration is smaller when interconnector capacities
are larger. In the national support scenarios, a large share of non-renewable gener-
ation is coal rather than gas based when interconnector capacities are larger. Thus,
the difference in generation from storage units between cooperative and national
support is smaller if the TYNDP is realized. Furthermore, a lower generation from
nuclear plants under national compared to cooperative support is replaced by coal
rather than by gas when interconnector capacities are larger.
Differences in regional generation patterns between national and cooperative support
scenarios do not fundamentally change given an absence of interconnector extensions.
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Countries with favorable meteorological conditions also generate more RES-E in coop-
erative than in national support scenarios, however, generally to a lower extent. For
example, the cost-efficient wind generation in Ireland, Norway and Denmark is lower
due to limited export possibilites. In contrast, e.g., solar generation in Spain in the co-
operative support scenarios is hardly reduced when the TYNDP is not realized, because
the additional solar generation in the cooperative (compared to the national) support
scenarios mainly replaces non-renewable based generation in Spain and is not exported
to other countries.
With regard to gains from cooperation, the absence of interconnector extensions has, as
expected, a decreasing effect. However, gains from cooperation remain at a significant
magnitude of 47 to 62 bn EUR2010 (cumulated from 2021 to 2030) which translates to
a reduction of the additional costs induced by the (national) RES-E targets by 36% to
37%.
2.4.4 The influence of RES-E investment costs on cooperation gains
Table 2.12 depicts the additional costs induced by the 2030 RES-E target under national
and cooperative RES-E support systems, as well as the associated cooperation gains
when investment costs for photovoltaic systems or for offshore wind plants are 10%
lower than in the reference case. Numbers in brackets indicate the difference compared
to the reference case (either in bn. EUR2010 or in percentage points).
Table 2.12: Effect of RES-E investment costs on additional costs induced by the 2030
RES-E target and cooperation gains (2021-2030)
Photovoltaic Costs - 10% Equal Extra- Flatrate
Share polation Growth
Additional costs of 2030 RES-E target - national
support (bn. EUR2010)
156 (-10) 115 (-10) 124 (-9)
Additional costs of 2030 RES-E target - coopera-
tive support (bn. EUR2010)
90 (-3) 68 (0) 76 (-3)
Gains from cooperation (bn. EUR2010) 65 (-8) 47 (-10) 48 (-6)
Gains from cooperation (%) 42 ( -2) 41 (-4) 39 (-2)
Offshore Wind Costs - 10%
Additional costs of 2030 RES-E target - national
support (bn. EUR2010)
160 (-6) 121 (-4) 131 (-2)
Additional costs of 2030 RES-E target - coopera-
tive support (bn. EUR2010)
91 (-2) 67 (-1) 76 (-3)
Gains from cooperation (bn. EUR2010) 69 (-4) 55 (-2) 54 (0)
Gains from cooperation (%) 43 (-1) 45 (0) 42 (+1)
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Lower costs for photovoltaic systems (compared to the reference case) mainly lead to
higher photovoltaic and to lower offshore wind-based generation under either national or
cooperative RES-E support. Given national RES-E support, the switch from offshore- to
photovoltaic-based generation mostly occurs in countries characterized by medium wind
speeds and medium solar radiation as opposed to the best sites throughout Europe (e.g.,
France and Germany). Under cooperative RES-E support, e.g., photovoltaic generation
in Italy is higher than in the reference case, while offshore generation in the United
Kingdom is lower. In contrast, generation at the best sites for offshore wind (e.g.,
in the Netherlands and Denmark) is not affected by lower photovoltaic costs. Also,
generation from other generation options such as onshore wind, is hardly affected by
lower photovoltaic costs. In contrast, the overall costs of reaching the 2030 RES-E target
is reduced by lower investment costs for photovoltaic systems, both given national and
cooperative RES-E support. The cost reducing effect is, however, more pronounced in
the national support scenarios, in which photovoltaic capacities are largely higher, such
that gains from cooperation decrease to 47 - 65 bn. EUR2010 (to 39 - 42 %).
Lower investment costs for offshore wind plants also lead to generation switches between
offshore wind- and photovoltaic-based generation. In addition, in the cooperative RES-E
support scenarios, higher offshore wind-based generation partly replaces biomass-based
generation. Contrary to the hypothesis made in Section 2.4.1, gains from cooperation
do not increase with decreasing offshore wind costs. In absolute terms, gains from
cooperation either do not change (‘Flatrate Growth’ scenario) or decrease slightly. In
relative terms, gains from cooperation do not change, decrease or increase in a negligible
order of magnitude. Although offshore wind-based generation is significantly higher in
the cooperative support scenarios, capacities are only slightly higher (but deployed at
sites with higher full load hours). Consequently, lower investment costs for offshore
plants affect approximately the same number of offshore wind plants in the national and
in the cooperative support scenarios. In terms of offshore wind generation costs, absolute
reductions due to decreasing investment costs are, however, larger in the national support
scenarios because full load hours are lower on average. Thus, in the ‘Equal Share’ and
‘Extrapolation’ scenarios, additional costs induced by the 2030 RES-E target decrease
more when RES-E is supported on a national level. In the ‘Flatrate Growth’ scenarios,
the highest difference in offshore wind capacity between national and cooperative support
occurs (8 GW in the reference case, 18 GW when offshore wind costs are lower). In this
case, cost reductions in the national and the cooperative support scenario are in the same
order of magnitude: The effect of higher offshore wind capacities in the cooperative
scenario balances the effect of a larger absolute reduction of generation costs in the
national scenario.
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2.5 Possible obstacles to cooperation in RES-E support
In Section 2.4, we have shown that stronger cooperation in RES-E support yields sub-
stantial cost savings in the period after 2020 and that these cost savings are relatively
robust to different developments of the grid infrastructure and RES-E investment costs.
As discussed in Section 2.2, several authors have already quantified cost savings from
cooperation in achieving the 2020 target. However, currently hardly any member states
plan to use cooperation mechanisms in order to reach their national 2020 targets.19 One
exception is the joint support system of Sweden and Norway that was implemented in
2012. In addition, Italy and Luxembourg both intend to profit from RES sources outside
their national borders in order to achieve their targets. This section addresses possible
obstacles to a cooperative RES-E support that need to be tackled in order to reduce the
costs of increasing the European RES-E share. In the following, we analyze the main
obstacles facing the implementation of cooperation mechanisms, as stated in the indi-
vidual member states’ NREAPs (see EC (2010)), and thereby provide further insights
on political measures required to increase cooperation among member states (MS).
• Uncertainty surrounding national RES-E deployment paths
Future RES-E deployment is not exactly predictable, especially in countries with a
price-based RES-E promotion system. MS explain within their NREAPs that they
are interested in statistical transfers in the case their national target is surpassed,
but would also like to be assured that their own target is met (see, e.g., NREAP
Ireland and NREAP Germany).
• Uncertainty surrounding RES-E deployment in third countries
Even more than RES-E deployment on national territories, the progress of joint
projects between MS and third countries is difficult to foresee. For example, many
MS are involved in initiatives to import RES-E from the North African countries.
However, Italy is the only country that states within its NREAP that it aims
to fulfill a part of its target through imports from third countries. In contrast,
e.g., France explains that the current status of the project does not allow for the
quantification of the amounts of RES-E that could be imported within the target
period of the Directive.
• Administrative issues
Another obstacle hindering the use of cooperation mechanisms are unclear admin-
istrative issues. Within the NREAPs, the MS were requested to describe national
19Cooperation mechanisms defined within the European Renewables Directive include statistical trans-
fers, joint projects and joint support systems between member states. In addition, targets can be achieved
through cooperation mechanisms with non-EU member states under certain conditions. For more de-
tailed information, see EC (2012).
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procedures for arranging statistical transfers or joint projects. Most countries de-
clared that no procedures have yet been established and that there is no clear
common understanding of how cooperation mechanisms could work in practice
(see, e.g., NREAP Ireland). In addition, there is a lack of information concerning
the potential for joint projects in other MS or third countries (see, e.g., NREAP
Slovakia or NREAP Spain).
• Sharing of integration costs
Several MS state that the implementation of statistical transfers or joint projects
is only eligible if integration costs of a higher RES-E share are borne by all partic-
ipating member states. These integration costs include, e.g., costs for reinforcing
the national grid and interconnectors as well as balancing costs (see, e.g., NREAP
Ireland and NREAP Germany). Obviously, it is not evident how, for example, grid
enforcement costs induced by renewable energies can be clearly distinguished from
those induced by other power plants or changes in the demand structure (Dena
(2010)). To quantify the integration costs induced only by those RES quantities
needed for cooperation mechanisms is even less straightforward.
• Insufficient interconnector capacities
Besides the unclear cost distribution of grid investments, an important issue for
the implementation of cooperation mechanisms is the actual realization of grid
enhancements, especially regarding interconnectors. Thus, administrative issues
or issues of public acceptance that hinder grid extensions can be an obstacle to the
use of cooperation mechanisms. Spain explains in its NREAP that participation
in joint projects would be ”senseless” for Spain if interconnectors between Spain
and France (and the rest of the European Union) are not enforced. Furthermore,
the Spanish NREAP states that the interconnectors between the European Union
and the North African countries are insufficient with regard to the envisaged RES-
E imports from North Africa. Portugal´s NREAP declares that it could easily
go beyond its own RES target given an extension of the interconnector capacity
between France and Spain.
• Influence on the conventional power market
A rising RES-E share has significant effects on the conventional power system.
Portugal explains that the Portuguese electricity market currently has surplus
capacity and therefore does not intend to produce more RES-E than required for
national target achievement. A rising amount of RES-E would lead to shrinking
full load hours of thermal power plants and thus affect their profitability.
• Other political targets
Finally, some governments also pursue political targets that can only be achieved
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by domestic RES promotion. For example, the Netherlands have set a higher
target for themselves than the mandatory target of the EU directive, which, in
addition, should be achieved through domestic production. Germany states in its
NREAP that the benefits from cooperation mechanisms have to be balanced with
the benefits from local RES production (such as local employment).
In summary, a sharing of costs and benefits between member states is challenging, and
unclear administrative procedures, a lack of information about RES-E potentials in
other countries and uncertainty about the progress of RES-E projects may hinder the
use of cooperation mechanisms. Potential drawbacks of cooperation have also been
addressed in the literature. Del R´ıo (2005) states that harmonization may be in conflict
with national socioeconomic and environmental objectives, e.g., if a country wants to
increase employment by creating green jobs. Klessmann et al. (2010) point out that a
quantification of indirect costs and benefits resulting from cooperation mechanisms is
hardly possible. These indirect costs include, e.g., grid integration costs or environmental
costs (e.g., impact on the landscape) whereas potential benefits listed by Klessmann
et al. (2010) include, e.g., local job creation and innovation. Pade et al. (2012) also
identify the distribution of costs and benefits as a major challenge. In addition, the
authors discuss in detail barriers that are specific to the implementation of the different
cooperation mechanisms. When implementing a joint support scheme, countries have
to agree on a common support system design, which can be very difficult in practice.
Joint projects are more easily to implement; however, Pade et al. (2012) point out that
transaction costs can be an important barrier for small size projects. Moreover, the
authors explain that uncertainty surrounding the setting of RES targets in the period
post 2020 is a barrier to cooperation because countries with low-cost RES potentials
may not be willing to exploit their potentials given uncertainty about the development
of future targets.
2.6 Conclusions
Generation costs of fluctuating renewables vary substantially throughout Europe due
to different meteorological conditions. Thus, any RES-E support system that does not
incentivize the use of best sites across Europe induces high extra costs. In this analysis,
we have shown that continuing with national support systems after 2020 would increase
the additional cost of a 2030 RES-E target substantially. Furthermore, we find that
the economic benefit of cooperation, in terms of cost savings in the electricity system,
is quite robust: The cost savings decrease only slightly when interconnectors are not
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further extended (compared to today) and depend only slightly on assumptions about
the developments of RES-E investment costs.
In order to benefit from cooperation in practice, prevailing obstacles facing cooperation
need to be tackled. Based on an analysis of the NREAP documents, we find that a
sharing of costs and benefits between member states is challenging and that unclear
administrative procedures, a lack of information about RES-E potentials in other coun-
tries and uncertainty surrounding the progress of RES-E projects may hinder the use of
cooperation mechanisms. However, the example of the joint support system of Norway
and Sweden shows that these obstacles can be overcome.20 Moreover, the European
Commission is currently working on the development of guidelines on the implemen-
tation of cooperation mechanisms to provide information on legal conditions and on
possible methodologies to share costs and benefits (EC (2012)).21 Moreover, hybrid
support systems (as opposed to pure national or pure cooperative support systems)
may yield a large part of possible cooperation gains while limiting the distributional
effects. For example, Jansen (2011) proposes a bottom-up harmonization in which joint
renewable quota systems can be supplemented with national support measures in order
to take into account national concerns. Pade et al. (2012) also propose ‘technology or
geographically specific joint support schemes’ (e.g., only for offshore wind) as a short-
to medium-term solution. The advantage of this approach would be that these specific
joint support schemes could coexist with national support schemes. Thereby, some bar-
riers to cooperation would be removed, such as the difficulties in agreeing on a common
support system or the pursuit of different objectives the member states have with regard
to RES-E support. The authors state that while full harmonization would lead to the
highest efficiency gains, it is difficult to implement in the short term. In the context of
European cooperation in transmission system planning, Buijs (2011) investigates how
different forms of collaboration affect overall and country-wise economic welfare and
discusses the impact of different compensation mechanisms. Further research in this
area is clearly required in order to avoid large excess costs of achieving national targets
without cooperation.
20Klessmann et al. (2010) explain that the idea of a joint support system between Norway and Sweden
was first abolished in 2006 because ”it was very hard to find a final agreement how to share the costs
and benefits in such a system”.
21The analysis presented in this chapter has been published in the EWI Working Paper Series in August
2013. In November 2013, the European Commission published its guidelines ”on the use of renewable
energy cooperation mechanisms” (EC (2013)). These guidelines clarify administrative procedures for
the implementation of different cooperation mechanisms and describe different practical design options
for statistical transfers, joint projects and joint support schemes. Moreover, indirect costs and benefits
arising in the host and the off-taking countries are named. However, the guidance also states that a
quantification of these indirect costs and benefits is difficult.

Chapter 3
Redistribution effects resulting
from cross-border cooperation in
support for renewable energy
3.1 Introduction and background
International trade increases overall welfare. However, trade also results in redistribution
effects such that different groups may be better or worse off with or without trade.
These general findings of international trade theory (see, e.g., Krugman and Obstfeld
(2009) or Bhagwati et al. (1998)) also apply to cross-border cooperation in achieving
political targets for electricity generation from renewable energy sources (RES-E). Due
to favorable meteorological conditions (e.g., high wind speeds or high solar radiation) or
large resource availabilities (e.g., of hydro reservoirs), some regions have cost advantages
in RES-E generation. Political targets for RES-E generation are, however, often not
linked to the resource potential of a region. Cooperation between regions with different
supply functions of RES-E generation thus increases system-wide welfare because less
costly generation options can be used. However, this cooperation also leads to regional
price effects from which some groups (e.g., consumers or producers in a particular region)
benefit while other groups lose compared to a situation without cooperation. While the
effect of increasing welfare resulting from cooperation in RES-E support has been studied
quite extensively (e.g., by Ragwitz et al. (2007), EWI (2010) and Aune et al. (2012)), the
associated redistribution effects have received little attention in literature thus far. This
is intriguing as redistribution effects seem to be one of the main reasons that cooperation
in RES-E support among member states of the European Union has been impeded thus
far (Fu¨rsch and Lindenberger (2013)).
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With this paper, we try to fill the existing gap in literature. We analyze redistribution
effects resulting from cooperation in a theoretical two-country electricity system model
in which RES-E support is implemented via a tradable green certificate system. In a
green certificate system, consumers or distributors of electricity are obliged to present
an amount of ‘green certificates’ corresponding to a politically-defined percentage share
of their electricity demand. Thereby, a market for the ‘green value’ of RES-E generation
is created (see Section 3.3). The green certificate market is closely linked to the whole-
sale electricity market for two reasons. First, the certificate price is paid on top of the
wholesale electricity price, such that the RES-E investor has two sources of incomes from
which he covers his costs. Therefore, if the electricity price level is high, the investor
will bid at low prices on the certificate market and vice versa. Second, an increase
in renewable-based electricity generation leads to a decrease in non-renewable-based
electricity generation (ceteris paribus). Therefore, as long as grid congestions between
different regions exist, varying regional allocations of RES-E also affect regional whole-
sale electricity markets. Consequently, welfare and redistribution effects resulting from
RES-E cooperation are significantly influenced by the degree of physical interconnec-
tion between different regional power systems. In this paper, we explicitly distinguish
between different grid interconnections, in analyzing under which conditions different
groups benefit or lose from the introduction of cooperation.
Main findings of this analysis include that the effects on consumers and total producers
per country resulting from cooperation can only be clearly determined if no grid con-
gestions between the countries exist. If bottlenecks in the transmission system exist,
the relationship between the slopes of the renewable and the non-renewable marginal
generation cost curves for electricity generation as well as the level of the RES-E target
essentially determine whether these groups benefit or lose from the introduction of cross-
border trading in green certificates. In contrast, system-wide welfare always increases
once cooperation in RES-E support is introduced. Similarly, welfare on the country level
always increases (compared to a situation without RES-E cooperation) if the countries
are perfectly or not at all physically interconnected. In the case of congested intercon-
nectors, the sum of producer and consumer rents in a country may also decrease under
certain conditions. However, in this case the level of congestion rents is also influenced
by the introduction of RES-E cooperation. Therefore, in this case, there always exists a
possible distribution of congestion rents between the countries which ensures that each
country benefits from the introduction of certificate trade.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: In Section 3.2, an overview of the
related literature and the contribution of the current work is presented. In particular,
the relationship between cooperation in RES-E support and international trade theory
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is highlighted. Section 3.3 covers the theoretical analysis of redistribution effects. In
Section 3.4, we draw conclusions and provide an outlook for further research.
3.2 Related literature and contribution of the current work
To our knowledge, the redistribution effects resulting from RES-E cooperation have not
yet been analyzed in a theoretical framework. However, our analysis is related to two
strands of literature. First, as pointed out in the introduction, the question of welfare and
redistribution effects resulting from RES-E cooperation is closely related to international
trade theory. Second, our analysis builds on the literature on the interaction between
renewable support and the competitive wholesale market for electricity. A part of the
latter literature also includes an investigation of cross-border cooperation in RES-E
support, however, these investigations do not analyze redistribution effects.
3.2.1 Relation to international trade theory
International trade theory shows that trade between different regions increases welfare
for two main reasons: First, because differences between the regions (e.g., in terms
of different resource availabilities) can be exploited and second, because trade enables
economies of scale to be achieved (Krugman and Obstfeld (2009)). The classical and
neoclassical trade theory (Smith, Ricardo, Heckscher and Ohlin) is founded on differences
between the countries, whereas the new trade theory focuses on reasons for trade between
similar countries, e.g., on the achievement of economies of scale and the reinforcement of
competition through increasing market sizes (Mej´ıa (2011)). The analysis presented in
this paper can be best related to classical and neoclassical trade theory, as cooperation
in our model occurs between regions with different RES-E generation costs.
In 1776, Adam Smith showed that trade between regions with an absolute cost advan-
tage in the production of different goods increases overall welfare. The Ricardian model
(developed by David Ricardo in 1817) states that trade increases welfare even if a region
has higher production costs for all goods. In the Ricardian model, countries specialize in
the production of the good in which they have a comparative advantage (Krugman and
Obstfeld (2009)). In both the models of Smith and Ricardo, labor is the only produc-
tion factor and trade occurs due to differences in regional labor productivities. Trade is
beneficial for both countries, which reach higher aggregate consumption levels than in
autarky. In addition, trade is beneficial for all individuals within the countries because
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productivities and real wages increase in both countries (Mej´ıa (2011)).22 Redistribution
effects resulting from trade were first addressed in the context of the Heckscher-Ohlin
model. Heckscher and Ohlin analyze trade between regions with different factor endow-
ments. Their model consists of two countries, two output goods and - in contrast to
Smith and Ricardo´s model - two input factors. Each of the output goods is intensive
in one of the input factors (i.e., it requires more of one of the input factors than of the
other) and each of the input factors is relatively abundant in one of the two countries.
The Heckscher and Ohlin model states that countries specialize in the production of
the good that is intensive in the input factor that is relatively abundant in the specific
country. As in the models of Smith and Ricardo, trade increases overall consumption
and, thus, welfare in both countries (Krugman and Obstfeld (2009)). However, as shown
in the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, changes in the output price, induced by trade, also
affect the relative factor prices in both countries, such that owners of the relatively
abundant factor, benefit from trade, whereas owners of the relatively scarce factor, lose
compared to the pre-trade situation (see, e.g., Zweifel and Heller (1992)).
Our analysis of cooperation in RES-E support is closest related to the theory of Heckscher
and Ohlin. The motivation for cooperation in RES-E, e.g., implemented as a cross-border
green certificate trading scheme, is that regions have different resource availabilities,
such as sites with high wind speeds, hydro reservoirs or lignite mines. Furthermore,
as will be shown in Section 3.3, cross-border green certificate trading leads to regional
price effects which in turn lead to income distribution effects between different groups
within a country. A difference between the analysis in this paper and the models of
Smith, Ricardo and Heckscher-Ohlin is that our model covers only the electricity system
(partial equilibrium model) and not the economy as a whole (general equilibrium model).
In addition, the general equilibrium models of Smith, Ricardo and Heckscher and Ohlin
assume that all factors are fully used, both before and after trade (which implies, e.g.,
that no unemployment exists). Therefore, no country will export or import both goods.
An export of both goods would simply not be possible and an import of both goods
would lead to unused resources and, thus, to inefficiencies. In our partial equilibrium
model of the electricity system, it is not assumed that all input factors are fully used.23
Therefore, it is possible that a country is an importer or an exporter of both green
certificates and electricity. As will be shown in Section 3.3, in this case, and under the
additional condition that the interconnector between the two countries is congested, it
is possible that the sum of consumer rents and producer profits in a country decreases
22Note that the Ricardian model assumes free and costless mobility of labor between the sectors within
a country. Also, the productivity of all workers in a country is assumed to be identical.
23In a partial equilibrium model, such an assumption would not be sensible. For example, agricultural
land can be used either for producing energy crops or for producing food. As the food sector is not
included in the model of the electricity system, it would not be reasonable to assume that all available
production sites are fully used for producing energy crops.
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once cooperation is introduced. However, if interconenctors are congested, cooperation
not only affects the welfare of producers and consumers, but also impacts congestion
rents. Including changes of the congestion rents, we find that, analogous to general
trade theory, overall international system-wide welfare always increases when trade is
possible. Moreover, similar to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, in which trade is beneficial
for all countries, we find that there always exists a possible redistribution of congestion
rents between the countries which ensures that sectoral welfare in the electricity systems
of all countries increases.
3.2.2 Interaction between RES-E support and the competitive whole-
sale electricity market
The influence of RES-E support on the wholesale electricity market, i.e., in terms of
wholesale electricity prices, has been studied e.g., by Amundsen and Mortensen (2001),
Jensen and Skytte (2002) and Fischer (2010). These authors either use one-country
models or models with electricity trading, in which, however, RES-E is only supported
in one country. Models with a common support scheme for renewable energies in two
or more countries are investigated by e.g., Bye (2003), Amundsen and Nese (2009), Sun
(2012), Aune et al. (2012) and Laffont and Sand-Zantman (2012). Except for Laffont
and Sand-Zantman (2012), all authors study the effects of RES-E support via a green
certificate market. Bye (2003) studies volume and price effects of an increasing RES-E
percentage requirement in a model under autarky, a model with only electricity trading
and a model with both electricity and green certificate trading. Amundsen and Nese
(2009) investigate the impact of the RES-E percentage requirement and CO2 emission
prices on RES-E generation and total electricity production, both under autarky and
with cross-border certificate trading. Aune et al. (2012) show that a common certificate
market ensures the cost-efficient allocation of production across countries as long as the
countries aim to increase their share of renewable energy in aggregate energy consump-
tion. Sun (2012) builds on the two-country model presented in Aune et al. (2012) and
investigates welfare effects of a socially-optimal RES-E percentage requirement under a
joint renewable support system. Laffont and Sand-Zantman (2012) study the optimal
degree of coordination in RES-E support in a two-country model with potentially lim-
ited transmission capacity. Their key finding is that the optimal degree of coordination
depends on the level of transmission capacity.
In summary, while theoretical two-country models with common renewable promotion
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systems have been studied by several authors, these analyses do not include redistri-
bution effects.24 Our contribution to literature is thus to theoretically determine the
redistribution effects resulting from cooperation in RES-E support, which to the best of
our knowledge has not yet been performed.
3.3 Theoretical analysis
In analyzing the redistribution effects resulting from cooperation in RES-E support,
we use a theoretical two-country model with a wholesale electricity market and a mar-
ket for green certificates. A system of tradable green certificates (TGC) is a support
mechanism for RES-E generation that is currently implemented in e.g., Poland, Great
Britain, Norway and Sweden.25 Of course, other support mechanisms also exist (see
www.res-legal.eu for an overview of current RES-E support mechanisms across Europe)
and cooperation in RES-E support is not restricted to a common TGC market. In this
analysis, we chose to focus on the TGC system because, as outlined in Section 3.2, most
literature that theoretically analyze RES-E support mechanisms, focus on this support
mechanism.
In the model, producers sell electricity from renewable and non-renewable energy sources
on the wholesale electricity market. Most renewable electricity sources are currently
not competitive with non-renewable electricity sources. It is assumed that a certain
RES-E target is decided politically and expressed as a percentage share of electricity
demand, and that RES-E generation is incentivized by a green certificate system. In a
green certificate system, the electricity consumer, or the electricity utility providing the
consumer with electricity, is usually obliged to present a certain amount of certificates
per unit of electricity demand. Producers of renewable energy usually receive green
certificates for each generated unit of RES-E (from the regulatory body). Thus, they
sell their produced electricity on the wholesale electricity market and the ‘green value’ of
the electricity on the green certificate market. Therefore, producers of renewable energy
have two sources of income and - in competitive markets - will offer green certificates at
a price which compensates for the additional costs of renewable generation compared to
the wholesale electricity price. For more information on the functioning of TGCs, the
interested reader is referred to, e.g., Amundsen and Mortensen (2001), Menanteau et al.
(2003) and Agnolucci (2007).
24The paper of Aune et al. (2012) also includes a numerical analysis in which welfare effects of coop-
eration on country levels are shown. However, redistribution effects between different groups within the
countries are analyzed neither in their theoretical nor in their numerical model.
25The term ‘tradable’ generally does not refer to trade between different countries, but simply to the
fact that green certificates can be traded between different market actors and often also across different
time periods.
Chapter 3. Redistribution effects resulting from cross-border cooperation in support for
renewable energy 51
The RES-E percentage requirements in the model are set on the national level and may
or may not be identical in the two countries. Without cooperation in renewable support
between the two countries, the national RES-E targets have to be achieved by domestic
RES-E production only. With cooperation, implemented in our analysis as a cross-
border green certificate trading system, imported green certificates can also contribute
to national target achievement. Note that cross-border trade in green certificates is
also possible without electricity trading because the green value, and not necessarily the
green electricity itself, is traded across borders. In the following, we analyze the welfare
effects of introducing a cross-border green certificate trading scheme in two cases. In the
first case, we assume that the grid connection between the two countries is unlimited
(‘copper plate’). Neglecting transmission losses, the two countries in this case have a
common wholesale price of electricity that is not affected by the regional distribution of
RES-E generation.26 In the second case, we assume that the interconnector linking the
two countries is congested or that, in the extreme case, the two countries are not at all
physically connected (‘limited grid’). Therefore, in this case, the regional distribution
of RES-E generation affects regional wholesale electricity markets.
In Section 3.3.1, we present the theoretical model. In Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 we discuss
welfare and redistribution effects resulting from cross-border green certificate trading
for the case of a copper plate and the case of limited grid connection, respectively. In
Section 3.3.4, the determinants for the results in the ‘limited grid’ case are discussed
in more detail and in Section 3.3.5, we present numerical examples to illustrate how
different assumptions (e.g., on the supply curves) influence welfare and redistribution
effects shown in the theoretical model.
3.3.1 The theoretical model
As a starting point for our analysis, we take the model presented in Amundsen and Nese
(2009), which is a theoretical two-country model with a wholesale electricity market and
a green certificate market. However, the research question of this paper is completely
different to the one of Amundsen and Nese (2009). Amundsen and Nese (2009) use the
model to investigate whether it is possible to derive clear results on the level of RES-E
generation resulting from a) an increase in the RES-E percentage requirement and of
b) an increase in the CO2 -price. We use the model to investigate welfare effects of
26Note that the (common) wholesale price for electricity could be affected by a different regional dis-
tribution of RES-E generation if the impact of the demand structure is taken into account. Assume, for
example, that the introduction of cross-border green certificate trading leads to a reduction of photo-
voltaic generation in country A, which is then replaced by a higher wind generation in country B. In this
case, the total amount of RES-E generation remains unchanged; however the structure of the renewable
infeed has changed. A possible influence on the wholesale electricity market resulting from a different
renewable energy mix is neglected in this analysis.
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cross-border green certificate trading, under different assumptions about the physical
interconnection between different regions. In contrast to Amundsen and Nese (2009),
we do not consider the market for CO2 emissions and assume that electricity demand
is inelastic. Unlike in other markets, demand in electricity markets is characterized by
a relatively low elasticity, especially in the short term (Erdmann and Zweifel (2008)).27
Thus, we believe that, for our research question, the assumption of a perfectly inelastic
demand is appropriate as an approximation for a low demand elasticity.28
Table 3.1 presents the parameters and variables of the two-country model, where the
index i denotes the country i ∈ {A,B} (and where i´ is an alias of i).
Table 3.1: Notation of the theoretical model (partly based on Amundsen and Nese
(2009))
si price of green certificate
qi wholesale price of electricity
xi total consumption of electricity
yi production of conventional electricity
gi production of renewable electricity
αi RES-E percentage requirement
zi national RES-E target [with zi = αi · xi]
Ci(yi) costs for conventional electricity with
∂C
∂y > 0;
∂C2
∂y2
≥ 0
hi(gi) costs for RES-E with
∂h
∂g > 0;
∂h2
∂g2
≥ 0
pii profit function of all producers
piRi profit function of renewable electricity producers
piCi profit function of conventional electricity producers
CRi consumer rent
CEi consumer expenditures (expenditures for meeting electricity demand)
Wi welfare
Ti,i′ traded green certificates
Mi,i′ interconnector capacity
Ei,i′ congestion rent
We assume that country B has a large potential of RES-E generation options with com-
paratively lower costs than country A (e.g., due to favorable meteorological conditions).
More specific, we assume that in the market equilibrium without certificate trading, the
price of green certificates in country B (at the certificate demand level corresponding to
27An overview of electricity demand estimations is, e.g., provided by Simmons-Su¨er et al. (2011) and
Liejesen (2007). In general, electricity demand of industrial consumers is more elastic than of household
customers. Furthermore, electricity demand is more elastic in the long term than in the short term.
Simmons-Su¨er et al. (2011) determine average household electricity demand elasticities to be -0.2 in the
short term (up to one year) and -0.6 in the long term (ten years or more), based on a literature review.
Real-time price elasticity of electricity demand is estimated to be close to zero (Liejesen (2007)).
28In contrast, the main finding of Amundsen and Nese (2009), namely that the effect of an increasing
percentage requirement on RES-E generation is indeterminate, relies on the assumption of an elastic
electricity demand. With elastic electricity demand, an increasing percentage requirement can lead to
a decreasing electricity demand such that the percentage requirement can also be achieved without an
increase in RES-E generation.
Chapter 3. Redistribution effects resulting from cross-border cooperation in support for
renewable energy 53
the national RES-E target zB) is lower than in country A. Technologies and resource
availabilities for the generation of non-renewable electricity may or may not be iden-
tical in both countries. Analogous to Amundsen and Nese (2009), we assume perfect
competition in all markets.
3.3.2 Welfare effects with unlimited grid connection (‘copper plate’)
In the case of unlimited grid connection between countries A and B, the introduction
of cross-border green certificate trading only affects the certificate market and not the
wholesale electricity market. In the absence of grid congestions non-renewable power
generation is optimally distributed between countries A and B even if green certificate
trading is not possible and the regional distribution of RES-E generation is not optimal.
Neglecting grid losses, a change in the regional distribution of renewable energy genera-
tion has no influence on the optimal regional distribution of non-renewable generation.
Thus, the outcome of the wholesale electricity market (in terms of the common power
price q and the regional levels of conventional electricity generation yi) is not affected
by the trading of green certificates.29 With the possibility to trade green certificates,
country A (with comparatively higher generation costs of RES-E) will import an amount
T of certificates instead of fulfilling the national renewable target (zA) using only local
RES-E production. In country B, a higher RES-E generation is generated than needed
to fulfill domestic demand for certificates (zB), such that an amount T of certificates
can be exported to country A. Equation (3.1) shows the profit function of conventional
electricity producers in countries A and B. Equations (3.2) and (3.3) show the profit
functions of renewable electricity producers in countries A and B, respectively.
piCi =q · yi − C(yi); i ∈ {A,B} (3.1)
piRA =[q + sA][zA − T ]− hA(zA − T ) (3.2)
piRB =[q + sB][zB + T ]− hB(zB + T ) (3.3)
Analogous to Billette de Villemeur and Pineau (2010), who analyze the impact of a
marginal increase in cross-border electricity trade on producer profits, consumer rents
and total welfare, we analyze the welfare effects of a marginal increase in cross-border
29In addition, as explained in footnote 26, this proposition relies on the assumption that the cost
function for non-renewable electricity generation Ci only depends on the level of non-renewable elec-
tricity generation and thus only on the level of demand minus the level of RES-E infeed. The possible
influence of a different structure of RES-E infeed, which may result from certificate trading, is neglected.
Furthermore, wholesale electricity price effects can occur if the RES-E quota in country B is not binding.
In this case, overall RES-E production in countries A and B would be lower than without the possibility
of certificate trading. This case is discussed via a numerical example in Section 3.3.5.
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certificate trade T from country B to country A. The case T = 0 corresponds to the case
where trading of green certificates is not allowed. In this case, by assumption, the price
of green certificates in country A is larger than in country B (sA(zA) > sB(zB)). In
the market equilibrium without certificate trading, the price of green certificates in each
country corresponds to the additional marginal costs of renewable energy production,
associated with a RES-E production of gi = zi, compared to the wholesale electricity
price: si = h
′
i(zi) − q.30 If green certificate trading is allowed, T is increased until
the prices of green certificates in both countries converge (sA = sB). As the wholesale
electricity price is identical in both countries and not affected by trading green certificates
(meaning that q and yi are independent of T ), the convergence of green certificate prices
is reached when the marginal costs of RES-E generation in both countries are equal
(h
′
A(zA − T ) = h
′
B(zB + T )). Thus, the optimal certificate trade T* is reached when
sA = h
′
A(zA − T ∗)− q = h
′
B(zB + T
∗)− q = sB, and arbitrage is no longer possible.
Lemma 3.1 states that an increase in the trading of green certificates increases welfare in
both countries, as long as 0 < T < T ∗ (implying h′A > h
′
B) and under the condition that
the interconnector is not congested. While consumers in country A benefit from trading,
producers of renewable electricity are worse off. Contrarily, RES-E producers in country
B profit from trading, whereas consumers are worse off (for proof, see Appendix B).31
In both countries, producers of conventional electricity are not affected by cross-border
certificate trading.
30The equilibrium condition in the certificate market (i.e., the certificate price corresponds to the
marginal generation costs of RES-E minus the wholesale electricity price) results from differentiating
the profit function of RES-E producers with regard to RES-E production gi (i.e., to the first-order
condition of profit maximization of the RES-E producers) (see Amundsen and Nese (2009)).
31To be precise, price effects (and thus also most redistribution and welfare effects) on country-levels
are only non-negative and not strictly positive or negative, as indicated in Lemma 3.1.
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Lemma 3.1. If 0 < T < T ∗ and M is unlimited then
dCRA
dT
=− dsA
dT
· αAxA = −dsA
dT
· zA ≥ 0 (3.4)
dpiRA
dT
=
dsA
dT
· [zA − T ] ≤ 0 (3.5)
dpiCA
dT
=0 (3.6)
dWA
dT
=− dsA
dT
· T ≥ 0 (3.7)
with
dsA
dT
=− h′′A(zA − T ) ≤ 0 (3.8)
dCRB
dT
=− dsB
dT
· αBxB = −dsB
dT
· zB ≤ 0 (3.9)
dpiRB
dT
=
dsB
dT
· [zB + T ] ≥ 0 (3.10)
dpiCB
dT
=0 (3.11)
dWB
dT
=
dsB
dT
· T ≥ 0 (3.12)
with
dsB
dT
=h
′′
B(zB + T ) ≥ 0 (3.13)
dW
dT
=
dWA
dT
+
dWB
dT
= [−dsA
dT
+
dsB
dT
] · T ≥ 0 (3.14)
In country A, the trading of green certificates leads to a decreasing price in green cer-
tificates (Eq. (3.8)), which is beneficial for consumers (Eq. (3.4)) and worse for RES-E
producers compared to a situation without trade (Eq. (3.5)). The price decrease refers
to the quantity zA for the consumers, but only to the quantity (zA − T ) for the RES-E
producers. Producers of conventional electricity are not affected by certificate trade (Eq.
(3.6)). Thus, total welfare in country A increases (Eq. (3.7)). In country B, in con-
trast, the trade in green certificates leads to an increasing price in green certificates (Eq.
(3.13)), which is beneficial for RES-E producers (Eq. (3.10)) and worse for consumers
compared to a situation without trade (Eq. (3.9)). In this case, the price increase refers
to the quantity (zB + T ) for the RES-E producers, but only to the quantity zB for the
consumers. Thus, total welfare in country B increases (Eq. (3.12)). The change in total
system-wide welfare corresponds to the sum of the welfare changes in A and B and is
therefore also positive (Eq. (3.14)).
Consequently, when grid connections are unlimited, it can be clearly shown that total
welfare in both countries increases. Furthermore, it can be seen that in the country with
a cost advantage for RES-E production (country B), producers are better and consumers
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are worse off than without trade. The opposite holds true in country A. The magnitude
of the overall welfare and distributional effects essentially depends on the slope of the
RES-E generation cost curves, which in turn determine the optimal certificate trade T ∗
and the changes in certificate prices.
3.3.3 Welfare effects with limited interconnection (‘limited grid’)
We now consider the case in which the electricity systems of countries A and B are not
perfectly physically interconnected. Either, the interconnector between the two countries
is congested, or, in the extreme case, the two regional electricity markets are not physi-
cally linked at all. Under this assumption, the different regional allocation of renewable
energy generation capacities, resulting from the introduction of green certificate trading,
has an influence on national wholesale electricity prices. If country A imports green cer-
tificates and thus reduces its domestic RES-E production, (inelastic) electricity demand
in country A has to be met by increasing generation from conventional plants. Similarly,
in country B, an increasing production of renewable energy leads to a decreasing produc-
tion of electricity from conventional energy sources. This effect is the larger, the smaller
electricity trading possibilities are. In the extreme case of no physical interconnection
between the countries, the amount of lower (higher) RES-E generation in country A (B)
has to be completely compensated by higher (lower) domestic conventional electricity
generation.
The profit functions of electricity producers (for renewable and conventional electricity)
in countries A and B are given by Eq. (3.15) - Eq. (3.20).32 Equations (3.15) and
(3.16) both present the profit function of conventional electricity producers in country
A - once for the case that country A is an importer of electricity and once for the case
that it exports electricity. Country A may be an importer both of certificates and of
electricity, e.g., if countries A and B have the same production costs for conventional
electricity or if country A has higher costs both for the generation of green and of
conventional electricity. In contrast, if country A has a cost advantage for the generation
of conventional electricity compared to country B, it may be an importer of certificates
but an exporter of electricity. Similarly, Country B is an exporter of green certificates
and may either be an importer or an exporter of electricity (Eq. (3.18) and Eq. (3.19)).
Note that we only consider the case, when the interconnector is congested and a complete
electricity price convergence between the two regional electricity markets cannot be
32 Note that the intermittent character of RES-E technologies such as wind and solar, is not taken
into account in the model. This becomes apparent in Equations (3.15), (3.16), (3.18) and (3.19) as the
total costs of conventional electricity generation (CA and CB) directly depend on the level of the residual
demand (= demand - RES-E generation). Additional integration costs that occur in the conventional
power system when RES-E shares increase (e.g., due to increasing balancing requirements or in ensuring
security of supply during hours of low RES-E infeed) are not taken into account.
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achieved. Thus, total electricity imports or exports correspond to the interconnector
capacity M. Setting M=0 corresponds to the case that the two countries are not at all
interconnected.
piCA =qA · [xA − zA + T −M ]− CA(xA − zA + T −M) [A imports electricity] (3.15)
piCA =qA · [xA − zA + T +M ]− CA(xA − zA + T +M) [A exports electricity] (3.16)
piRA =[qA + sA] · [zA − T ]− hA(zA − T ) (3.17)
piCB =qB · [xB − zB − T +M ]− CB(xB − zB − T +M) [B exports electricity] (3.18)
piCB =qB · [xB − zB − T −M ]− CB(xB − zB − T −M) [B imports electricity] (3.19)
piRB =[qB + sB] · [zB + T ]− hB(zB + T ) (3.20)
As in the ‘copper plate’ case, certificates are traded until certificate prices converge.
However, in this case, convergence implies that the additional marginal generation costs
of RES-E are identical in both countries ((h
′
A − C
′
A) = (h
′
B − C
′
B)). Lemma 3.2 defines
welfare and redistribution effects resulting from the trading of green certificates (for
0 < T < T ∗; meaning that (h′A − C
′
A) > (h
′
B − C
′
B)), given that country A (B) is not
only a certificate but also an electricity importing (exporting) country.
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Lemma 3.2. If 0 < T < T ∗, M > 0 but limited and A (B) is an electricity importer
(exporter), then:
dCRA
dT
=−dsA
dT
· zA︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
−dqA
dT
· xA︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
(3.21)
dpiA
dT
=
dsA
dT
· [zA − T ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+
dqA
dT
· [xA −M ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
(3.22)
dpiRA
dT
=[
dsA
dT
+
dqA
dT
] · [zA − T ] ≤ 0 (3.23)
dpiCA
dT
=
dqA
dT
· [xA − zA + T −M ] ≥ 0 (3.24)
dWA =−dsA
dT
· T︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
−dqA
dT
·M︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
(3.25)
with
dsA
dT
=− h′′A(zA − T )− C
′′
A(xA − zA + T −M) ≤ 0 (3.26)
and
dqA
dT
=C
′′
A(xA − zA + T −M) ≥ 0 (3.27)
dCRB
dT
=− dCEB
dT
= −dsB
dT
· zB︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
−dqB
dT
· xB︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
(3.28)
dpiB
dT
=
dsB
dT
· [zB + T ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+
dqB
dT
· [xB +M ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
(3.29)
dpiRB
dT
=[
dsB
dT
+
dqB
dT
] · [zB + T ] ≥ 0 (3.30)
dpiCB
dT
=
dqB
dT
· [xB − zB − T +M ] ≤ 0 (3.31)
dWB
dT
=
dpiB
dT
+
dCRB
dT
=
dsB
dT
· T︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+
dqB
dT
·M︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
(3.32)
with
dsB
dT
=h
′′
B(zB + T ) + C
′′
B(xB − zB − T +M) ≥ 0 (3.33)
and
dqB
dT
=− C ′′B(xB − zB − T +M) ≤ 0 (3.34)
dEA,B
dT
=[
dqA
dT
− dqB
dT
] ·M ≥ 0 (3.35)
dW
dT
=
dWA
dT
+
dWB
dT
+
dEA,B
dT
= [−dsA
dT
+
dsB
dT
] · T ≥ 0 (3.36)
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In country A, the trading of green certificates leads to a decreasing price of green cer-
tificates (Eq. (3.26)) but to an increasing wholesale electricity price (Eq. (3.27)). The
change in the wholesale electricity price is always (in absolute values) smaller than, or
equal to, the change in the green certificate price. Thus, profits of renewable electricity
producers decrease (Eq. (3.23)) and profits of conventional electricity producers increase
(Eq. (3.24)). However, effects on consumer rents and on total producer profits cannot
be clearly determined without making further assumptions. With regard to consumer
rents, the smaller change in the wholesale electricity price refers to total electricity de-
mand (xA), while the larger change in the green certificate price only affects a fraction
of electricity demand (namely (zA = xA · αA)). With regard to producer profits, the
change in the wholesale electricity price refers to (xA −M), which is likely to be larger
than the quantity (zA − T ) that is affected by the change in the certificate price.33
In country B, the trading of green certificates leads to an increasing price of green
certificates (Eq. (3.33)) but to a decreasing wholesale electricity price (Eq. (3.34)).
Thus, profits of renewable electricity producers increase (Eq. (3.30)), while profits of
conventional electricity producers decrease (Eq. (3.31)). However, as in country A,
the effects on consumer rents and on total producer profits are not clear. Again, the
change in the wholesale electricity price (in absolute values) is smaller than, or equal
to, the change in the green certificate price and affects total electricity demand (xB) for
consumers and (xB +M) for producers. The change in the certificate price, in contrast,
affects only (zB = xB · αB) for consumers and (zB + T ) for producers.
The change in total welfare in countries A and B depends on the change in the green
certificate price and, in contrast to the ‘copper plate’ case, also on the change in the
wholesale electricity price (Eq. (3.25) and Eq. (3.32)). If country A is an electricity
importer and the wholesale electricity price increases once cooperation is introduced,
consumers pay a higher wholesale electricity price for their total demand (xA), while
producers only profit from the higher price for the quantity (xA −M). Therefore, the
welfare change in country A, defined as the sum of changes in producer profits and con-
sumer rents, depends on (dsAdT ·T ) and on (dqAdT ·M), and can without further assumptions
on the slopes of the marginal generation cost curves only be clearly determined if either
one of the price effects is zero or if T > M .34 Similarly, if country B is an electricity
exporting country, the decreasing wholesale electricity price affects producers to a larger
extent (xB +M) than consumers (xB), such that it is unclear, whether total welfare in
country B increases or decreases.
33As (xA > zA), M would need to be substantially larger than T in oder to let (xA −M) be smaller
than (zA−T ). At the same time, when assuming that the interconnector is congested, it is unlikely that
M is substantially larger than T.
34As | dsA
dT
| > | dqA
dT
|, it follows that, if T > M , | dsA
dT
· T | > | dqA
dT
·M | (independent of the slopes of the
marginal cost curves).
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In contrast, if either the two countries are not at all interconnected (M=0) or if country
A (B) is an electricity exporting (importing) country, the welfare changes in A and
B are always positive. In the latter case, Equation (3.25) is transformed to dWAdT =
−dsAdT · T + dqAdT ·M and Equation (3.32) to dWBdT = dsBdT · T − dqBdT ·M . These equations
are always non-negative.
The change in total system-wide welfare corresponds to the sum of the welfare changes
in countries A and B and to the change in the congestion rents. If the interconnector
between A and B is congested, the changes in the regional wholesale electricity prices
affect the price difference between the countries and thus, in turn, the congestion rents.
If country A is an electricity importing country (and correspondingly, country B is an
electricity exporting country), the price difference between A and B increases when cer-
tificate trade is possible (Eq. (3.35)). In contrast, if country A (B) is an electricity
exporting (importing) country, then the difference in the wholesale electricity price be-
tween A and B decreases with an increasing T, since the wholesale electricity price in A
is lower than in B without certificate trading. In both cases, total system-wide welfare
increases in T. If country A (B) imports (exports) electricity, then the increasing con-
gestion rents compensate for the negative components in dWAdT and
dWB
dT (Eq. (3.36)).
If country A (B) exports (imports) electricity, the decreasing congestion rent compen-
sates for the additional welfare increasing effects in A and B based on the changing
wholesale electricity prices (see Appendix B). Thus, the change in total system-wide
welfare always only depends on the change in the certificate price in both countries and
on T, and is always positive. Therefore, even if the welfare in one country, defined as
the sum of consumer rents and producer profits, decreases in T, congestion rents can
always be redistributed in a way that all countries benefit from certificate trading. In
fact, in the European Union congestion rents have to be used for one or several of the
three following purposes: (1) guaranteeing the actual availability of the allocated ca-
pacity, (2) for network investments maintaining or increasing interconnector capacities
or (3) for reducing network tariffs (Art. 6 of the Regulation (EC) 1228/2003; see also
Kapff and Pelkmans (2010)). Therefore, if congestion rents are used for purposes (2)
or (3), increasing congestion rents have a welfare increasing effect on the country level.
If interconnector capacities are increased, ceteris paribus, the welfare in both countries
increases - either because of increasing producer profits that overcompensate decreasing
consumer rents or, vice versa, because increasing consumer rents dominate (e.g., Kapff
and Pelkmans (2010)). If network tariffs are reduced, endconsumer electricity prices
decrease and consumer rents increase, which also has a welfare increasing effect. There-
fore, if for example congestion rents are used for a network tariff reduction, there exist
possible distributions of the network tariff reduction between the two countries, which
ensure that welfare in both countries increases once certificate trade is introduced.
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In summary, we find that both when the two countries are perfectly interconnected or
if bottlenecks exist, system-wide welfare always increases in T (as long as T < T ∗).
Also, welfare on the country-levels always increases either if the two countries form
a copper plate or if the countries are not at all interconnected. If bottlenecks exist,
congestion rents can always be redistributed in a way, that both countries benefit from
the introduction of certificate trading. In contrast, redistribution effects arise between
different groups within the two countries, such that the introduction of certificate trade
is not beneficial for all groups. Producers of renewable energy yield lower profits in
country A (characterized by relative higher generation costs of renewable energy), while
profits of RES-E producers in country B increase. If bottlenecks exist, the opposite
holds true for producers of conventional electricity. In the copper plate case, producers
of conventional electricity are not affected by the introduction of certificate trading.
Effects on consumer rents and total producer profits (renewable and conventional) can,
however, not be determined, except for the copper plate case. Table 3.2 provides an
overview of the price, welfare and redistribution effects resulting from trading of green
certificates.
Table 3.2: Price, welfare and redistribution effects resulting from cross-border trading
of green certificates
Copper plate Limited interconnection
M>0 but limited M=0
dsA ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0
dsB ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0
dqA = ≥ 0 ≥ 0
dqB = ≤ 0 ≤ 0
dCRA ≥ 0 ? ?
dCRB ≤ 0 ? ?
dpiCA = ≥ 0 ≥ 0
dpiCB = ≤ 0 ≤ 0
dpiRA ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0
dpiRB ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0
dpiA ≤ 0 ? ?
dpiB ≥ 0 ? ?
dWA ≥ 0 ? ≥ 0
dWB ≥ 0 ? ≥ 0
dEA,B = ? =
dWA + dWB + dEA,B ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0
In the next section, the influence factors for those effects marked by a question mark in
Table 3.2 are discussed.
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3.3.4 Determinants of the redistribution effects in the case of limited
interconnection
In this section, determinants of redistribution effects of cooperation, arising in the case of
limited interconnection, are investigated in more detail. In the following, it will be shown
that the sign of the changes of consumer rents and producer profits essentially depends
on the relationship between the slopes of the generation cost curves for renewable-based
and conventional electricity and on the level of the RES-E quota.
For this purpose, Equation (3.21), which defines the change in consumer rents in country
A due to an increase in T, can be rewritten as follows:
dCRA
dT = −(−h
′′
A(zA − T )− C
′′
A(xA − zA + T −M)) · zA − (C
′′
A(xA − zA + T −M) · xA).
Thereby, it can be seen that the change in consumer rents depends on the slopes of the
generation cost curves of renewable and non-renewable electricity generation (h′′A and
C ′′A) and on the RES-E percentage requirement (zA). While the slopes of the supply
curves determine the magnitude of the price effects (resulting from cooperation) on the
certificate and on the wholesale electricity market, the level of the RES-E percentage
requirement determines how large the part of electricity demand is that is affected by
the change in the green certificate price. If the slopes of the two marginal generation
cost curves are identical (in the relevant areas) and the RES-E quota is exactly 50%,
then the effect of the change in the certificate price exactly compensates for the effect
of the change in the wholesale electricity price. In this case, consumer rents are not
affected by certificate trading. The upper part of Table 3.3 shows how consumer rents
in country A change in T, depending on the relationship between the slopes of the two
marginal generation cost curves and the level of the RES-E quota. Generally, consumers
in country A benefit from certificate trading, if the RES-E marginal generation cost curve
is relatively steep compared to the conventional one (h′′A ≥ C ′′A) and/or the RES-E quota
is high.
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Table 3.3: Changes in consumer rents and producer profits in country A (case II,
‘limited grid’) depending on the slopes of the marginal generation cost curves and the
level of the RES-E quota
dCRA/dT
h′′A = C
′′
A h
′′
A > C
′′
A h
′′
A < C
′′
A
zA = 0.5xA 0 > 0 < 0
zA < 0.5xA < 0 ? < 0
zA > 0.5xA > 0 > 0 ?
dpiA/dT
h′′A = C
′′
A h
′′
A > C
′′
A h
′′
A < C
′′
A
zA = 0.5(xA −M) > 0 ? > 0
zA < 0.5(xA −M) > 0 ? > 0
zA > 0.5(xA −M) ? ? ?
The lower part of Table 3.3 shows how the change in total producer profits in country
A depends on the slopes of the marginal generation cost curves, on the RES-E quota
and on the size of the interconnector capacity.35 As defined in Equation (3.23), the
change in the certificate price refers to the quantity (zA − T ) for the producers. Thus,
the change in total producer profits shown in Table 3.3 cannot be determined in many
cases because the level of T is also necessary to determine whether the sum of producers
benefit or lose from certificate trading. Generally, if the slope of the marginal generation
cost curve for conventional electricity is relatively steep and the RES-E target is low,
the wholesale electricity price effect is likely to be dominant, implying that producers in
country A benefit from certificate trading.
Table 3.4 depicts the changes in consumer rents and total producer profits in country
B depending on the slopes of the renewable and the conventional marginal generation
cost curves and the level of the RES-E quota. The effects shown in Table 3.4 mirror
the ones depicted in Table 3.3: Under the same conditions as in country A, either the
certificate price effect or the wholesale electricity price effect is dominant. However, as
price effects in country A and B are opposite, a dominant certificate price effect implies
increasing consumer rents in country A and decreasing consumer rents in country B.36
35Note that the depicted changes in producer profits correspond to the case that country A is not only
a certificate but also an electricity importing country. If A is an electricity exporting country, (xA−M)
has to be replaced by (xA + M).
36Note that the depicted changes in producer profits correspond to the case that country B is not only
a certificate but also an electricity exporting country. If B is an electricity importing country, (xB +M)
has to be replaced by (xB −M).
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Table 3.4: Changes in consumer rents and producer profits in country B (case II,
‘limited grid’) depending on the slopes of the marginal generation cost curves and the
level of the RES-E quota
dCRB/dT
h′′B = C
′′
B h
′′
B > C
′′
B h
′′
B < C
′′
B
zB = 0.5xB 0 < 0 > 0
zB < 0.5xB > 0 ? > 0
zB > 0.5xB < 0 < 0 ?
dpiA/dT
h′′B = C
′′
B h
′′
B > C
′′
B h
′′
B < C
′′
B
zB = 0.5(xB +M) > 0 > 0 ?
zB < 0.5(xB +M) ? ? ?
zB > 0.5(xB +M) > 0 > 0 ?
Table 3.5 shows under which conditions (i.e., the slopes of the marginal cost curves
and the relation between T and M) welfare in country A decreases or increases, given
that A is an importer both of certificates and of electricity.37 Generally, if the amount
of certificates traded is large compared to the amount of electricity traded, and if the
marginal cost curves of RES-E are relatively steep compared to the marginal cost curves
of conventional electricity, then welfare on the country level increases. In contrast,
if the amount of certificates traded is relatively small and the conventional marginal
generation cost curves are relatively steep, then the wholesale electricity price effect
dominates and welfare, defined as the sum of producer profits and consumer rents,
decreases. Remember however, that, as explained in Section 3.3.3, congestion rents
increase in T if A is electricity importer. These congestion rents can be distributed
between A and B in a way which ensures that welfare in both countries always increases
in T.
Table 3.5: Change in welfare in country A (case II, M>0, but limited) depending on
the slopes of the marginal generation cost curves and the relation between certificate
and electricity trading
dWA/dT
h′′A = C
′′
A h
′′
A > C
′′
A h
′′
A < C
′′
A
T = 0.5M 0 > 0 < 0
T < 0.5M < 0 ? < 0
T > 0.5M > 0 > 0 ?
T > M > 0 > 0 > 0
37Note that the welfare effects in country B are identical to the ones depicted in Table 3.5 when h′′A
is replaced by h′′B and C
′′
A by C
′′
B .
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Summarizing, the relation between the slopes of the RES-E supply curve and the supply
curve for conventional electricity has a high influence on welfare and redistribution effects
resulting from cooperation. Whether in real-world power systems the supply curve of
RES-E is steeper or flatter than the one of non-renewable-based electricity cannot be
generally said and depends, for example, on available country-specific potentials for
different power plant types. For this reason, a determination of redistribution effects in
real-world power systems needs to be based on quantitative modeling analyses and is an
important subject for future research. In the next section, the role of the supply curves´
slopes and the RES-E percentage requirement is further demonstrated, using numerical
examples.
3.3.5 Numerical examples
In this section, we construct two simple numerical examples in order to highlight the
effect of the degree of physical interconnection between the two countries, the slopes of
the RES-E and the conventional supply curves and the RES-E quota requirement on
welfare and redistribution effects induced by cooperation in RES-E support. Table 3.6
provides an overview of the assumptions made in the two numerical examples.
Table 3.6: Assumptions made in the numerical examples
Example 1 Example 2
Demand
xA 10 10
xB 10 10
RES-E target
zA 5 4
zB 5 4
Cost curves
CA 0.5y
2
A 0.75y
2
A + 2yA
CB 0.5y
2
B 0.5y
2
B
hA 2g
2
A 0.75g
2
A + 5gA
hB g
2
B 0.5g
2
B + 3gB
In the first numerical example, a 50% RES-E share of electricity demand has to be
reached in both countries and costs for conventional electricity generation are identical
in both countries. In contrast, country B has a cost advantage in the production of
renewable-based electricity compared to country A. Furthermore, in both countries, the
slope of the RES-E supply curve is steeper than the slope of the conventional supply
curve (h′′A(gA) = 4 > C
′′
A(yA) = 1 and h
′′
B(gB) = 2 > C
′′
B(yB) = 1).
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Table 3.7 shows the results of this first numerical example for three different interconnec-
tor settings: M=0 (‘no grid’), M=1 (‘limited grid’) and M unlimited (‘copper plate’). It
can be seen that the optimal amount of certificate trade (T*) increases with an increas-
ing level of interconnection between the two countries and that the common certificate
price with certificate trading (s*) decreases when M increases. Furthermore, overall wel-
fare gains of certificate trading (WA +WB +EA,B) increase when M, and therefore T*,
increases.
Table 3.7: Effects of cooperation in RES-E support:
Results from numerical example 1
M = 0 M = 1 M unlimited
(‘no grid’) (‘limited grid’) (‘copper plate’)
T* 1.25 1.5 1.67
s* 8.75 8.5 8.33
T=0 T=T* diff. T=0 T=T* diff. T=0 T=T* diff.
A sA 15.00 8.75 -6.25 15.00 8.50 -6.50 15.00 8.33 -6.67
qA 5.00 6.25 1.25 5.00 5.50 0.50 5.00 5.00 0.00
piRA 50.00 28.12 -21.88 50.00 24.50 -25.50 50.00 22.22 -27.78
piCA 12.50 19.53 7.03 12.50 15.13 2.63 12.50 12.50 0.00
piA 62.50 47.66 -14.84 62.50 39.63 -22.88 62.50 34.72 -27.78
CEA 125.00 106.25 -18.75 125.00 97.50 -27.50 125.00 91.67 -33.33
CRA 18.75 27.50 33.33
WA 3.91 4.63 5.55
B sB 5.00 8.75 3.75 5.00 8.50 3.50 5.00 8.33 3.33
qB 5.00 3.75 -1.25 5.00 4.50 -0.50 5.00 5.00 0.00
piRB 25.00 39.06 14.06 25.00 42.25 17.25 25.00 44.44 19.44
piCB 12.50 7.03 -5.47 12.50 10.13 -2.38 12.50 12.50 0.00
piB 37.50 46.09 8.59 37.50 52.38 14.88 37.50 56.94 19.44
CEB 75.00 81.25 6.25 75.00 87.50 12.50 75.00 91.67 16.67
CRB -6.25 -12.50 -16.67
WB 2.34 2.38 2.77
EA,B 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
WA +WB + EA,B 6.25 8.00 8.32
Note that, due to the assumption of an inelastic electricity demand, no absolute values for
consumer rents and welfare levels can be calculated. However, the differences in expenditures
that consumers pay for meeting their electricity demand (CE) (multiplied by (-1)) correspond
to the change in consumer rents (CR).
Regardless of the size of the interconnector capacity M, the certificate price effect is
always dominant in this example. Therefore, consumers in country A and total producers
in country B benefit from certificate trading, while consumers in country B and total
producers in country A are worse off than without certificate trading. On the country
level, the change in welfare is positive in A and B. However, trade gains are unequally
distributed between the two countries. In all three interconnector settings, the welfare
increase in country A is larger than in country B. When the two countries form a copper
plate, the welfare gain in country A makes up even two thirds of the overall welfare
gain. The reason is, that, as shown in Lemma 2, the welfare change on the country-level
depends on the changes in the green certificate and in the wholesale electricity price
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(dW = | dsdT · T | + | dqdT ·M |). As the slopes of the conventional electricity supply curves
are the same in both countries, it follows that |dqAdT | = |dqBdT |. In contrast, the RES-E
supply curve is steeper in A than in B, such that the certificate price effect in A is larger
than in B (|dsAdT | > |dsBdT |). Consequently, the welfare change in A is larger than in B
(dWAdT >
dWB
dT ).
In the second example, it is assumed that countries A and B have different cost curves for
RES-E as well as for conventional electricity generation. In contrast to the first example,
the slopes of the RES-E and the conventional supply curves in each country are identical
(h′′A(gA) = C
′′
A(yA) = 1.5 and h
′′
B(gB) = C
′′
B(yB) = 1). Moreover, in contrast to the first
example, the RES-E quotas in both countries are assumed to be 40% instead of 50%.
Table 3.8 shows price, welfare and redistribution effects occurring in this second example
due to certificate trading. First of all, it needs to be noted that under the assumptions
made in this example, country A is not always a certificate importing country. When
M=0 and certificate trading is not possible, the certificate price in A is lower than in
country B. The reason is that country A has higher costs for RES-E and conventional
electricity generation compared to country B. Therefore, the certificate price in country
A is lower than in B, due to a high wholesale electricity price. When electricity trading
is possible (M=1 or M unlimited), country A is an electricity importing country, both
when certificate trade is and is not possible. Therefore, the wholesale electricity price
in country A is lower than without the possibility of electricity trading and the pre-
certificate trading certificate price is higher in country A than in B. Thus, when M=1
or when M is unlimited, country A imports electricity and green certificates.
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Table 3.8: Effects of cooperation in RES-E support:
Results from numerical example 2
M = 0 M = 1 M unlimited
(‘no grid’) (‘limited grid’) (‘copper plate’)
T* 0.2 0.3 1.6
s* 0.6 0.6 0.6
T=0 T=T* diff. T=0 T=T* diff. T=0 T=T* diff.
A sA 0.00 0.60 0.60 1.50 0.60 -0.90 3.38 0.60 -2.78
qA 11.00 10.70 -0.30 9.50 9.95 0.45 7.63 8.00 0.38
piRA 12.00 13.23 1.23 12.00 10.27 -1.73 12.00 4.32 -7.68
piCA 27.00 25.23 -1.77 18.75 21.07 2.32 10.55 12.00 1.45
piA 39.00 38.46 -0.54 30.75 31.34 0.59 22.55 16.32 -6.23
CEA 110.00 109.40 -0.60 101.00 101.90 0.90 89.75 82.40 -7.35
CRA 0.60 -0.90 7.35
WA 0.06 -0.32 1.12
B sB 1.00 0.60 -0.40 0.00 0.60 0.60 0.00 0.60 0.60
qB 6.00 6.20 0.20 7.00 6.70 -0.30 7.63 8.00 0.38
piRB 8.00 7.22 -0.78 8.00 9.25 1.25 10.69 15.68 4.99
piCB 18.00 19.22 1.22 24.50 22.45 -2.06 29.07 32.00 2.93
piB 26.00 26.44 0.44 32.50 31.69 -0.81 39.76 47.68 7.92
CEB 64.00 64.40 0.40 70.00 69.40 -0.60 76.25 82.40 6.15
CRB -0.40 0.60 -6.15
WB 0.04 -0.21 1.77
EA,B 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.50 3.25 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00
WA +WB + EA,B 0.10 0.22 2.89
As in the first example, the optimal amount of certificates traded and the welfare gains
increase with an increasing interconnection between the two countries.38 In contrast
to the first example, however, the common certificate price when certificate trading
is possible (s*) does not vary with different levels of M. As shown in Lemma 2, the
certificate price effect depends on the slopes of the RES-E and the conventional electricity
supply curve. On the one hand, an increase in M leads to an increase in T* and therefore,
ceteris paribus, to an increasing certificate price effect. On the other hand, the larger
the interconnector capacity is, the smaller the wholesale electricity price effect becomes.
As the change in the wholesale electricity price reinforces the certificate price effect, a
larger interconnector capacity also has a decreasing effect on changes in the certificate
price. Under the assumptions of equal slopes of the two supply curves, these two effects
exactly compensate for each other.
38Note that the overall welfare gain is significantly higher when M is unlimited compared to the case
when M=1, as shown in the third column of Table 3.8. The reason is that without certificate trading the
RES-E quota in country B is not binding (i.e., the certificate price would be negative when producing
only 4 units of RES-E). Thus, the overall amount of RES-E produced is lower when certificate trading
is possible because a part of the certificates traded from country B to country A corresponds to RES-E
generation that exceeds the RES-E quota even without certificate trade. Consequently, some of the
traded certificates do not induce extra costs in country B. Moreover, for this reason, the wholesale
electricity price increases both in countries A and B when certificate trading is possible.
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Regarding redistribution effects, the certificate price effect in this example clearly domi-
nates if M is unlimited. In contrast, it can be seen that if M=1, the wholesale electricity
price effect is dominant both with regard to changes in consumer rents and with regard
to changes in producer profits in the two countries. As the slopes of the RES-E and the
conventional electricity supply curves are identical in this example, the change in the
certificate price is twice as high as the change in the wholesale electricity price in both
countries. However, as the RES-E quota is lower than 50%, the wholesale electricity
price effect dominates.
Regarding welfare effects on the country-level, it can be seen that welfare in countries A
and B decreases if M=1. As stated in Table 3.5, welfare on the country level decreases
if the slopes of the RES-E and the conventional supply curves are identical and if T <
0.5M , which is satisfied in this example. In this case, the increase in the wholesale
electricity price in country A leads to increasing end-consumer electricity prices for all
consumers in country A, while producers in country A only partly benefit from this
price increase because a part of the consumed electricity is imported. Similarly in
country B, the decrease in the wholesale electricity price affects producers to a larger
extent than consumers because electricity generation is higher than electricity demand
due to exports. However, if M=1, congestion rents increase by 0.75 once cooperation
is introduced and consequently, welfare on the system-level increases. Moreover, in
this case, e.g., an equal distribution of the additional congestion rents between the two
countries would ensure that both countries benefit from the introduction of certificate
trade.
3.4 Conclusion
As shown in neoclassical trade theory, trade between regions characterized by different
resource availabilities increases overall welfare. However, due to trade-induced changes
in prices, some individuals benefit from trade while others are worse off compared to a
situation in autarky. This paper is motivated by findings of trade theory and analyzes
cooperation in RES-E support between regions that are characterized by different supply
functions of RES-E generation. The paper shows that cooperation in RES-E support
also increases overall welfare and creates winners and losers compared to a situation in
which each country achieves its RES-E target by local production only.
Our analysis shows that, due to opposing price effects of cooperation on the wholesale
electricity market and on the green certificate market, the determination of winners and
losers of cooperation is not straightforward as long as the different regions are not per-
fectly physically interconnected. Whether consumers or producers in a country benefit
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or are worse off essentially depends on the relation between the slopes of the RES-E and
the conventional electricity supply curves as well as on the level of the RES-E target and
on the degree of physical interconnection between the different countries. In contrast,
system-wide welfare always increases once cooperation in RES-E support is introduced.
Similarly, welfare on the country level always increases (compared to a situation without
RES-E cooperation) if the countries are perfectly or not at all physically interconnected.
In the case of congested interconnectors, the sum of producer and consumer rents in a
country may also decrease under certain conditions. However, in this case the level of
congestion rents is also influenced by the introduction of RES-E cooperation. Therefore,
in this case, there always exists a possible distribution of congestion rents between the
countries which ensures that each country benefits from the introduction of certificate
trade.
Redistribution effects have a high relevance in political decisions surrounding the imple-
mentation of cooperation in RES-E support. In most real-world electricity systems, bot-
tlenecks in the transmission lines between different countries exist currently. Our analysis
shows that, in this case, the determination of redistribution effects is not straightfor-
ward and needs to be based on thorough quantitative analyses of real-world electricity
systems. In particular, the interaction between the support for renewable energy and
the wholesale electricity market needs to be taken into account. Moreover, important
influence factors of redistribution effects can change over time, e.g., when interconnec-
tors are expanded, when the RES-E targets increase over time or when cost degressions
of different technologies lead to changing supply curves.
It is also important to take these considerations into account when discussing the shar-
ing of costs and benefits of cooperation mechanisms. In this context, two important
questions arise: First, who should or would need to be compensated in order to enhance
cooperation between different regions? And second, how should compensation payments
be determined? Regarding the first question, our analysis shows that in most cases co-
operation increases welfare on the country level. Thus, compensation mechanisms on
the country level would be hardly needed if countries are not concerned about domestic
redistribution effects or unequally high benefits among participating countries. However,
while the analysis includes effects resulting form cooperation on RES-E support expendi-
tures and on the wholesale electricity market, effects on regional grid enhancement costs
and other integration costs are neglected. Furthermore, the theoretical model assumes
that producer profits are clearly allocated to the country in which the electricity is pro-
duced. For example, in the European electricity system, large international companies
operating in several countries play an important role in electricity production. Thus, a
clear association between producer profits and countries can be difficult in practice.
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Regarding the second question, direct and indirect costs and benefits of cooperation
have already been assessed in literature, e.g., by Klessmann et al. (2010) and Pade et al.
(2012). These costs and benefits include, e.g., a reduction of RES-E target compliance
costs, grid reinforcement and grid expansion costs, power market effects, effects on the
technological development of power plants, employment effects and regional environmen-
tal effects. In particular, Pade et al. (2012) state that compensation mechanisms should
include power market effects and that barriers to cooperation between countries with a
common electricity market are lower because, in this case, RES-E deployment leads to
similar power market effects in the cooperating countries. Our analysis confirms that
power market effects can have a significant influence on redistribution effects resulting
from cooperation. However, thorough quantitative analysis based on real-world data is
needed to determine the magnitude of these power market effects. In summary, further
research, is needed to further investigate redistribution effects and possible measures to
enhance cooperation.

Chapter 4
Who benefits from cooperation? -
A numerical analysis of
redistribution effects resulting
from cooperation in European
RES-E support
4.1 Introduction
An important target in European energy policy is to increase the share of renewable
energy sources (RES) in primary energy consumption, mainly for reasons of environ-
mental protection and security of supply (EU (2001), EC (2009)). The electricity sector
plays an important role in reaching this target. By 2020, the overall RES share in
primary energy consumption should reach 20%, whereas the renewable energy share in
electricity consumption (RES-E) is targeted to increase up to 34%.39 The contribution
of the individual member states of the European Union (EU) in achieving this target
has been agreed upon based on the member states´ GDP, their RES level in 2005 and
their resource potentials for renewable energy generation (EC (2009)). As the resource
potential is only one among several factors which influenced the target distribution, a
cost-efficient regional allocation of RES-E production across Europe is not reached if the
39Directive 2009/28/EC defines the contribution of each member state to reach the 20% RES target
in primary energy consumption. This target includes the electricity, transportation and heating and
cooling sectors. The sector-specific distribution of the targets were defined by the member states in their
National Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAP). An aggregation of the targets for the electricity
sector of all member states leads to a EU-wide RES-E target of 34% by 2020 (EC (2012)).
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national targets are achieved purely by domestic production (e.g., EWI (2010), Aune
et al. (2012)). Thus, in order to reduce target compliance costs, the European Directive
2009/28/EC on the promotion of renewable energy establishes the possibility of using
cooperation mechanisms, including statistical transfers, joint projects and joint support
schemes.
The use of cooperation mechanisms potentially enables the member states to benefit
from low-cost generation options across Europe, either because support payments can
be reduced (in member states with small potentials of low-cost generation options com-
pared to their targets) or because additional revenues can be acquired (in member states
with large potentials of low-cost generation options). Despite these potential benefits
from cooperation, almost all member states plan to reach their 2020 targets solely by
domestic RES-E production (Beurskens et al. (2011)). One reason why member states
are reluctant to implement cooperation mechanisms is that cooperation induces redis-
tribution effects (Fu¨rsch and Lindenberger (2013)). For example, Portugal states in its
National Renewable Energy Action Plan (NREAP) that it could easily produce more
RES-E than required for achieving its national target if the interconnector between the
Iberian Peninsula and France would be expanded. Without interconnector expansions,
a larger RES-E share would devaluate the existing power plant fleet of Portugal (Por-
tuguese Republic (2010)). Furthermore, in the history of the joint quota system of
Norway and Sweden, redistribution effects played an important role. This joint RES-E
support system was introduced in 2012 and is one of the few exceptions of a cooperation
mechanism in use. An earlier attempt to establish the joint support scheme, however,
failed in 2006 because the different parties could not agree on a sharing of costs and
benefits (Klessmann et al. (2010)).
While the overall benefit of cooperation in RES-E support has been quantified in prior
research, e.g., by Voogt et al. (2001), Ragwitz et al. (2007), EWI (2010), Capros et al.
(2010) and Aune et al. (2012), the effects of cooperation on individual groups such as
consumers or producers in individual countries have, to our knowledge, not yet been
quantified.40 However, in a theoretical analysis, this research question has recently been
addressed by Unteutsch (2014), who relates cross-border cooperation in RES-E support
40Moreover, redistribution effects of other policies in the electricity system have been subject to prior
research, however, to our knowledge, we are the first to numerically analyze redistribution effects of
cooperation in RES-E support. For example, Huang et al. (2005) and Billette de Villemeur and Pineau
(2010) show effects of electricity trading on overall sectoral welfare, consumer rents and producer rents.
Bauer et al. (2008) analyze redistribution effects of electricity transfers from North Africa to Europe.
Hirth and Ueckerdt (2012) analyze redistribution effects between consumers and producers induced by
support schemes for renewable energies and by CO2 emission reduction policies. Neuhoff et al. (2013)
investigate the distributional effects of increasing RES-E support payments in Germany on different
household types and discuss different compensation mechanisms to lower the burden carried by low-
income households.
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to international trade theory and shows in a theoretical two-country model that cooper-
ation in RES-E support increases overall welfare but is not beneficial for all groups. The
author shows that as long as cooperating countries are not perfectly physically inter-
connected, cooperation has opposite effects on regional wholesale electricity prices and
prices for green certificates.41 For this reason, the net effect of cooperation on consumers
and producers per country is theoretically not clear as long as grid congestions between
different countries exist. Moreover, while the system-wide welfare always increases if
cooperation is implemented, the net welfare effect of cooperation on the country level
can be undetermined under certain conditions (including that a country is importer or
exporter both of electricity and of green certificates). Therefore, redistribution effects
resulting from cooperation depend on data that is specific to each electricity system and
need to be determined by numerical analyses using real-world data.
The paper presented numerically analyzes the effects shown in Unteutsch (2014) for the
European electricity system up to 2020. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the di-
rection, magnitude and robustness of redistribution effects that could be induced in the
European electricity system in reaching the 2020 RES-E targets by EU-wide cooperation
(via cross-border trading of green certificates) rather than by national approaches. The
analysis is carried out using the investment and dispatch optimization model DIMEN-
SION of the Institute of Energy Economics, which captures the European electricity
system in great detail. As shown in Unteutsch (2014), the degree of physical intercon-
nection and the slopes of the RES-E and the conventional electricity supply curves have
a large influence on the direction and the magnitude of redistribution effects. Therefore,
we model different scenarios with regard to interconnector capacity extensions between
European regions as well as with regard to factors influencing the slopes of the supply
curves (such as CO2 - prices and RES-E investment costs).
Main findings of this paper include that, in the European electricity system, effects of
a change in the green certificate price in most countries would overcompensate for the
effects of a change in the wholesale electricity price. Thus, in most countries with com-
paratively high (low) generation costs for renewable energies, consumer rents increase
(decrease) due to cooperation and producers yield lower (higher) profits. In addition, we
find that the magnitude of redistribution effects between the individual groups is quite
large: In some countries, the change in consumer rents or producer profits resulting
from cooperation is nearly twice as high as the overall welfare effect of cooperation in
the whole European electricity system. Moreover, the benefit different countries have
from cooperation varies substantially. In our analysis, we find that Germany would by
41In Unteutsch (2014), cooperation in RES-E support is implemented as a cross-border green cer-
tificate trading scheme. A green certificate system is one of several RES-E support systems currently
implemented in European member states. See Section 4.2 for a brief description.
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far have the largest (absolute) benefit of cooperation, achieved by significant reductions
of RES-E target compliance costs via certificate imports. Finally, we find that the sign
of redistribution effects is quite robust to different developments of interconnector ex-
tensions, the CO2 price and RES-E investment costs. The magnitude of redistribution
effects, in contrast, is in some countries sensitive to these assumptions (especially with
regard to the assumption on the CO2 price).
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: In Section 4.2, findings of Unteutsch
(2014) are briefly summarized in order to provide the theoretical background for the
analysis carried out in this paper. Section 4.3 outlines the modeling approach and
covers the results of the numerical analysis. In Section 4.4, we draw conclusions and
provide an outlook for future research.
4.2 Theoretical background
As described in the introduction, this paper directly builds on the theoretical analysis of
redistribution effects by Unteutsch (2014), whose results are briefly summarized in this
section. Unteutsch (2014) analyzes the impact of cooperation in RES-E support in a
theoretical two-country electricity system model in which RES-E support is implemented
as a green certificate system. In a green certificate system, a market for the green value
of renewable electricity is created by obligating consumers or distributers of electricity
to certify that a certain share of the electricity produced or consumed comes from
renewable energy sources (see Amundsen and Mortensen (2001), Menanteau et al. (2003)
or Agnolucci (2007) for a detailed description).
In the model presented by Unteutsch (2014), it is assumed that a country A has higher
RES-E generation costs compared to a country B, whereas generation costs of con-
ventional electricity in A can be equal, higher or lower than in B. Each country has a
national RES-E target, expressed as a percentage share of (inelastic) electricity demand.
Without cross-border trading of green certificates, the national RES-E target has to be
achieved solely by domestic RES-E production. When trading of green certificates is
possible, country B produces a higher RES-E amount than needed for national target
achievement and exports certificates to country A until the certificate prices in the two
countries converge. Note that the trading of green certificates is also possible without
physical trading of electricity.
In this analytical framework, effects of cooperation in RES-E support (via cross-border
green certificate trading) on consumer rents, producer profits and total welfare in both
countries are analyzed for two different cases of physical interconnection between the
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two countries, i.e., the ‘copper plate’ case and the ‘limited interconnection’ case. The
‘copper plate’ case assumes that no grid congestion between the countries exist and that,
consequently, the two regional electricity markets are perfectly interconnected. In the
‘limited interconnection’ case, electricity trade between the two countries is restricted -
either because the interconnector is congested (the interconnector capacity M is > 0 but
limited such that no complete electricity price convergence between the two markets is
possible) or because no interconnector exists (M=0). Table 4.1 summarizes the results
from the analysis by Unteutsch (2014).
Table 4.1: Price, welfare and redistribution effects resulting from cross-border trading
of green certificates
Copper Limited interconnection
plate M>0 but M=0
limited
Green certificate price in A (dsA) ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0
Green certificate price in B (dsB) ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0
Wholesale electricity price in A (dqA) = ≥ 0 ≥ 0
Wholesale electricity price in B (dqB) = ≤ 0 ≤ 0
Consumer rents in A (dCRA) ≥ 0 ? ?
Consumer rents in B (dCRB) ≤ 0 ? ?
Profits of conventional elec. producers in A (dpiCA) = ≥ 0 ≥ 0
Profits of conventional elec. producers in B (dpiCB) = ≤ 0 ≤ 0
Profits of renewable-based elec. producers in A (dpiRA) ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0
Profits of renewable-based elec. producers in B (dpiRB) ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0
Total producer profits in A (dpiA) ≤ 0 ? ?
Total producer profits in B (dpiB) ≥ 0 ? ?
Welfare in A (dWA) ≥ 0 ? ≥ 0
Welfare in B (dWB) ≥ 0 ? ≥ 0
Congestion rent (dEA,B) = ? =
System-wide welfare (dWA + dWB + dEA,B) ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0
Source: Unteutsch (2014)
In all cases, the certificate price in country A (with comparatively higher RES-E gener-
ation costs) decreases when cross-border cooperation in RES-E support is possible (sA),
whereas the certificate price in country B (sB) increases. The opposite holds true for
the wholesale electricity prices (qA and qB), except for the ‘copper plate’ case in which
a different regional allocation of RES-E production does not affect the common whole-
sale electricity market. In country A, producers of conventional electricity yield higher
profits (piCA) than without cooperation in RES-E support (due to the increased wholesale
electricity price), while producer profits gained with conventional electricity generation
decrease in country B (piCB) (except for the ‘copper plate’ case in which producer prof-
its from conventional electricity generation are not affected by cooperation). Producer
profits of RES-E (piRA , pi
R
B), in contrast, increase in country B and decrease in country A.
Except for the ‘copper plate’ case, the net effect on consumers (CRA, CRB) and total
producers (piA, piB) in countries A and B cannot be determined without making further
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assumptions. While the decreasing green certificate price in country A is beneficial for
consumers in this country, the increasing wholesale electricity price has an end-consumer
price increasing effect. Similarly, in country B, the increasing certificate price leads to
increasing end-consumer prices (ceteris paribus), while the decreasing wholesale electric-
ity market price has an opposite effect. Welfare on the country level (WA, WB) always
increases due to cooperation, except under certain conditions in the ‘limited grid’ case
(as further discussed below). However, given the conditions under which welfare on the
country level can decrease, congestion rents (EA,B) increase such that overall system-
wide welfare (WA +WB +EA,B) always increases once cooperation in RES-E support is
introduced. Moreover, these additional congestion rents could potentially be distributed
between the two countries in a way which ensures that all countries benefit from the
introduction of certificate trade.
Moreover, for the cases in which effects on consumers, producers and welfare per country
cannot be determined (marked by a ‘?’ in Table 4.1), Unteutsch (2014) shows under
which conditions the effects are unambiguous, particular with respect to the slopes of
the supply curves and the level of the RES-E targets. Generally, if the conventional
electricity supply curve is relatively steep compared to the RES-E supply curve and the
RES-E target is rather low, then the wholesale electricity price effect resulting from co-
operation is likely to be dominant. In this case, producers in country A and consumers
in country B benefit from cooperation, while producers in country B and consumers in
country A lose compared to a situation in which each country achieves its RES-E target
without cooperation. Similarly, if the RES-E supply curve is relatively steep compared
to the conventional electricity supply curve and the RES-E target is rather high, the
certificate price effect is likely to be dominant. In this case, cooperation is beneficial
for consumers in country A and for producers in country B. Total welfare in country
A and B always increases when cooperation in RES-E support is introduced and the
two countries are not at all or perfectly interconnected. If, however, a bottleneck in
the interconnector exists and country A is an importer of both certificates and electric-
ity (and country B an exporter of certificates and electricity), welfare on the country
level (defined as the sum of consumer rents and producer profits) can decrease under
certain conditions. For example, the amount of certificates traded may be relatively
small compared to the amount of electricity traded and the conventional electricity sup-
ply curve may be relatively steep compared to the RES-E supply curve. In this case,
higher electricity import costs or lower revenues from electricity exports resulting from
cooperation can overcompensate the benefit from certificate trading in terms of reduced
RES-E production costs or additional incomes from certificate trading.
In summary, Unteutsch (2014) shows that redistribution effects of cooperation depend
on the level of interconnection between the different countries as well as on the slopes
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of the supply curves and the level of the RES-E target(s). These factors are specific
to each electricity system and can also change over time, e.g., when interconnectors
are expanded or when fuel, CO2 prices or investment costs change, leading to changing
supply curves. Therefore, in order to determine the direction and the magnitude of
redistribution effects in real-world electricity systems, a quantification based on real-
world data is needed. In this paper, we analyze which redistribution effects would
occur in the European electricity system up to 2020, if the 2020 targets were reached
with EU-wide cooperation in RES-E support rather than with national RES-E support.
As in the theoretical analysis presented in Unteutsch (2014), the model-based scenario
analysis is built on the assumption that the RES-E targets are either cost-efficiently
reached within national borders (when cooperation is not possible) or by using low-cost
generation options throughout Europe (via cooperation).
4.3 Numerical analysis
We numerically analyze redistribution effects in the European electricity system that
may potentially arise when reaching RES-E targets for 2020 with European-wide co-
operation rather than by national approaches. According to the European Directive
2009/28/EC, the renewable energy share in the European Union´s (EU) final energy
consumption (including the electricity, transportation and heating and cooling sectors)
should increase to 20% by 2020. The contribution of each country to the European-wide
target has also been defined in Directive 2009/28/EC, while the sector-specific break-
down of the national targets has been stated by each member state within its National
Renewable Energy Action Plan (NREAP). Overall, the achievement of the national
RES-E targets would lead to an EU-wide RES-E share of approximately 34% by 2020
(EC (2010)). Despite the possibilities to cooperate across borders in order to achieve
the national targets, given by the Directive 2009/28/EC, most member states almost
purely rely on national approaches. As described in the introduction (Section 4.1), one
impediment of stronger cooperation seems to be (politically undesired) redistribution
effects.
Therefore, we compare consumer rents, producer profits and total welfare per coun-
try in the event that the 2020 RES-E targets are reached either on a national level or
with EU-wide cooperation. In both cases, we assume that targets are reached with a
technology-neutral support system. It is important to note that, in reality, many EU
countries currently have technology-specific support systems.42 Thus, we do not quantify
redistribution effects that would arise when changing from the currently implemented
42See www.res-legal.eu for an overview of renewable energy support system designs currently imple-
mented in European countries.
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country-specific support systems to a cooperative support design. Instead, we show
which effects would arise when changing from purely national, technology-neutral sup-
port systems to a system in which RES-E is supported as technology-neutral and with
European-wide cooperation. Thereby, we quantify the effects that have been theoreti-
cally shown by Unteutsch (2014) for the European power system up to 2020 and focus on
the welfare and redistribution effects explicitly induced by cross-border cooperation. In
contrast, we do not take into account effects which could arise from inefficient national
support systems. In specific, the numerical analysis in this paper aims at investigating
the following questions:
1. Who benefits and who loses when the 2020 RES-E targets in Europe are achieved
with cross-border cooperation in RES-E support?
2. How large are these redistribution effects?
3. How robust are these redistribution effects (in terms of their sign and magnitude)
with regard to different developments of interconnector extensions and with regard
to changes in the CO2 price, fuel prices or investment costs, which influence the
slope of electricity supply curves?
In Section 4.3.1, we define the scenarios to analyze and provide information on the most
important assumptions. In Section 4.3.2, the modeling approach is described. In Section
4.3.3, we describe and analyze the model results.
4.3.1 Scenario definition and assumptions
As discussed in Unteutsch (2014), the level of grid interconnection between countries
influences the optimal amount of certificates traded as well as the redistribution and
welfare effects resulting from cooperative RES-E support. Therefore, the numerical
analysis presented in this paper also distinguishes between different grid interconnec-
tion settings. The current European power system is, on the one hand, already deeply
intermeshed and is, on the other hand, still subject to substantial bottlenecks between
some regions. Interconnector extensions are planned but often delayed (EWI and en-
ergynautics (2011)). Thus, we model two main scenarios that differ with regard to the
progress in interconnector extensions. In the first scenario, we assume that interconnec-
tors are not extended at all from today onwards. In the second scenario, we assume that
all planned interconnector extensions, as stated in the Ten-Year Network Development
Plan (TYNDP; see ENTSO-E (2010)), are realized.
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Moreover, as discussed in Unteutsch (2014), price effects, which in turn induce redistri-
bution effects, depend on the slopes of the supply curves for renewable and conventional
electricity generation. Thus, we run sensitivities with regard to three factors which influ-
ence the slopes of the supply curves. First, we analyze the effects of a higher CO2 price
than in the reference case (30 EUR/t compared to 20 EUR/t in 2020). Second, we ana-
lyze the effects of lower photovoltaic investment costs and third, of lower offshore wind
investment costs (- 10 % compared to the investments costs in the reference case).43
In all sensitivity runs, we assume that the TYNDP is realized. Table 4.2 provides an
overview of the main scenarios and the sensitivities.
Table 4.2: Overview of modeled scenarios
Interconnector extension
no extension TYNDP
Reference assumptions x x
Sensitivities higher CO price x
lower photovoltaic costs x
lower offshore wind costs x
All scenarios depicted in Table 4.2 are modeled twice: Once assuming purely national
RES-E support systems and once with EU-wide cooperation. RES-E targets in 2020
and electricity demand in 2020 are depicted in Table 4.3. Electricity demand is assumed
to develop according to the ‘additional energy efficiency’ scenario of the NREAPs (see
Beurskens et al. (2011)).44
43The investment costs in the reference case correspond to those costs which are also assumed in the
analysis presented in Chapter 2 of this thesis (see Table 2.3).
44The analysis covers the EU-27 countries (with the exception of Cyprus and Malta), Norway and
Switzerland. As Norway and Switzerland are not part of the European Union and have no NREAP,
assumptions on electricity demand are based on EWI and energynautics (2011). RES-E targets are
assumed to be slightly above historical RES-E generation in 2010.
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Table 4.3: Final electricity demand and NREAP target in 2020 [TWhel]
electricity demand RES-E target
Austria (AT) 74 52
Belgium (BE) 111 23
Bulgaria (BG) 37 8
Czech Republic (CZ) 84 12
Denmark (DK) 38 21
Estonia (EE) 11 2
Finland (FI) 102 33
France (FR) 546 155
Germany (DE) 562 217
Greece (GR) 68 27
Hungary (HU) 51 6
Ireland (IE) 33 14
Italy (IT) 375 99
Latvia (LV) 9 5
Lithuania (LT) 9 3
Luxembourg (LU) 7 1
Netherlands (NL) 136 50
Norway (NO) 119 114
Poland (PL) 170 32
Portugal (PT) 65 36
Romania (RO) 74 31
Slovakia (SK) 33 8
Slovenia (SL) 16 6
Spain (ES) 375 150
Sweden (ES) 155 97
Switzerland (CH) 67 45
United Kingdom (UK) 377 117
Table 4.4 depicts the assumed fuel price developments up to 2020, based on Prog-
nos/EWI/GWS (2010) and EWI and energynautics (2011) (biomass solid and biogas).
In addition, CO2 emission factors are shown. The CO2 price is assumed to increase up
to 20 EUR2010/t in 2020.
Table 4.4: Fuel prices [EUR2010/MWhth]
and CO2 emission factor [t CO2 /MWhth]
Fuel price CO2 factor
2008 2020
[ EUR2010/MWhth] [t CO2 /MWhth]
Nuclear 3.6 3.3 0
Coal 17.28 10.1 0.335
Lignite 1.4 1.4 0.406
Natural gas 25.2 23.1 0.201
Biomass (solid) 15.0-27.7 15.7-34.9 0
Biomass (gas) 0.1-70.0 0.1-67.2 0
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Assumptions on technical and economic parameters of power plants correspond to those
described in Chapter 2 of this thesis (see Tables 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5).
4.3.2 Model description
For the numerical analysis, we use the dynamic investment and dispatch optimization
model DIMENSION developed at the Institute of Energy Economics at the Univer-
sity of Cologne. The model minimizes total costs required to meet an inelastic hourly
electricity demand in each market region. Hourly demand is represented by a typical
day approach, reflecting typical demand and RES-E feed-in structures on a weekday
and a weekend-day in autumn/winter and in spring/summer. Different meteorological
conditions throughout Europe are taken into account by modeling different wind speed
conditions in 47 onshore and 42 offshore wind regions. Different levels of solar radiation
throughout Europe are captured by modeling 38 photovoltaic regions. Meteorological
data is taken from EuroWind (2011). Hourly dispatch decisions include ramping pro-
cedures of thermal power plants, pumping and generation operations in storage units
and import and export streams between market regions. Furthermore, RES-E infeed
can be curtailed if this option is beneficial for minimizing total costs, e.g., when cur-
tailment is cost-optimal compared to ramping procedures of thermal power plants. The
model optimizes investment and dispatch decisions of thermal power plants (possibly
equipped with combined-heat-power technology (CHP)), storage units and renewable
plants. The existing power plant fleet is taken into account by several vintage classes,
representing typical technological characteristics (e.g., conversion efficiencies) of power
plants build at different points in time. Renewable technologies covered by the model
include: onshore wind, offshore wind (shallow and deep water), biomass solid, biogas,
concentrated solar power (equipped with thermal energy storage), geothermal and pho-
tovoltaics (ground and roof). The generation in biomass or biogas plants is restricted by
yearly fuel potentials. Investments in wind- and solar-based technologies are restricted
by area potentials. The technological progress of wind turbines is taken into account
by modeling different technology classes which can be deployed at different future time
periods. The option of repowering is also included in the modeling.
A detailed documentation of the basic model is provided by Richter (2011). In this anal-
ysis, we use an extended model version including the option of endogenous investments
in renewable energy plants. For a documentation of this extended model version, the
reader is referred to Ja¨gemann et al. (2012) and Fu¨rsch et al. (2013a).
In this paper, we use the DIMENSION model to analyze redistribution effects of EU-wide
cooperation compared to national RES-E support. Equations (4.1) to (4.4) show how
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redistribution effects in terms of consumer rents, producer profits as well as welfare on the
country level and on the European electricity system level are determined. A list of the
abbreviations used in the equations for model sets, parameters and variables, is provided
in Table 4.5. The difference in consumer rents (in country i and year y) between EU-
wide cooperation and national RES-E support is defined by Eq. (4.1), i.e., the difference
in expenditures that consumers pay to meet their electricity demand multiplied by (-
1).45 These expenditures include costs for buying electricity on the wholesale electricity
market, RES-E support expenditures and costs for ensuring security of supply. In the
model, ‘security of supply’ is defined by the requirement that an amount of ‘securely
available’ electricity generation capacity exists that is sufficient to meet peak demand
including during times of low wind infeed and low solar radiation (see, e.g., Fu¨rsch et al.
(2013a)).46 Producers may earn incomes on the wholesale electricity market, for selling
green certificates on the certificate market and by providing securely available generation
capacities. In addition, producers can earn incomes by selling heat that is generated by
combined-heat-and-power plants on the heat market. Producer profits are determined
as the sum of these incomes, from which the following costs are deducted: variable
generation costs (including fuel and CO2 costs), additional variable costs arising from
ramping procedures, costs for pumping electricity into storage units, fixed operation and
maintenance costs and annualized investment costs. Equation (4.2) shows the difference
in producer profits between cooperative and national RES-E support. The difference in
the national welfare of country i is defined as the sum of differences in consumer rents
and in producer profits in this country (Eq.(4.3)). Differences in the overall European-
wide welfare are determined as the sum of differences of all national welfares and of
the congestion rents that the transmission system operators (TSO) earn (Eq.(4.4)).
Congestion rents cannot be allocated to a particular TSO of a specific country. In reality,
often agreements regarding the allocation of these rents exist (see, e.g., Nordpool Spot
(na)). However, as these agreements can change over time, we do not allocate congestion
rents to specific countries.
45As DIMENSION is a linear optimization model, no absolute values for consumer rents can be
determined. However, we are only interested in differences of consumer rents between scenarios with
cooperative and national RES-E support. Assuming an inelastic electricity demand, these differences in
consumer rents correspond to the differences in expenditures that consumers pay to meet their demand.
46Due to limited computed hours in the model, not all combinations of demand and RES-E infeed
that may occur with some probability can be explicitly modeled. Thus, in this modeling approach,
investments that are only required to meet security of supply are incentivized by a capacity price. Note
that, in real-world electricity markets, investments in plants which are only necessary for a few hours
can also be incentivized by price peaks in the electricity wholesale market (see Nagl (2013)).
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dCRi,y =φy · (−1) · [
∑
h
(qCOi,h,y − qNi,h,y) · xi,h,y (4.1)
+(sCOy − sNi,y) · αi,y ·
∑
h
xi,h,y
+ωa(
∑
a
CCOi,a,y · γCOi,y −
∑
a
CNi,a,y · γNi,y)
dpii,y =φy · [
∑
h,a
(qCOi,h,y · ZCOa,i,h,y − qNi,h,y · ZNa,i,h,y) (4.2)
+(sCOy ·
∑
r,i,h,y
ZCOr,i,h,y − sNi,y ·
∑
r,i,h,y
ZNr,i,h,y)
+ωa(
∑
a
CCOi,a,y · γCOi,y −
∑
a
CNi,a,y · γNi,y)]
+hy(
∑
d,h
HCOd,i,h,y −
∑
d,h
HCOd,i,h,y)]
−(
∑
h,a
va,y · (ZCOa,i,h,y − ZNa,i,h,y))
−(
∑
h,a
vra,y(R
CO
a,i,h,y −RNa,i,h,y))
−(qCOi,h,y · PCOp,i,h,y − qNi,h,y · PNp,i,h,y)
−
∑
a
(CCOi,a,y − CNi,a,y) · foma,y
−
∑
a
(ICOi,a,y − INi,a,y) · anna,y
dWi,y =dCRi,y + dpii,y (4.3)
dWy =
∑
i
dWi,y + φy · [[(qCOi,h,y · (1− λi,i′)− qCOi′,h,y) ·MCOi,i′,h,y]] (4.4)
−[(qNi,h,y · (1− λi,i′)− qNi′,h,y) ·MNi,i′,h,y]
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Table 4.5: Model abbreviations including sets, parameters and variables
Abbreviation Dimension/Unit Description
indices
a Technology
p Subset of a Storage technology
r Subset of a RES-E technology
d Subset of a Combined-heat-and-power technology
i,i’ Countries
h Hour
y Year
CO Coordinated Support
N National Support
Model parameters
anna,y EUR2010/MW Annuity for technology specific investment costs
xi,h,y MWel Demand
φy % Discount rate
foma,y EUR2010/MW Fixed operation and maintenance costs
va,y EUR2010/MWhth Variable generation costs
vra,y EUR2010/MWhth Additional variable costs for ramping
ωa % Capacity factor
αi,y % Quota on RES-E generation
λi,i′ % Transmission losses
Marginal values
qNi,h,y,q
CO
i,h,y EUR2010/MWhel Power price (marginal on power balance)
sNi,y,s
N
i,y EUR2010/MWhel Green certificate price (marginal on RES-E quota)
γNi,y, γ
CO
i,y EUR2010/MWhel Capacity price (marginal on peak capacity constraint)
hy EUR2010/MWhth Heat price
Model variables
ZNa,i,h,y,Z
N
a,i,h,y MWel Electricity generation
RNa,i,h,y, R
CO
a,i,h,y MWel Capacity which is ramped up in hour h
MNi,i′,h,y, M
CO
i,i′,h,y MWel Net electricity trade between regions
CNi,a,y,C
CO
i,a,y MWel Installed capacity
INi,a,y,I
CO
i,a,y MWel Capacity Additions
PNp,i,h,y, P
CO
p,i,h,y MWel Consumption in storage operation
HNd,i,h,y, H
CO
d,i,h,y MWth Heat generation in combined-heat-and-power plants
Variables
calculated ex-post
dCRi,y EUR2010 Difference in consumer rents
dpii,y EUR2010 Difference in producer profits
dWi,y EUR2010 Difference in country-wise sectoral welfare
dWy EUR2010 Difference in overall sectoral welfare
4.3.3 Model results
In this section, we present results from our scenario analysis with regard to price, re-
distribution and welfare effects of EU-wide cooperation in reaching the 2020 RES-E
targets. First, we present model results of the main scenarios (Section 4.3.3.1). Second,
we discuss the results of the sensitivity analysis (Section 4.3.3.2).
Chapter 4. Who benefits from cooperation? - A numerical analysis of redistribution
effects resulting from cooperation in European RES-E support 87
4.3.3.1 Analysis of the main scenarios
As described in Section 4.3.1, the main scenarios differ with regard to the assumed
level of physical interconnection between European regions. For the two different grid
extension scenarios (‘no extension’, ‘TYNDP’), we compare consumer rents, producer
profits and welfare in reaching the 2020 RES-E targets with either (technology-neutral)
national support or (technology-neutral) cooperative RES-E support. In addition, before
discussing welfare and redistribution effects, the general effects of cooperation on the
optimal technological and regional generation and capacity mix in the European power
system are briefly presented.
Effects of cooperation on generation patterns and welfare
Table 4.6 shows electricity generation and capacity differences by energy source on the
European level, resulting from the introduction of cooperation. It can be seen that
in 2020, European generation from onshore wind plants and concentrated-solar-power
(CSP) plants is higher with cooperation, while biomass-based electricity generation is
lower compared to the case where each country achieves its national target on its own.
Generation from onshore wind plants mainly increases because sites with high load fac-
tors in Poland, the Czech Republic and Ireland can be used to a larger extent (note that
the installed European onshore wind capacities are identical with and without cooper-
ation). The higher CSP generation is mainly of Spanish origin and the lower biomass
generation is mainly driven by a reduction in German biomass generation. Moreover,
offshore wind generation is higher with cooperation when the TYNDP can be realized,
because in this case offshore generation in Norway and Denmark is significantly higher
with cooperation and clearly overcompensates for a lower offshore wind generation in
Germany. In contrast, if the TYNDP is not realized, the favorable offshore wind sites in
Northern Europe can only be used to a smaller extent. Therefore, if the TYNDP is not
realized, European wind offshore generation decreases once cooperation is introduced
because the effect of lower offshore wind generation in Germany dominates.47 Photo-
voltaic generation is mainly higher in Spain and lower in Italy, when cooperation is
introduced. The increase in Spanish photovoltaic generation resulting from cooperation
is higher when the TYNDP is not realized because in this case offshore wind generation
from Northern Europe can be used to a lesser extent to achieve the European RES-E
47In the model, grid connection costs (as well as grid extension and other grid related costs) have
not been included. In the case of offshore wind plants, grid connection costs are substantially higher
compared to other technologies and depend on the shore distance of the wind parks. In Germany,
potential wind offshore areas are located relatively far from shore (Skiba and Reimers (2012)). Therefore,
when including offshore grid connection costs, the benefit of cooperation achieved by replacing German
offshore wind generation by less costly generation options may, ceteris paribus, increase.
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target cost-efficiently. Therefore, photovoltaic-based electricity generation on the Eu-
ropean level increases once cooperation is introduced when the TYNDP is not realized
and decreases in the TYNDP case.
Table 4.6: Generation and capacity differences between cooperative and national
RES-E support scenarios in the year 2020 [TWh and GW] on the European level (in
the TYNDP and in the ‘w/o TYNDP’ scenario)
Generation differences Capacity differences
TYNDP w/o TYNDP TYNDP w/o TYNDP
Nuclear -4.3 2.6 -0.5 0.6
Lignite 0.2 -1.5 0.6 -0.2
Gas 50.2 9.7 5.4 -1.1
Coal -41.5 -9.3 -3.9 -1.0
Storage -0.4 -1.0 0.0 0.0
Hydro 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -2.7
Biomass -29.2 -19.6 -4.5 -3.1
Onshore Wind 14.0 12.8 0.0 0.0
Offshore Wind 31.8 -14.8 4.3 -6.2
Photovotaics -8.5 9.2 -6.9 5.2
CSP 8.0 10.4 1.7 2.3
Geothermal -17.5 1.3 -2.4 0.2
Positive (negative) values indicate that electricity generation or generation capacities are
higher (lower) once cooperation is introduced.
Taking a look at generation differences of non-renewable-based electricity sources, a
switch from coal to gas-based electricity generation can be observed, once cooperation
is introduced. Coal-based electricity generation is lower in Spain and Poland, where, in
turn, RES-E generation is significantly higher with cooperation. In the TYNDP case,
gas-based electricity generation increases significantly in Italy, which is an importer
of green certificates once cooperation is introduced. An overview of changes in the
generation and capacity mixes on country level is provided in Table C.2 in Appendix C
for the largest certificate importing and exporting countries, which are also analyzed in
the following.
In Table 4.7, certificate trade streams in 2020 for the largest certificate importing and
exporting countries are shown. The amount of certificates traded is, in some coun-
tries, independent of the level of interconnection between countries (e.g., in Germany,
Poland and Italy). In these countries, the trade in green certificates mainly leads to a
switch between domestic renewable and conventional electricity generation. Moreover,
Germany is already today well interconnected with neighboring electricity markets. In
other countries, e.g., in Denmark and Norway, the enforcement of interconnectors is a
critical factor in determining to what extent sites with high wind speeds can be used
to generate more RES-E than required for national target achievement. For example,
in Norway, most electricity generation comes from renewable energy sources. Thus, due
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to low conventional generation that could be reduced, an increase in RES-E generation
has to be exported. Furthermore, in Spain, the amount of exported certificates signifi-
cantly depends on whether the TYNDP is realized or not. As explained above, in Spain
certificate exports are substantially lower when the TYNDP is realized because, in this
case, many other and more cost-efficient RES-E generation options (e.g., offshore wind
in Norway) are accessible.
Taking a look at the amount of certificates traded by the individual countries, it can be
seen that Germany is the largest importer, with certificates corresponding to 91 TWh
of green electricity and making up 42% of its NREAP target. Similarly, Finland and
Greece import large amounts of certificates and cost-efficiently fulfill one third or more
of their national target by using cooperation mechanisms (in the TYNDP case). Large
exporters of certificates are mainly countries with large potentials of sites with high
wind speeds, either for onshore or for offshore wind. In relation to its national target,
Denmark is the largest exporter of certificates (204% when the TYNDP is realized, 83%
when interconnectors are not enforced).
Table 4.7: Green certificate trade streams in 2020 [TWh and % of NREAP targets],
overall welfare gain from cooperative RES-E support [bn. EUR2010, cumulated 2010-
2020 and discounted by 5 %] and certificate price in 2020 [EUR2010/MWh] in the
scenarios ‘TYNDP’ and ‘w/o TYNDP’
TYNDP w/o TYNDP
Certificate trade of TWh % of target TWh % of target
largest certificate importing countries [TWh]
Finland (FI) -11 33% -5 14%
Germany (DE) -91 42% -91 42%
Greece (GR) -8 37% -3 10%
Italy (IT) -9 9% -9 9%
Portugal (PT) -7 20% -3 8%
Sweden (SE) -10 10% -9 10%
United Kingdom (UK) -6 5% -4 3%
Certificate trade of
largest certificate exporting countries [TWh]
Czech Republic (CZ) 9 80% 9 80%
Denmark (DK) 28 204% 11 83%
France (FR) 5 3% 11 7%
Ireland (IE) 7 50% 6 44%
Norway (NO) 51 45% 21 18%
Poland (PL) 19 60% 19 60%
Spain (ES) 23 15% 38 25%
Overall welfare gain [bn. EUR2010] 12 10.6
European certificate price [EUR2010/MWh] 47.4 52.1
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In addition, Table 4.7 depicts the overall welfare gain of cooperation as well as the Eu-
ropean certificate price (in the case that cooperation is possible), depending on the level
of interconnection between regions. Generally, stronger interconnections between the
European regions facilitate the use of low-cost generation options throughout Europe as
well as the balancing of supply and demand over large distances (Fu¨rsch et al. (2013a)).
Therefore, the European-wide benefit of cooperative, compared to purely national, RES-
E support increases because sites with high wind speeds or high solar radiation are more
easily accessible (see also Fu¨rsch and Lindenberger (2013)). The overall welfare gain
of introducing cooperation is 12 bn. EUR2010 when the TYNDP is realized and 10.6
bn. EUR2010 when interconnector capacities are not extended. Note that the results
in terms of cost figures presented in this section refer to the period 2010-2020 and are
discounted by 5%. As we use a dynamic model and amortization times of power plants
are long (typically around 20 years, depending on the technology), these costs do not
include all costs induced by the 2020 target (and vice versa, the presented welfare gains
do not include the total long-term benefit of introducing cooperation in the achievement
of the 2020 target).
The largest welfare gain of cooperation on the country level is achieved in Germany, as
can be seen in Table 4.8 which depicts welfare differences per country between cooper-
ative and national RES-E support scenarios (cumulated from 2010 to 2020).
Table 4.8: Country-wise welfare differences between cooperative and national RES-E
support scenarios [bn. EUR2010, cumulated 2010-2020, discounted by 5%]
Certificate importing countries TYNDP w/o TYNDP
Finland (FI) 0.1 0.3
Germany (DE) 5.3 4.3
Greece (GR) 0.1 0.0
Italy (IT) 0.1 0.2
Portugal (PT) 0.0 0.0
Sweden (SE) 0.4 -0.1
United Kingdom (UK) 0.0 0.1
Certificate exporting countries
Czech Republic (CZ) 0.8 0.9
Denmark (DK) 0.1 0.1
France (FR) 0.3 0.1
Ireland (IE) -0.1 0.1
Norway (NO) 0.6 0.1
Poland (PL) 0.7 1.0
Spain (ES) 1.3 0.3
Positive (negative) values indicate that welfare is higher (lower) once cooperation is introduced.
On the country level, welfare generally increases with cooperation because either in-
creasing consumer rents overcompensate for decreasing producer profits or vice versa.
The country that benefits (in absolute terms) most from cooperation is Germany. It
is the country with the highest electricity demand and the highest RES-E target (see
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Table 4.3) and also trades the highest amount of certificates (see Table 4.7). Certificate
exporting countries which benefit most from cooperation are Poland, the Czech Repub-
lic and, if the TYNDP is realized, Spain and Norway. In relation to their electricity
demand, countries which benefit most from cooperation are smaller countries such as
Latvia and Luxembourg.
In some few countries, however, welfare decreases. In Ireland (if the TYNDP is realized)
and Sweden (if the TYNDP is not realized), cumulated welfare up to 2020 is lower
under cooperation. In these two countries, the welfare decreasing effect is temporary
and occurs because not all costs and incomes from electricity generation are realized
in the same period.48 In contrast, in Portugal and France (in the TYNDP scenario),
welfare decreases in the long term. As shown theoretically by Unteutsch (2014), the
change in welfare on the country level, resulting from cooperation, can be negative if a)
a country is an exporter of both electricity and certificates, and the additional incomes
gained from certificate exports do not outweigh lower incomes gained from the export
of electricity or if b) a country is an importer of both electricity and certificates and
the cost savings, in terms of renewable energy production, do not outweighed higher
electricity import costs. In this numerical analysis, welfare decreases in Portugal, an
importer of both electricity and certificates, and in France, an exporter of electricity
and certificates (in the TYNDP scenario).
While the overall European-wide benefit of cooperation increases if countries are better
interconnected (Table 4.7), the effect of interconnector extensions on the welfare change
is ambiguous on the country level. In Germany, the benefit of cooperation is larger if
the TYNDP is realized and certificates can be imported at a comparatively low price. In
contrast, in Poland, the benefit of cooperation is larger without interconnector extensions
because, in this case, the European certificate price is higher and higher revenues from
certificate exports can be gained.
In the following, we discuss how the introduction of cross-border trading of green cer-
tificates influences prices, consumer rents and producer profits in the different European
countries.
Effects of cooperation on price changes
Unteutsch (2014) shows that cross-border trading of green certificates leads to an in-
crease (decrease) of green certificate prices in countries with comparatively low (high)
RES-E generation costs, while opposite price effects occur on the regional wholesale
electricity markets. Table 4.9 depicts green certificate prices and wholesale electricity
48In these countries, cumulated welfare up to 2020 decreases; however, cumulated welfare up to the
end of the modeled period increases. In order to account for long amortization and lifetimes of power
plants, the optimization model runs up to 2040.
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prices in 2020 for both the cooperative and the national RES-E support scenarios in
selected European countries.
Table 4.9: Green certificate prices and wholesale electricity prices in 2020 (with na-
tional and with cooperative RES-E support), [EUR2010/MWh]
TYNDP w/o TYNDP
Certificate Wholesale Certificate Wholesale
price electr. price price electr. price
Certificate Nat Coop Diff. Nat Coop Diff. Nat Coop Diff. Nat Coop Diff.
importers
FI 36.9 47.4 10.5 47.8 46.9 -0.9 35.0 52.1 17.1 47.4 46.7 -0.7
DE 87.6 47.4 -40.1 46.6 49.5 3.0 87.6 52.1 -35.5 46.3 49.5 3.2
GR 44.7 47.4 2.7 50.5 53.4 2.7 45.6 52.1 6.5 51.1 52.7 1.7
IT 40.7 47.4 6.7 56.8 58.4 1.6 42.4 52.1 9.7 55.4 56.7 1.3
PT 34.3 47.4 13.1 54.5 52.6 -1.9 34.2 52.1 17.9 55.8 52.6 -3.1
SE 61.9 47.4 -14.4 46.4 43.8 -2.6 64.7 52.1 -12.6 45.2 41.5 -3.7
UK 113.7 47.4 -66.3 49.4 50.7 1.3 110.0 52.1 -58.0 50.5 52.4 1.9
Certificate
exporters
CZ 14.3 47.4 33.2 45.9 47.8 1.9 13.6 52.1 38.5 46.1 47.3 1.2
DK 0.0 47.4 47.4 46.6 44.0 -2.6 0.0 52.1 52.1 46.2 42.5 -3.7
FR 14.7 47.4 32.7 45.7 46.1 0.4 16.2 52.1 35.9 44.8 45.1 0.4
IE 0.0 47.4 47.4 51.7 48.2 -3.4 4.6 52.1 47.4 53.6 46.2 -7.4
NO 0.0 47.4 47.4 46.0 40.6 -5.4 0.0 52.1 52.1 45.6 36.5 -9.0
PL 0.0 47.4 47.4 47.2 48.8 1.6 0.0 52.1 52.1 47.1 47.9 0.9
ES 23.8 47.4 23.7 52.2 51.0 -1.2 22.1 52.1 30.0 54.2 49.6 -4.6
In all certificate exporting countries, green certificate prices increase with cooperation,
while the opposite generally holds true in the certificate importing countries. However,
in some certificate importing countries, the green certificate price in 2020 also increases
(FI, PT, IT, GR). In these countries, the certificate prices in the period post 2020
decrease given cooperation. Therefore, from a dynamic perspective, for these countries
it is cost-efficient to import certificates. Note that the range of certificate price changes
is identical in many exporting countries (NO, PL, DK and IE in the ‘TYNDP’ case). In
these countries, the national certificate price is zero because the national target is not
binding. The certificate price changes thus correspond to the different certificate prices
occurring with cooperation (see Table 4.7). The largest certificate price change occurs
in the United Kingdom. As shown in Table 4.7, the amount of certificates imported
is comparatively low (3% and 5% without and with the realization of the TYNDP,
respectively). However, the high certificate price in the national RES-E scenarios shows
that it is very costly to reach the national target completely by domestic production.
The wholesale electricity price increases in most certificate importing countries. Excep-
tions occur in Portugal, Finland and Sweden. In these countries, the wholesale elec-
tricity prices decrease because the RES-E generation in neighboring countries increases
(Spain and Norway). In most certificate exporting countries, wholesale electricity prices
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are lower with cooperation (DK, IE, NO, ES). In other certificate exporting countries,
which today are already well interconnected with certificate importing countries, whole-
sale electricity prices increase (CZ, FR and PL).
In general, it can be seen that, in most countries, the change in the green certificate
price far exceeds the change in the wholesale electricity price. Unteutsch (2014) shows
that, in general, the change in green certificate prices is larger than the change in whole-
sale electricity prices but affects a smaller quantity than the change in the wholesale
electricity price. Thus, the net effect of cross-border cooperation on consumer rents and
total producer profits per country is theoretically unclear and needs to be determined
by numerical analyses.
Effects on consumers rents and producer profits
Results of the numerical analysis in terms of consumer rents and producer profits per
country are depicted in Table 4.10. The upper part of the table depicts the change of
discounted, cumulated consumer rents and producer profits up to 2020 that result from
cross-border green certificate trading. Percentage changes are depicted in the lower part
of the table.49 Consumer rents are only affected by cooperation via changes in the green
certificate prices and in the wholesale electricity prices, assuming an inelastic demand.
Producer profits, in contrast, are affected by cooperation via price and quantity effects
as the amount of electricity produced and/or the electricity mix within a country also
changes.
49Due to the assumption of an inelastic electricity demand, absolute values for consumer rents with
either national or cooperative RES-E support cannot be determined. Thus, the percentage change of
consumer rents between cooperative and national RES-E support can also not be determined. While
absolute differences in the expenditures of consumers in meeting their electricity demand (multiplied
with -1) correspond to absolute difference in consumer rents, percentage changes cannot be determined.
Thus, the lower part of Table 4.10 depicts the percentage change in expenditures of consumers as well
as the percentage changes of producer profits between cooperative and national RES-E support.
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Table 4.10: Differences in consumer rents and producer profits between cooperative
and national RES-E support, cumulated up to 2020 and discounted by 5% [bn. EUR2010
and %-changes]
changes in bn. EUR2010
TYNDP w/o TYNDP
Certificate Consumer rent Changes of Consumer rent Changes of
importing changes producer profits changes producer profits
countries (Coop-Nat) (Coop-Nat) (Coop-Nat) (Coop-Nat)
FI -1.0 1.2 -1.9 2.2
DE 20.0 -14.7 18.1 -13.8
GR -0.4 0.5 -0.6 0.6
IT -4.2 4.3 -3.8 3.9
PT -1.1 1.1 -1.5 1.6
SE 5.2 -4.8 5.4 -5.4
UK 20.8 -20.8 18.2 -18.1
Certificate
exporting
countries
CZ -1.7 2.5 -1.5 2.5
DK -2.6 2.7 -2.8 2.9
FR -13.0 13.3 -14.9 15.1
IE -1.7 1.6 -1.3 1.4
NO -13.9 14.5 -13.7 13.7
PL -5.6 6.3 -5.2 6.2
ES -13.6 14.8 -14.6 14.9
% changes
Certificate Changes in Changes of Changes in Changes of
importing consumer producer profits consumer producer profits
countries expenditures expenditures
countries (Coop-Nat) (Coop-Nat) (Coop-Nat) (Coop-Nat)
FI 2.4 7.9 4.5 14.9
DE -7.3 -13.5 -6.6 -12.7
GR 1.3 4.3 1.9 5.2
IT 2.3 7.5 2.1 7.0
PT 3.6 9.5 5.0 13.1
SE -6.3 -7.5 -6.5 -8.6
UK -11.3 -36.3 -9.9 -31.5
Certificate
exporting
countries
CZ 5.8 17.7 5.1 17.2
DK 17.1 42 18.3 45
FR 5.0 9.2 6.0 11.2
IE 13.5 85 10.1 78
NO 34.3 38 34.2 37
PL 9.3 60 8.6 59
ES 8.6 28 9.2 28
Positive (negative) values indicate that consumer rents, consumer expenditures or producer
profits are higher (lower) once cooperation is introduced.
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It can be seen that, in those countries which are exporters of certificates, consumer rents
decrease and producer rents increase when changing from a national to a cooperative
support system. Results for countries that are importers of certificates are more ambigu-
ous. In some certificate importing countries, the effect of the change in the certificate
price overcompensates for the effect of the change in the wholesale electricity price (e.g.,
in DE, GB and SE), such that consumer rents increase and producer profits decrease.
However, in other certificate importing countries, the wholesale electricity price effect
dominates such that producers make higher profits (especially from the utilization of ex-
isting conventional plants) and consumers are worse off with cooperation (e.g., PT). In
Italy and Greece, both the certificate and the wholesale electricity price in 2020 increase
such that consumers rents decrease and producer profits increase.
The largest effects of cooperation on consumer rents (in terms of percentage changes)
occur in Norway, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. In these countries, the
certificate price effect resulting from cooperation is very large and, in addition, the
RES-E targets are comparatively high, such that the change in the certificate price
has a large influence on the electricity bill of end consumers. Regarding the change in
producer profits, cooperation substantially increases profits in Ireland, Poland, Denmark
and Norway. These countries export large amounts of certificates and are characterized
by high changes in the certificate prices. Moreover, it can be seen that redistribution
effects are generally large compared to the overall welfare gain resulting from cooperation
on the European level. For example, the changes in consumer rents and producer profits
in the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Norway and France far exceed the overall
change in European-wide welfare (see Table 4.7).
Comparing changes in consumer rents and producer profits in the scenarios with and
without the realization of the TYNDP, it can be seen that the effects of cooperation
are of a similar order of magnitude in both settings. Even in Norway, which exports
certificates corresponding to 51 TWh RES-E generation when the TYNDP is realized
and less than half as much when interconnectors are not enforced, the effect of coop-
eration on consumer rents and producer profits hardly differs. Consumer rents are not
directly affected by the amount of certificates traded but only by the changes in prices.
In Norway, the combined effect of cooperation on the wholesale electricity price and
the certificate price are of the same order of magnitude with and without realization
of the TYNDP. In addition, due to the assumed high RES-E target in Norway, both
price changes affect nearly the same amount of electricity for consumers. Moreover, the
effect of cooperation on producer profits is hardly influenced by different grid extensions
because (as discussed in more detail in the following) producer profits in Norway mainly
increase with cooperation as the incomes of existing hydro plants increase. Additional
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incomes from those capacities that are only built to export green certificates (in the
cooperative support scenarios), in contrast, are comparatively low.
A closer look on producer profits
Tables 4.11 through 4.13 present a closer look on changes in producer profits. Table 4.11
depicts differences in producer profits between the national and the cooperative support
scenarios by fuel type and Tables 4.12 and 4.13 highlight effects of cooperation in RES-E
support on producer profits per country for conventional power plants and renewable
energy plants, respectively. In all three tables, only changes in producer profits realized
using plants from the currently existing European power plant fleet are shown. Thus,
to be specific, producer rents (and not profits) of existing plants are depicted because
investment costs of existing power plants are considered as stranded costs.
Examining the changes in producer rents of the existing power plant fleet is interesting
for two main reasons. First, in contrast to new power plant investments, existing plants
are not mobile. Investment decisions for the existing power plant fleet have been made
in the past without anticipating European-wide cooperation (and possibly also without
anticipating a strong RES-E expansion in general). If producer rents realized by these
plants would decrease due to a shift in politics towards more cooperation in RES-E
support, cooperation plans would presumably face strong opposition from the respec-
tive plant owners.50 Second, it may be questioned as to whether it is appropriate to
determine country-wise producer profits in light of international capital markets. While
this question also concerns the existing power plant fleet, since large international stock
companies generate a large part of electricity in many countries, this question becomes
even more important for new investments. While the current ownership structure of the
European power plant fleet is known, it is unclear which companies would build new
capacities. Furthermore, in some countries, the state owns a large part of the existing
power plant fleet.
Table 4.11 shows that, on a European level, producer rents gained from electricity gen-
eration by existing lignite, coal, gas and hydro plants are larger with cooperative than
with national RES-E support. In contrast, rents gained from generation by existing
biomass, offshore wind and photovoltaic plants decrease once cooperation is introduced.
Rents gained from existing nuclear plants are larger with cooperative RES-E support if
the TYNDP is realized but lower with national RES-E support if interconnectors are
not enforced. The owners of existing onshore wind plants, in contrast, benefit in sum
50In fact, Portugal, for example, states in its National Renewable Energy Action Plan (NREAP) that it
would be interested in surpassing its own target and make use of cooperation mechanisms, given that the
interconnector between Spain and France is expanded. Without a stronger interconnection of the Iberian
Peninsula to Central Europe, the impact of a higher RES-E share on the existing conventional power
plant fleet in Portugal would be strong (see Portuguese Republic (2010) and Fu¨rsch and Lindenberger
(2013)).
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(on a European level) from cooperation if interconnectors are not enforced but are worse
off in the cooperation case if the TYNDP is realized.
Producer rents realized with lignite-based, gas-based and coal-based electricity gener-
ation increase because wholesale electricity prices in those countries, in which large
capacities of lignite, gas and coal plants are located, increase once cooperation is intro-
duced. Large lignite plants exist in Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic. Lignite
production in these countries is hardly affected by the introduction of cooperation in
RES-E support, whereas wholesale electricity prices in these three countries increase
(Table 4.9). Producer rents of existing coal plants mainly increase because wholesale
electricity prices in Germany and Italy increase. Producer rents realized by existing gas
plants increase mainly due to increased generation and electricity prices in Germany,
the United Kingdom, Italy and - especially in the TYNDP case - the Netherlands.
The effect of cooperation on producer rents gained from electricity generation by ex-
isting nuclear plants is rather small because generation levels are hardly affected by
the introduction of cooperation. In addition, existing nuclear plants are located both
in countries in which the wholesale electricity price increases with cooperation (e.g.,
FR) and in countries where the wholesale electricity price decreases (e.g., ES and FI).
Therefore, the net effect on overall producer rents from existing nuclear plants on the
European level is small.
Hydro rents are substantially larger with cooperative RES-E support because most hy-
dro power plants are competitive without support payments. For example, the national
green certificate price (without cooperation) is zero in Norway, where large hydro power
resources are located. Thus, a shift towards a cooperative RES-E support system, in
which hydro power producers gain revenues from selling green certificates at the Euro-
pean certificate prices, increases hydro rents substantially.51 The increase in hydro rents
is larger if the TYNDP is not realized because, in this case, the European certificate
price is higher.
Producer rents realized using existing biomass plants, offshore wind plants and photo-
voltaic systems decrease once cooperation is introduced because a large part of these
plants were built in countries that are importers of certificates if cooperation is possible
(e.g., Germany, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom, Italy). In most of these countries,
the certificate price is lower with cooperation than with national RES-E support.
Existing onshore wind capacities are mainly located in Germany and Spain. While
the certificate price in Germany decreases once cooperation is introduced, the opposite
51Of course, hydro may also be excluded from the support system, depending on the specific support
design. For example, in Germany, large hydro power plants are currently excluded from the RES-E
support system.
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price effect resulting from cooperation is observed for Spain. If the TYNDP is realized,
onshore rents on a European level decrease because the effect of lower rents gained in
Germany is dominant. In contrast, if interconnectors are not enforced, the increase in
the certificate price resulting from cooperation in Spain is higher than if the TYNDP is
realized and onshore wind rents increase on a European level.
Table 4.11: Differences in producer rents gained from electricity generation of ex-
isting power plants (by fuel type) between cooperative and national RES-E support,
cumulated up to 2020 and discounted by 5% [bn. EUR2010 and %-changes]
TYNDP w/o TYNDP
bn. EUR2010 % bn. EUR2010 %
Nuclear 1.1 0.6 -0.8 -0.5
Lignite 1.4 4.6 0.6 2.0
Coal 4.8 12.2 4.2 10.5
Gas 3.3 8.3 0.6 1.4
Storage 0.2 3877.4 0.5 -337.5
Hydro 23.7 9.4 31.3 12.5
Biomass -3.6 -74.4 -1.9 -42.1
Onshore Wind -0.9 -1.7 0.7 1.4
Offshore Wind -0.5 -18.6 -0.3 -12.1
Photovoltaics -1.0 -6.1 -0.7 -4.3
Positive (negative) values indicate that producer rents are higher (lower) once cooperation is
introduced.
Tables 4.12 and 4.13 depict changes in producer rents on the country level. The changes
in producer rents gained from generation by existing conventional power plants (Table
4.12) mostly reflect the changes in wholesale electricity prices (see Table 4.9). An excep-
tion is Spain, where producer rents increase despite of decreasing wholesale electricity
prices in 2020. However, the wholesale electricity price in 2015 is higher given coopera-
tive rather than national RES-E support. The largest benefit (in absolute values) from
cooperation in terms of producer rents of existing conventional power plants is realized
in Germany (+ 5.1 bn. EUR2010 in the TYNDP scenario), followed by Spain (+ 1.9 bn.
EUR2010) and United Kingdom (+ 1.3 bn. EUR2010).
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Table 4.12: Differences in producer rents gained from electricity generation by exist-
ing conventional power plants (per country) between cooperative and national RES-E
support, cumulated up to 2020 and discounted by 5% [bn. EUR2010 and %-changes]
TYNDP w/o TYNDP
Certificate importing countries bn. EUR2010 % bn. EUR2010 %
Finland (FI) 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.1
Germany (DE) 5.1 14.1 4.3 12.0
Greece (GR) 0.1 1.9 0.1 1.5
Italy (IT) 0.7 8.2 0.1 1.8
Portugal (PT) -0.1 -2.9 -0.1 -2.8
Sweden (SE) -0.6 -3.8 -1.0 -6.7
United Kingdom (UK) 1.3 9.5 1.1 7.1
Certificate exporting countries
Czech Republic (CZ) 0.6 4.3 0.2 1.6
Denmark (DK) -0.1 -2.3 -0.1 -2.3
France (FR) -1.0 -0.9 -1.1 -1.1
Ireland (IE) 0.1 35.3 0.1 103.9
Norway (NO) 0.0 23.4 0.0 135.7
Poland (PL) 0.5 4.4 -0.1 -0.6
Spain (ES) 1.9 7.4 1.1 4.4
Positive (negative) values indicate that producer rents are higher (lower) once cooperation is
introduced.
Existing RES-E plants make up approximately one third of the currently existing Euro-
pean power plant capacity. Producer rents realized up to 2020 using currently existing
RES-E plants are higher given cooperative RES-E support, in particular, in countries
that are characterized by large hydro power resources and in which, in addition, the
certificate price increases once cooperation is introduced (NO, FR, ES, IT). Lower pro-
ducer rents under cooperative RES-E support are mainly realized in Germany and the
United Kingdom, where the certificate price decreases with cooperation. In many other
European countries, very few RES-E capacities currently exist.
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Table 4.13: Differences in producer rents gained from electricity generation by ex-
isting RES-E plants (per country) between cooperative and national RES-E support,
cumulated up to 2020 and discounted by 5% [bn. EUR2010 and %-changes]
TYNDP w/o TYNDP
Certificate importing countries bn. EUR2010 % bn. EUR2010 %
Finland (FI) 0.7 11.7 1.3 21.3
Germany (DE) -14.5 -23.0 -12.8 -20.3
Greece (GR) 0.1 1.9 0.2 4.0
Italy (IT) 1.8 5.0 3.8 10.0
Portugal (PT) 0.7 8.0 1.0 10.9
Sweden (SE) -4.3 -9.3 -4.5 -9.8
United Kingdom (UK) -6.2 -34.7 -5.3 -30.3
Certificate exporting countries
Czech Republic (CZ) 1.0 94.0 1.1 104.2
Denmark (DK) 1.5 93.8 1.8 120.0
France (FR) 5.8 17.9 6.7 21.8
Ireland (IE) 0.4 35.9 0.4 30.4
Norway (NO) 15.8 38.1 18.6 44.4
Poland (PL) 0.6 77.5 0.7 84.5
Spain (ES) 6.4 22.6 7.7 27.5
Positive (negative) values indicate that producer rents are higher (lower) once cooperation is
introduced.
4.3.3.2 Sensitivity Analysis: The influence of CO2 emission prices and RES-
E investment cost developments on welfare and redistribution effects
As shown by Unteutsch (2014), the slopes of the electricity supply curves (for RES-E and
conventional electricity) determine the magnitude of the price changes and thereby also
the magnitude of redistribution effects induced by certificate trade. Therefore, we run
sensitivities with regard to three parameters that influence the slopes of the supply curves
and investigate whether findings of the main scenarios are robust to these changes. We
run sensitivities for the development of the CO2 emission price, photovoltaic investment
costs and offshore wind investment costs, which are all subject to great uncertainty. In
the sensitivity analysis, we assume that the CO2 emission price in 2020 is higher (by 10
EUR/t) and that photovoltaic and offshore wind investment costs in 2020 are lower (by
10% each) compared to the assumptions made in the main scenarios.
An increasing CO2 emission price and decreasing RES-E investment costs have a com-
mon impact on the electricity system: Generation cost differences between RES-E plants
and conventional plants decrease. Thus, the costs of achieving RES-E targets also de-
crease - both on a national level and under cooperation. The overall European system-
wide benefit of cooperation decreases (‘lower photovoltaic costs’) or increases (‘lower off-
shore costs’ and ‘higher CO2 price’), depending on whether costs in the national or in the
cooperative RES-E support scenarios are more affected by an increasing CO2 emission
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price/decreasing RES-E investment costs. Table 4.14 provides an overview of European-
wide welfare effects and the European green certificate price in the ‘reference’ case,
corresponding to the ‘TYNDP’ scenario of the main scenarios, as well as in the sensi-
tivity scenarios. In addition, certificate trade streams, price changes, redistribution and
welfare effects in selected countries are presented.
Table 4.14: The influence of the CO2 price and RES-E investment cost develop-
ments on model results [[bn. EUR2010], cumulated 2010-2020 and discounted by 5 %;
[EUR2010/MWh] in 2020 or [TWh] in 2020 ]
Reference Higher Lower wind Lower photovoltaic
CO2 price offshore costs costs
Overall welfare 12 13.4 12.4 11.3
gain [bn. EUR2010]
European certificate 47.4 34.2 45.6 42.4
price [EUR2010/MWh]
Results for
selected countries
Certificate price DE - 40.1 (+ 2.9) - 30.8 (+ 1.4) - 42 (+ 3.2) - 33.6 (+ 3.4)
change [EUR2010/MWh] DK + 47.4 (- 2.6) + 34.2 (- 2.5) + 45.6 (- 3.7) + 42.4 (- 0.8)
and ES + 23.7 (- 1.2) + 15.1 (- 2.2) + 21.9 (- 0.5) + 16.0 (+ 0.2)
(wholesale electricity IE + 47.4 (- 3.4) + 34.2 (- 3.3) + 45.6 (- 4.2) + 42.4 (- 2.9)
price change) IT + 6.7 (+ 1.6) - 2.8 (+ 0.3) + 4.9 (+ 1.7) + 10 (+ 1.6)
NO + 47.4 (- 5.4) + 34.2 (- 5.5) + 45.6 (- 5.5) + 42.4 (- 3.9)
PL + 47.4 (+ 1.6) + 34.2 (- 0.8) + 45.6 (+ 1.8) + 42.4 (+ 1.9)
Certificate trade [TWh] DE -91 -91 -91 -91
DK 28 21 34 21
ES 23 20 19 36
IE 7 7 9 7
IT -9 -9 -9 3
NO 51 50 51 51
PL 19 17 19 17
Consumer rent DE + 20.0 (- 14.7) + 19.9 (- 9.8) + 20.6 (- 15.5) + 15.4 (- 8.8)
change [bn. EUR2010] DK - 2.6 (+ 2.7) - 1.8 (+ 1.6) - 2.4 (+ 2.4) - 2.5 (+ 2.5)
and ES - 13.6 (+ 14.8) - 6.8 (+ 7.5) - 12.9 (+ 14.3) - 9.9 (+ 10.4)
(changes in producer IE - 1.7 (+ 1.6) - 1.1 (+ 1.3) - 1.6 (+ 1.5) - 1.5 (+ 1.3)
profits [bn. EUR2010]) IT - 4.2 (+ 4.3) + 1.4 (- 0.7) - 4.1 (+ 4.2) - 5.4 (+ 5.1)
NO - 13.9 (+ 14.5) - 9.5 (+ 8.9) - 13.3 (+ 14.3) - 12.7 (+ 12.7)
PL - 5.6 (+ 6.3) - 2.4 (+ 3.4) - 5.5 (+ 6.1) - 5.1 (+ 5.7)
Changes in country-wise DE 5.3 7.1 5 6.7
welfare [bn. EUR2010] DK 0.1 -0.2 0 0
ES 1.3 0.7 1.4 0.5
IE -0.1 0.2 -0.2 -0.2
IT 0.1 0.7 0.1 -0.4
NO 0.6 -0.7 1 0
PL 0.7 1 0.6 0.6
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In many countries, the amount of certificates traded is not sensitive to changes in the
CO2 emission price or RES-E investment costs. For example, the amount of certifi-
cates traded by Germany and by Norway is (approximately) the same in the reference
and all sensitivity scenarios. In the case of lower investment costs for offshore wind
plants, Denmark and Ireland export a higher amount of certificates, while exports from
Spain decrease compared to the ‘reference’ case. In the case of lower photovoltaic costs,
countries in the Mediterranean region (Spain and Italy) produce more RES-E, while
offshore wind generation in the North Sea region is reduced. In fact, Italy is a cer-
tificate importing country in all scenarios except for the ‘lower photovoltaic’ sensitivity
scenario. A higher CO2 price reduces the overall amount of traded certificates in Europe
by around 10%. Due to a higher CO2 price, the relative costs of generating power and
heat in geothermal plants compared to the costs of generating heat and power in hard
coal CHP plants decrease in some countries. Therefore, in some countries which are
certificate importers in the ‘reference’ scenario, the optimal amount of domestic RES-E
production increases.
Furthermore, the sign of the redistribution effects determined in the main scenarios is,
in most countries, robust to changes in the supply curves assumed in the sensitivity
scenarios. In most certificate importing countries, such as Germany, the certificate price
decreases and the wholesale electricity price increases. In addition, in most certificate
importing countries, the certificate price effect overcompensates for the wholesale elec-
tricity price effect such that consumers are better and producers are worse off than in
a situation with purely national RES-E support systems. The opposite holds true for
most certificate exporting countries, such as Norway and Ireland.
In contrast, the magnitude of price and redistribution effects highly depends on the
assumptions varied in the sensitivity scenarios. The European certificate price is lower by
around 28% when assuming a CO2 price of 30 EUR/t (instead of 20 EUR/t). A decrease
in offshore wind investment costs (photovoltaic costs) by 10% reduces the European
green certificate price by around 4% (11%) compared to the ‘reference case’. In countries
where the national RES-E target is not binding, the European certificate price directly
corresponds to the certificate price change resulting from cooperation (e.g., in Ireland
and Norway). In these countries, a lower European certificate price reduces the benefit
of cooperation for producers and attenuates the effect of decreasing consumer rents. For
example, in the sensitivity scenario ‘higher CO2 price’, the benefit that producers receive
from cooperation decreases compared to the ‘reference’ case by 32% in Norway (19% in
Ireland). Furthermore, the effect of increasing expenditures for consumers to meet their
electricity demand decreases compared to the ‘reference’ case (-32% in Norway, -35% in
Ireland). In other countries, the change in the certificate price depends on the relation
between the national and the European certificate price, which both depend on changes
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in CO2 emission prices and/or RES-E investment costs. For example, in Germany, lower
photovoltaic costs have a larger impact on the national than on the European certificate
price. Thus, both the benefit consumers have from cooperation and the negative impact
cooperation has on producer profits substantially decrease compared to the reference
case (by 23% for consumers, by 40% for producers). Moreover, the effect that lower
photovoltaic costs have on the redistribution effects between individual groups within
the countries is significantly larger than the effect of lower photovoltaic costs on the total
system-wide welfare change resulting from cooperation (- 6% compared to the reference
case).
In summary, the sensitivity analysis shows that the sign of the redistribution effects of
cooperation and the magnitude of the overall European-wide welfare effect are quite ro-
bust to different assumptions which influence the slope of the electricity supply curves.
However, the magnitude of price changes and thus also of redistribution effects is sensi-
tive to different developments of RES-E investment costs and the CO2 emission price.
4.3.4 Critical discussion of the numerical results
This paper numerically analyzes welfare and redistribution effects potentially resulting
from the introduction of cooperation in European RES-E support. While the modeling
represents the European power system by including European data about e.g., electric-
ity demand, resource potentials, wind speed and the existing power plant fleet, some
important differences between the current real-world European power system and the
modeled situation exist. Therefore, in this section we discuss which model specifics have
to be kept in mind when drawing conclusions from the model results presented in Section
4.3.3.
Probably the largest difference between the modeled scenarios and the real-world Eu-
ropean power system stems from the assumption of technology-neutral RES-E support
in all countries, both in the cases with and without cross-border cooperation. As stated
in the introduction of this section, currently a variety of country-specific RES-E sup-
port systems exists in Europe and many countries have implemented technology-specific
support systems, generally not leading to a cost-optimal generation mix. This current
real-world situation is not taken into account in the analysis presented in Section 4.3.3.
Therefore, in this paper, we do not quantify welfare and redistribution effects induced
by a change from the currently implemented country-specific RES-E support systems to
a RES-E support system with European-wide cooperation. Instead, we analyze the ef-
fects of introducing European-wide cooperation starting from a (hypothetical) situation
of country-specific technology-neutral RES-E support. Thereby, we explicitly determine
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the separate welfare and redistribution effects of cooperation and exclude the effects
which could also be achieved by optimizing national RES-E policies.
Note also that a complete change from purely national RES-E support to European-
wide cooperation represents an extreme shift of politics that is very unlikely to occur
before 2020. A first step towards European-wide cooperation would be the use of bi-
lateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms. Our analysis shows that especially
Germany would have a large benefit from cooperation - even under the assumption of
a cost-efficient domestic RES-E generation mix. Also, the analysis identifies potential
cooperation partners such as Poland or Spain. However, the magnitude of redistribution
effects resulting from different bilateral or multilateral engagements would have to be
calculated in separate model analyses as the magnitude of price effects would be dif-
ferent compared to the case when changing from purely national support to complete
European-wide cooperation. Nevertheless, this analysis shows that in the European
power system effects of cooperation arising in the RES-E market would in most coun-
tries (such as Germany) be dominant compared to effects in the electricity market and
that the sign of redistribution effects is in most countries very robust. Therefore, the
results from this analysis provide a general idea of the impact different cooperation
agreements would have on individual groups within the participating countries.
In addition, the magnitude of redistribution effects would in reality also depend on a
variety of additional political decisions. For example, grandfathering rules could apply
for existing renewable energy power plants. In this case, owners of existing RES-E plants
would not be affected by the introduction of cooperation and consumers in countries
with comparatively expensive existing RES-E plants would benefit to a smaller extent
from cooperation. Moreover, as stated in footnote 51, renewable energies which are
competitive without subsidies, such as large hydro power plants, might be excluded
from the RES-E support system. In this case, countries with large hydro power resources
would benefit less from cooperation.
In summary, the exact magnitude of redistribution effects resulting from different coop-
eration mechanisms in reality depends on many design specifics of the RES-E support
systems and the cooperation mechanisms themselves. Conclusions which can be drawn
from this analysis for the European electricity system are presented in the next sec-
tion and include that the effects of cooperation in the RES-E market overcompensate
in most countries for the effects occurring in the wholesale electricity market - even if
interconnectors are not further extended compared to today.
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4.4 Conclusion
Due to different meteorological conditions and resource availabilities across Europe,
cooperation in the support of renewable energies would increase overall welfare in the
European electricity sector. However, just like international trade in general, cooperation
in the achievement of national RES-E targets, e.g., via cross-border green certificate
trading, is not beneficial for all groups but creates winners and losers.
We find that in the European electricity system, effects of the change in the certificate
price in most countries would overcompensate for the effects of the change in the whole-
sale electricity price. Thus, in most countries with comparatively high (low) generation
costs for renewable energies, consumer rents increase (decrease) due to cooperation and
producers yield lower (higher) profits. In addition, we find that the magnitude of re-
distribution effects between the individual groups is quite large: In some countries, the
change in consumer rents or producer profits resulting from cooperation is nearly twice
as high as the overall welfare effect of cooperation in the whole European electricity
system. Moreover, the benefit different countries have from cooperation varies substan-
tially. In our analysis, we find that Germany would by far have the largest (absolute)
benefit of cooperation, achieved by significant reductions of RES-E target compliance
costs via certificate imports. Finally, we find that the sign of redistribution effects is
quite robust to different developments of interconnector extensions, the CO2 price and
RES-E investment costs. The magnitude of redistribution effects, in contrast, is in some
countries sensitive to these assumptions (especially with regard to the assumption on
the CO2 price).
Therefore, this analysis shows that cooperation indeed has a significant influence on the
welfare of different groups and thereby sheds further light to the question why it has been
difficult to implement cooperation mechanisms thus far. Although on a country level the
benefit of cooperation is generally positive, large inner-country redistribution effects may
occur and those groups which potentially are worse off once cooperation is introduced
may have a large influence on political decisions about the implementation of cooper-
ation. The question, how these redistribution effects should be dealt with, however,
is not straightforward. According to international trade theory, winners of trade can
always compensate losers such that no group is worse off than without trade. However,
in reality such compensation mechanisms can be complicated to design. First, it would
need to be clarified who should be compensated by whom. Considering only consumers,
cross-country compensation mechanisms could be implemented between those consumers
who benefit from trade and those who pay higher prices once cooperation is introduced.
But which group would, for example, compensate owners of conventional power plants
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in a country where the power price decreases once cooperation is introduced? Imple-
menting compensation mechanisms for producers is especially difficult because many
companies in the electricity sector operate in several countries and may therefore in
some countries benefit from cooperation and lose revenues in other countries. Moreover,
companies may also own both conventional and renewable power plants. Finally, even
a clear distinction between producers and consumers can be difficult in practice, e.g., in
the field of household photovoltaic installations. Second, the quantification of adequate
compensation payments can be difficult ex-ante to the implementation of cooperation.
As shown in this analysis, the exact magnitude of redistribution effects is specific to
economic and technological developments in the power system, which are often subject
to uncertainty. Finally, many other policies in the European power sector also induce
redistribution effects, for which no compensation mechanisms exist. Examples are the
European CO2 emission trading system, the initial implementation of RES-E targets and
the plan to create a single European electricity market. Thus, the question of welfare
and redistribution effects resulting from cooperation in RES-E support comes back to
the general question of trade and cooperation: To what extent should individual groups
be protected and how far should overall welfare be increased?
This analysis has several shortcomings which could be addressed by future research.
First, no sensitivities regarding the particular design of (national and cooperative) RES-
E support systems have been made. This, for example, includes the question of how
welfare and redistribution effects of cooperation depend on a technology-neutral (versus
a technology-specific) and a quantity-based (versus a price-based) support. Moreover,
in this analysis, we neglected that in practice grandfathering rules may apply for exist-
ing RES-E technologies. Second, in this analysis, we aggregated producer profits and
consumer rents on country levels. While this seems appropriate for consumers as well
as for some electricity producers, this procedure may be questioned for many electricity
producers that are large international stock companies, operating in several countries.
Further research analyzing the impact of cooperation on firm levels may be interest-
ing. Third, this analysis is based on a purely deterministic approach and neglects, e.g.,
the stochastic nature of wind and solar in-feed. Nagl et al. (2013) show that including
weather uncertainties in optimization models influences the value of different power plant
types. In particular, Nagl et al. (2013) find that the value of fluctuating renewables such
as wind decreases compared to deterministic modeling approaches. Consequently, in-
cluding weather uncertainties would also affect the optimal generation mixes both when
cooperation is and when it is not possible. Including stochastics therefore would lead
to a more accurate determination of welfare and redistribution effects. Fourth, in this
analysis, only the impact of an EU-wide cooperation in comparison to pure national
RES-E support systems is analyzed. A first step towards European-wide cooperation
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would be the use of cooperation mechanisms between two or more countries via a com-
mon support system, joint projects or statistical transfers. Our analysis shows that in
all scenarios the benefit of cooperation would be particularly large for Germany. There-
fore, an engagement in bilateral or multilateral cooperation mechanisms would be an
important measure to increase cost-efficiency in German RES-E support. The analy-
sis of welfare and redistribution effects resulting from cooperation between Germany
and different potential cooperation partners would be an interesting subject for further
research.

Chapter 5
Optimization of power plant
investments under uncertain
renewable energy deployment
paths: a multi-stage stochastic
programming approach
5.1 Introduction
In order to reduce CO2 emissions and the dependency from imported fuels, many coun-
tries established ambitious targets to increase electricity generation from renewable en-
ergy sources (RES-E). European member states agreed to increase the European RES-E
share from 15.6% in 2007 to 34% in 2020. Although long-term targets (after 2020) have
not been defined on a European level, individual member states, such as Germany, aim
at increasing their RES-E shares continously up to 80% in 2050.
However, the implementation of political plans can be uncertain, even if reliable targets
exist, for four principal reasons. First, many RES-E technologies are relatively new,
implying that technological and cost developments are uncertain and/or that limited
experiences exist for construction and maintenance. Second, favorable RES-E sites are
often located far from demand centers and therefore the electricity network has to be
adapted. Third, local opposition may hinder the construction of new sites or transmis-
sion lines due to visual or environmental concerns. Fourth, when RES-E is supported
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by a price-based promotion system, such as by a feed-in-tariff system, resulting RES-E
quantities are inherently uncertain.
Uncertainty of the achievement of RES-E targets is challenging for investment planning
because different shares of RES-E fundamentally change the optimal mix of dispatchable
power plants. Specifically, uncertain future RES-E deployment paths induce uncertainty
about the level and the steepness of the residual load duration curve and the structure
of the hourly residual load. Thus, the optimal mix of (dispatchable) peak-, mid- and
baseload plants is uncertain. In addition, it is uncertain how flexible the power plant fleet
should optimally be and how valuable storage units are for the system. Consequently, the
optimal investment planning for power plants with long construction times, amortization
times and technical lifetimes is difficult.
In this paper, we show in a first part how uncertain future RES-E penetration levels im-
pact the electricity system and in a second part try to quantify this impact from a social
welfare perspective for the electricity systems of Germany and its neighboring countries.
For the second part, we assume that a continuous increase in the RES-E share up to
2050 is a reliable target, which is however submitted to risks concerning the progress of
necessary infrastructure investments, public acceptance and cost developments of RES-
E. We use a multi-stage stochastic investment and dispatch model to quantify effects on
investment choices, electricity generation and system costs.
Our main findings include that uncertainty about the achievement of RES-E targets
significantly affects optimal investment and dispatch decisions. In particular, plants
with a medium capital/operating cost ratio have a higher value under uncertainty. We
find that this technology choice is mainly driven by the uncertainty about the level rather
than about the structure of the residual load. Furthermore, given larger investments in
plants with medium capital/operating cost ratio under uncertainty, optimal investments
in storage units are lower than under perfect foresight. In the case of the Central
European power market, costs induced by the implementation risk of renewable energies
are rather small compared to total system costs.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: The next section provides an
overview of related literature and the contribution of the current work. Section 5.3
describes the modeling approach and gives an overview of assumed input parameters.
In Section 5.4 we theoretically discuss the impact of uncertain future RES-E penetration
levels and highlight the most important effects in an illustrative modeling example. In
Section 5.5 we quantify the impact of uncertain RES-E target achievements for the
electricity systems of Germany and its neighboring countries. In Section 5.6 we draw
conclusions and provide an outlook for further research.
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5.2 Related literature
The analysis of uncertainties using stochastic optimization models can be traced back
to the 1950´s (Dantzig (1955)). Applications to electricity investment planning models
often focus on the effects of demand, fuel or CO2 emission price uncertainties. In
recent years, the influence of intermittent renewable infeed on investment decisions for
conventional power plants has also been analyzed with stochastic optimization models.
The influence of demand uncertainty on investment decisions was first shown in the
1980´s, for example by Murphy et al. (1982) and Mondiano (1987). Using multi-stage
optimization models, Gardner (1996) and Gardner and Rogers (1999) analyze the effect
of demand uncertainty in dynamic contexts.52 Gardner (1996) shows that the value of
technologies with short lead times, short lifetimes and/or a low capital/operating cost
ratio increases in an uncertain environment. Gardner and Rogers (1999) analyze, in
more detail, the effect of short lead times when dealing with demand uncertainty.
Fuel cost uncertainty has been addressed e.g., by Hobbs and Maheshwari (1990), who
show that the expected costs of neglecting uncertainty of fuel prices in investment plan-
ning is lower than those of disregarding demand uncertainties. Reinelt and Keith (2007)
use a stochastic dynamic model to analyze generation technology choices and optimal
timing in investment when future CO2 and natural gas prices are uncertain. Roques et al.
(2006) evaluate investment decisions in nuclear and CCGT plants under uncertainty of
natural gas prices, CO2 emission prices and electricity prices, by applying a multi-stage
stochastic program. Effects of uncertain future CO2 regulations are also addressed by
Patino-Echeverri et al. (2009) who apply a stochastic dynamic model and analyze the
effect of uncertainty on investment strategies, social costs and CO2 emissions.
Short-term uncertainties concerning the infeed of intermittent renewables have been
analyzed in stochastic investment and dispatch models e.g., by Swider and Weber (2007)
and Sun et al. (2008). Swider and Weber (2007) use a stochastic model to estimate the
integration costs of intermittent wind and show that larger investments into thermal
capacities are required when short-term stochastics of wind infeed are taken into account.
This result is confirmed by Sun et al. (2008), who find that neglecting short-term wind
infeed uncertainty leads to an undervaluation of the operational flexibility and results
in insufficient investments in thermal power plants.
In contrast to the analysis of short-term uncertain renewable infeed, we analyze the
influence of long-term uncertain renewable penetration levels induced by uncertainty as
to whether political RES-E targets can be achieved. To our knowledge, the impact of
52Dynamic stochastic electricity optimization models have been developed earlier for different appli-
cations, e.g., by Manne and Richels (1978).
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long-term uncertain residual load developments on the power system has not yet been
analyzed. Other long-term uncertainties, e.g., demand, fuel or CO2 emission price un-
certainties, either primarily correspond to uncertainty as to how much capacity should
be optimally constructed (demand) or induce uncertainty concerning the optimal tech-
nology mix (fuel and CO2 emission prices). In the context of uncertain future RES-E
penetration levels, both the optimal amount of dispatchable generation capacities and
the optimal technology mix are uncertain because the level and the slope of the future
residual load duration curve as well as the volatility of the hourly residual load curve
are unknown.
5.3 Model description and assumptions
In this section, we describe the stochastic optimization model (5.3.1) and present the
major assumptions underlying the scenario analyses (5.3.2).
5.3.1 Model description
We develop a linear multi-stage stochastic investment and dispatch model for electricity
markets. The model covers thermal power plants and storage units. In each model
period, different nodes account for different possible realizations of the residual load.
In the following, we present the basic model equations and describe how uncertainty is
captured in the model. Abbreviations used for model sets, parameters and variables are
shown in Table 5.1.53
53The table only shows sets, parameters and variables used in the equations listed within this chapter.
In addition, the model comprises variables necessary for ramping or storage equations such as the hourly
storage level in a storage unit. Ramping and storage equations are modeled as described in Richter
(2011).
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Table 5.1: Model abbreviations including sets, parameters and variables
Abbreviation Dimension Description
Model sets
d Day
h Hour
n Node
n1 alias of n Node (direct ancestor of n)
n2 alias of n Node (direct or indirect ancestor of n)
r Region
r1 alias of r Neighboring region of r
res RES-E technology
s Subset of t Storage technology
t Technology
y Subset of n Node (associated with a certain model year)
Model parameters
ad MW Exogenous capacity commissions
annuity EUR2010/MW Technology specific investment costs (annuity)
attc EUR2010/MWhth Attrition costs for ramp-up operation
co EUR2010/t CO2 CO2 emissions prices
cres MW RES-E capacities
dsc % Discount factor
f EUR2010/MWhth Fuel prices
fomc EUR2010/MW Fixed operation and maintenance costs
heatpr EUR2010/MWhth Heating price for end consumers
heatratio MWhth/MWhel Ratio for heat extraction
p % Occurence probability of node
β % Minimum generation level of power plants
η % Net efficiency
ηpartload % Net efficiency in partload operation
ρ MW Residual demand
θ MW Peak demand
τ % Capacity factor
γ % Capacity factor (RES-E plants)
ω t CO2 /MWhth CO2 emissions per fuel consumption
ξ [0;1] Indicates if a technology has reached its lifetime
Model variables
C MW Installed capacity (net)
CADD MW Capacity commissions (net)
CRTO MW Capacity which is ready to operate (net)
CSUB MW Capacity decommissions (net)
CUP MW Ramped-up capacity (net)
G MW Electricity generation (net)
NI MW Net imports
S MW Consumption in storage operation
Z EUR2010 Total system costs (objective value)
The objective of the model is to minimize total discounted system costs (eq. 5.1) while
satisfying hourly (residual) demand (eq. 5.2) and ensuring that peak demand can be
met by securely available capacities in each node (eq. 5.3). Equation 5.4 determines the
capacity in each node, which depends on investment decisions made in previous periods,
and which is thus chosen under uncertainty about the level and the structure of the
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residual load.
min Z =
∑
n
[
p(n) · dsc(y) ·
∑
t,r
[[∑
n2
annuity(t) · CADD(t, n2, r)
]
(5.1)
+C(t, n, r) · fomc(t)
+
[∑
d,h
G(d, h, n, t, r)
]
·
[
f(y, t) + co(y) · ω(t)
η(t)
]
+
[∑
d,h
CUP (d, h, n, t, r)
]
·
[
f(y, t) + co(y) · ω(t)
η(t)
+ attc(t)
]
+
[∑
d,h
(CRTO(d, h, n, t, r)−G(d, h, n, t, r))
]
·
[
f(y, t) + co(y) · ω(t)
ηpartload(t)
− f(y, t) + co(y) · ω(t)
η(t)
]
· β
1− β
−
∑
d,h
heatpr(y) · heatratio(t) ·G(d, h, n, t, r)
]]
s.t.
∑
t
G(d, h, n, t, r) +
∑
r1
NI(d, h, n, r, r1)−
∑
s
S(d, h, n, s, r) = ρ(d, h, n, r) (5.2)
τ · C(t, n, r) + γ · cres(res, n, r) ≥ θ(n, r) (5.3)
C(t, n) = C(t, n1) + CADD(t, n1) + ad(t, y)− CSUB(t, n) (5.4)
−
∑
n2
[
(CADD(t, n2) + ad(t, n2)) · ξ(t, n, n2)
]
Total system costs comprise fixed costs (investment and fixed operation and mainte-
nance costs), variable production costs (including fuel and CO2 costs), ramp-up costs
and costs arising due to efficiency losses in part-load operation. We simulate ramp-up
costs in this linear approach by referring to power plant vintage classes and setting a
minimal load restriction. Also, additional costs for ramping-up (attrition (attc) and
extra fuel costs) are taken into account (as in Richter (2011) and Nagl et al. (2013)). In
part-load operation, fuel costs of power plants are higher due to lower efficiency values,
which is taken into account by a linear approximation (as in Swider and Weber (2007)).
Chapter 5. Optimization of power plant investments under uncertain renewable energy
deployment paths: a multi-stage stochastic programming approach 115
A heat remuneration for electricity generation in co-generation mode is subtracted from
total system costs. As in Nagl et al. (2013), we assume that the heat remuneration cor-
responds to the ”assumed gas price (divided by the conversion efficiency of the assumed
reference heat boiler) which roughly represents the opportunity costs for households and
industries”. Heat generation in co-generation plants is restricted by a maximum heat
potential per model region. The inflexibility of electricity generation in co-generation
mode is accounted for by longer ramping times (as in Nagl et al. (2013)). All cost pa-
rameters are taken into account with the occurrence probability p(n) of the node n in
which the costs arise.
The hourly residual demand per country and node, inflows to storage units and elec-
tricity exports have to be met by generation from thermal and storage plants and/or by
electricity imports (eq. 5.2). The dispatch within each node is calculated for four typi-
cal days, representing a weekday and a weekend-day in autumn/winter and in spring/-
summer. These typical days capture typical seasonal, weekly and diurnal patterns of
demand, wind speeds, solar radiation and inflow into hydro storages. Note that the
model includes only long-term uncertainties about the deployment of RES-E capacities
and no short-term uncertainty about the hourly infeed of renewables. The dispatch of
generation and demand is realized under perfect foresight.
Peak demand (augmented by a security margin) per country and node has to be ensured
by installed capacities which are securely available (eq. 5.3).54 Thermal and storage
capacities are adjusted by a factor incorporating possible outages (in the range of 85-
90%; see Section 5.3.2). Fluctuating RES-E contribute with a relatively low capacity
credit (5% for wind, 0% for photovoltaics).
Equation 5.4 determines the capacity in node n depending on the installed capacity and
the investment decisions made in its ancestor node n1. In addition, the installed capacity
in node n is augmented by exogenous capacity commissions (representing thermal and
storage power plants that are already under construction or in an advanced planning
process) and reduced by capacity decommissions, before or at the end of the technical
lifetime of plant t. Thus, the model takes into account that power plant investments
have long planning times, construction times, amortization times and technical lifetimes.
Long planning times and construction times are represented by the fact that investment
decisions have to be made one period before their commissioning, and thus under un-
certainty about the state of the world at commissioning time. Long amortization times
and technical lifetimes in uncertain environments are represented by the fact that at the
time at which an investment decision for a power plant is made, the state of the world
in each period up to the end of its lifetime is uncertain.
54Peak demand corresponds to the highest demand before subtraction of fluctuating RES-E infeed.
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In addition to the equations presented in this section, the model incorporates common
elements of linear dispatch models such as storage equations, ramping and minimum
load restrictions, net transfer possibilities and the possibility of RES-E curtailment, as
presented in Richter (2011) and Fu¨rsch et al. (2013a).
5.3.2 Assumptions
In the following, we present the major assumptions underlying the scenario analyses. For
the illustrative example (Section 5.4), cost assumptions for the year 2020 are used. For
the analysis of RES-E implementation risks on the electricity systems of Germany and
its neighboring countries (Section 5.5), we model Germany, Benelux (covering Belgium,
the Netherlands and Luxembourg), Denmark, Czech Republic and Poland (‘CZ + PL’),
Switzerland and Austria (‘CH + AT’) and France.
5.3.2.1 Electricity demand and potential heat generation in combined-heat-
and-power (CHP) plants
We assume that in the long term, increasing energy efficiency will counterbalance any
further increase in electricity demand driven by economic or population growth. Thus,
we assume that electricity demand will increase until 2030 and stagnate afterwards. In
addition to electricity demand values, Table 5.2 reports values for heat demand, based
on data for electricity production in co-generation reported in EURELECTRIC (2008).
In order to reduce computational time, the option to generate electricity in combined-
heat-and-power (CHP) plants is restricted to countries in which CHP-based electricity
generation makes up a major part of today´s electricity generation.
Table 5.2: Net electricity demand in TWhel and (potential heat generation in CHP
Plants in TWhth)
2020 2030 2040 2050
Benelux 226.2 (128) 241.7 (128) 241.7 (128) 241.7 (128)
CH + AT 140 (-) 149.5 (-) 149.5 (-) 149.5 (-)
CZ + PL 233.9 (146) 260.4 (146) 260.4 (146) 260.4 (146)
Denmark 43.1 (54) 46 (54) 46 (54) 46 (54)
Germany 611 (191) 628 (191) 628 (191) 628 (191)
France 523.6 (-) 558.3 (-) 558.3 (-) 558.3 (-)
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5.3.2.2 Power plants
Table 5.3 depicts assumed investment costs for thermal and storage technologies (based
on EWI and energynautics (2011) and EWI/Prognos/GWS (2010)). In addition to the
listed technologies, the model comprises several technology classes to account for exist-
ing power plants. Investments into nuclear, hard coal, lignite, open-cycle-gas-turbines
(OCGT), combined-cycle-gas-turbines (CCGT) and compressed-air-storages (CAES) are
possible. Investments into nuclear plants are restricted to countries that already have
existing nuclear power plants and that did not agree on a political phase-out of nuclear
power. In addition, we account for long planning and construction times of nuclear
plants. Therefore, no endogenous nuclear investments are possible before 2020, and af-
terwards investments are restricted to a maximum of 3 GW per 5-year-period and model
region. For hard coal and lignite, state-of-the-art and innovative power plants are con-
sidered in the model. Innovative hard coal plants are equipped with ”improved materials
and processing techniques” and thus able to run at higher temperatures (700 degrees
Celsius) and higher pressures (350 bars) (EWI and energynautics (2011)). The efficiency
is assumed to increase by about 4 percentage points to 50% due to these improvements
(EWI and energynautics (2011)). Investment costs are higher than the costs of state-of-
the-art technologies but are decreasing due to learning effects by around one third by
2050. ‘Innovative’ lignite technologies use a more efficient drying process than existing
plants and can therefore increase their efficiency to 46.5% (see EWI and energynautics
(2011) and EWI/Prognos/GWS (2010)). Hard coal, lignite and CCGT plants can also
be build as CHP technologies. Endogeneous investments in pump storage and hydro
storage plants are not considered, because the existing space potentials are already used
to a large extent.
Table 5.3: Investment costs of thermal and storage technologies in EUR2010/kW
Technologies 2020 2030 2040 2050
Nuclear 3,157 3,157 3,157 3,157
Hard Coal 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500
Hard Coal - innovative 2,250 1,875 1,750 1,650
Hard Coal - innovative CHP 2,650 2,275 2,150 2,050
Lignite - innovative 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950
Lignite - innovative CHP 2,350 2,350 2,350 2,350
OCGT 400 400 400 400
CCGT 800 800 800 800
CCGT-CHP 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100
Pump storage - - - -
Hydro storage - - - -
CAES 850 850 850 850
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Table 5.4: Economic-technical parameters of thermal and storage technologies
Technology η (ηload) ηmin availability FOM-costs Lifetime
[%] [%] [%] [EUR2010/kW] [a]
Nuclear 33.0 28.0 84.5 96.6 50
Hard Coal 46.0 41.0 83.75 36.1 40
Hard Coal - innov. 50.0 45.0 83.75 36.1 40
Hard Coal - innov. CHP 22.5 17.5 83.75 55.1 40
Lignite - innov. 46.5 41.5 86.25 43.1 40
OCGT 40.0 20.0 84.5 17 20
CCGT 60.0 50.0 84.5 28.2 30
CCGT-CHP 36.0 26.0 84.5 40 30
Pump storage 87.0 (83.0) 87.0 95.25 11.5 100
Hydro storage 87.0 87.0 90.75 11.5 100
CAES 86.0 (81.0) 86.0 95.25 9.2 30
Table 5.4 shows the conversion efficiencies (at optimal operation and when operating at
minimum load level), technical availability, operational and maintenance costs and the
technical lifetime of conventional plants (mainly based on EWI and energynautics (2011)
and EWI/Prognos/GWS (2010)). The efficiency grades depicted correspond to those of
newly constructed plants. CHP plants have lower electrical but higher total efficiency
grades than plants without the co-generation option (EWI and energynautics (2011)).
The availability factor accounts for planned and unplanned shut-downs of the plants,
e.g., because of inspections (EWI and energynautics (2011)). In addition, the availability
factor determines the contribution of thermal and storage plants to the securely available
capacity at times of peak demand. For renewable plants treated exogenously, we assume
a contribution of 5% for wind and 0% for solar plants to securely available capacity.
Biomass and geothermal capacities are dispatchable plants and assigned a capacity credit
of 80%.
Assumed CO2 factors (in t CO2 /MWhth) are 0.406 for lignite-fired plants, 0.335 for
hard-coal fired plants and 0.201 for gas-fired plants.
We assume that yearly lignite generation is restricted to 350 TWhth in Germany and
to 249 TWhth in the region ‘Czech Republic + Poland’. In the other model regions,
lignite is not a generation option because its low calorific value leads to prohibitively
high transportation costs.
5.3.2.3 Fuel and CO2 emission prices
Table 5.5 lists the assumed development of fuel prices (including transportation costs to
the power plants) as well as historical prices. After the high price year of 2008, fuel prices
came down rapidly before beginning to rebound afterwards. Assumptions concerning the
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fuel price development are mainly based on EWI and energynautics (2011). Regarding
CO2 prices, we assume that more restrictive quotas will lead to increasing prices, while
an increasing RES-E share attenuates this effect. Overall, we assume that the CO2 price
increases up to 45 EUR2010/t CO2 by 2050.
Table 5.5: Fuel costs in EUR2010/MWhth and CO2 emission costs in EUR2010/t CO2
2008 2020 2030 2040 2050
Oil 44.6 99.0 110.0 114.0 116.0
Coal 17.28 13.4 13.8 14.3 14.7
Natural Gas 25.2 28.1 30.1 32.1 34.1
Lignite 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
Uranium 3.6 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3
CO2 22 25 35 40 45
5.3.2.4 Net transfer capacities
Table 5.6 depicts the assumed net transfer capacities (NTC), restricting imports and ex-
ports between model regions. Assumptions are based on ENTSO-E (2010). For model
regions representing several countries, such as Benelux, the NTC-values of the repre-
sented countries have been summed.
Table 5.6: Net transfer capacities [MW]
DE FR Benelux CH+AT CZ+PL DK
DE - 3050 4830 3100 1600 1500
FR 2600 - 2900 3000 - -
Benelux 3980 1300 - - - -
CH+AT 4800 1100 - - 600 -
CZ+PL 3200 - - 800 - -
DK 2050 - - - - -
5.4 Theoretical discussion of effects and illustrative exam-
ple
In this section, we discuss the influence of RES-E infeed on the optimal electricity
capacity mix, the effects of uncertain future RES-E penetration levels and means to
measure these effects (Section 5.4.1). In addition, we highlight the impact of uncertain
future RES-E deployment paths via an illustrative modeling example (Section 5.4.2).
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5.4.1 Theoretical discussion of results
Uncertain future RES-E penetration levels lead to uncertainty about the residual de-
mand, required to be met by thermal power plants or by storage units. Figure 5.1 illus-
trates the influence of RES-E infeed on the optimal mix of dispatchable power plants.
The upper graph depicts an hourly load curve without and after subtraction of RES-E
infeed. The middle graph shows the corresponding (residual) load duration curves and
the lower graph depicts the optimal mix of peak-, mid- and baseload plants under the
simplifying assumption that only their yearly utilization times are decisive for the deter-
mination of the optimal capacity mix.55 Even though the load duration curve approach
provides a good approximation of the optimal capacity mix, it is important to note that
in addition to yearly utilization times, the hourly variability of demand influences the
optimal capacity mix. In the following we first discuss the influence of RES-E infeed on
the optimal capacity mix under a load duration curve consideration. Then, we discuss
the influence of the changing hourly variability of demand on the optimal capacity mix.
55An electricity load duration curve ranks load levels in a descending order of magnitude. The integral
under the load duration curve shows how much electricity is demanded for how many hours per year.
For the fraction of demand, that is needed in nearly all hours of the year, plants with high fixed and
low variable costs (baseload plants) are cost-efficient while demand peaks are cost-efficiently met by
peakload plants, characterized by high variable but low fixed costs (see e.g. Stoft (2002)).
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Figure 5.1: Effects of RES-E infeed on the optimal capacity mix
Source: Own illustration based on Nabe (2006) and de Miera et al. (2008).
Given high infeed of renewables, the residual load duration curve becomes steeper.56 In
many hours, a large part of the (residual) demand is met by renewables with negligible
variable generation costs. Thus, the (residual) demand fraction, which is high in almost
all hours of the year, shrinks. Consequently, the optimal capacity mix comprises less
baseload plants, which need high utilization times in order to be cost-efficient (yb < xb).
In addition, these baseload plants achieve lower utilization times than without RES-E
56While an increasing RES-E share generally increases the steepness of the residual load curve, this
is not necessarily the case for small shares of renewables whose infeed matches well with demand. In
these cases, an increasing RES-E share (up to a certain level) can even flatten the residual load duration
curve. For example, small shares of solar based generation can flatten the electricity demand curve in
countries with demand peaks at noon.
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infeed due to a steeper residual load curve in the area where utilization times are higher
than h∗B. On the other hand, fluctuating RES-E such as wind and solar plants are
not necessarily available at times of high demand. Thus, high electricity demand still
needs to be met by dispatchable power plants. Consequently, the optimal capacity mix
comprises a larger amount (or at least a larger share) of peak- and midload capacities
(yp > xp and ym > xm) when RES-E shares are high (see also Lamont (2008) and
De Jonghe et al. (2011)). This effect is further amplified when considering security
of supply requirements (not depicted in Figure 5.1). Due to low capacity credits of
fluctuating RES-E, a large share of dispatchable generation capacities are also needed in
electricity systems with high RES-E penetration, in order to ensure that peak demand
can be met with securely available capacities (see, e.g., Dena (2008) and Weigt (2009)).
In addition, the volatility of the hourly residual load curve increases with a higher RES-E
share (upper graph). Consequently, with an increasing RES-E share, the economic value
of power plants with short ramping times, and/or low costs for ramping or part load
operation, increases. Plants with a high capital/operating ratio are also those plants
characterized by long ramping times, while plants with a low capital/operation cost
ratio, such as open cycle gas turbines, can be ramped up and down within short time-
frames. In addition, plants with a high capital/operating cost ratio typically have high
minimum load requirements. Consequently, the increasing demand volatility induced
by an increasing RES-E share also impacts optimal investment decisions of fossil fuel
plants (De Jonghe et al. (2011)). Of course, also the economic value of storage units is
significantly influenced by demand volatility (see, e.g., Nagl et al. (2011a)).
For these reasons, under uncertain future RES-E penetration levels, it is uncertain
whether the optimal electricity mix should comprise large shares of baseload or rather
large shares of peakload plants and storage units. The impact of this uncertainty on
electricity system costs can be measured with the expected value of perfect information
(EVPI) and with the value of the stochastic solution (VSS). The EVPI determines the
expected additional costs induced by uncertainty, when the uncertainty is taken into
account by a stochastic optimization procedure. The VSS corresponds to the additional
costs (compared to the stochastic solution) arising when investments are planned for
the average realization of the random parameters (here: residual load curves), without
taking into account uncertainty. Thereby, the VSS measures how effectively stochastic
optimization can help to mitigate the effects of uncertainty (Birge (1997)).
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5.4.2 Illustrative example
In this section, we present an illustrative modeling example in order to highlight the
effects of uncertain future RES-E deployment paths on optimal investment choices
(5.4.2.1) and system costs (5.4.2.2). We consider one model region without an exist-
ing power plant fleet and only two time periods. Furthermore, for reasons of simplicity,
we assume in this example that the contribution of RES-E to security of supply require-
ments is zero.57
5.4.2.1 Effects of uncertainty on the optimal technology mix
In this illustrative example, investment decisions have to be made in period 0 under
uncertainty concerning the RES-E penetration in period 1, when RES-E shares of 0%
(S1), approximately 25% (S2) and approximately 50% (S3) can be realized with equal
probability. Investments can be made into hard coal, CCGT and OCGT plants, rep-
resenting a baseload, a midload and a peakload technology, respectively. In addition,
investments into storage units are possible.
Figure 5.2 depicts the residual load duration curves in S1, S2 and S3 as well as the
stochastic residual load duration curve that corresponds to the probability weighted
horizontal aggregation of the residual load curves of the three scenarios. It can be clearly
seen that the stochastic residual load duration curve differs from all three deterministic
load duration curves and, in particular, also from the average residual load duration
curve (S2). In contrast to the average, the stochastic residual load duration curve takes
into account that all extremely low or extremely high demand levels within the three
scenarios can be realized with some probability. In Figure 5.2, it is also apparent, which
power plant technologies are cost-efficient depending on their yearly utilization times
(analogue to Figure 5.1). Considering only the load duration curve, OCGT plants are
the cost-efficient choice to cover the demand levels occurring in fewer than h∗M (full
load) hours ( - given our cost assumptions). For yearly full load hours larger than h∗M
(h∗B), CCGT (hard coal) plants are cost-efficient. Of course, the hourly volatility of
demand also determines the cost-efficient technology mix and especially the investments
into storage units. However, abstracting in a first step from the hourly volatility, it can
be seen that the residual load duration curve of S1 is comparatively flat, implying that
a large share of hard coal plants should be cost-efficient. The residual load duration
curve of S2 is also relatively flat except for the area of low utilization times. Since we
57As described in Section 5.3.2, the contribution of fluctuating RES-E to security of supply require-
ments is close to zero, because peak demand can occur when neither sun nor wind power is securely
available, e.g., during night hours. In this illustrative scenario, we assume a capacity credit of 0% of all
RES-E, as this assumption simplifies the calculation of the VSS in Section 5.4.2.2.
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assume in this illustrative scenario that the contribution of RES-E to security of supply
requirements is zero, all residual load curves start at the same demand level. Thus, the
residual load curve of S2 and S3 are steep in the area where full load hours are below h∗M .
S3 generally has a steeper residual load curve than S1 and S2, indicating that a large
share of OCGT plants should be cost-efficient. The stochastic residual load duration
curve is flatter than S2 and S3 in the areas of very low utilization times but steeper than
all deterministic scenarios between h∗M and h
∗
B. Thus, a large share of CCGT plants
should be cost-efficiently deployed under stochastic optimization.
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Figure 5.2: Residual load duration curves - deterministic and stochastic
Remark: Note that the load duration curve approach only provides an approximation of the
optimal capacity mix. In addition, the optimal capacity mix is influenced by hourly demand
variability.
In addition to yearly utilization times, optimal investment choices depend on the hourly
variability of demand, which in turn determines the flexibility required from the power
plant fleet. In particular, optimal investment decisions for storage units depend on
the hourly variability of demand and cannot be determined by a load duration curve
approach. Table 5.7 shows the maximum, minimum and average variations of residual
demand from one hour to the next hour in the different scenarios. It can be seen
that demand volatility significantly increases with an increasing RES-E share.58 In
58As described in Section 5.3.1, we use a typical day approach to represent seasonal, daily and hourly
variability of demand and infeed structures of fluctuating RES-E. Generally, this approach allows us to
take into account typical residual demand situations resulting, e.g., from situations in which high RES-E
infeed and low demand or low RES-E infeed and high demand occur at the same time. However, weather
situations such as several weeks of calm wind cannot be captured by the limited number of typical days.
Thus, including these weather phenomenons, e.g., by including a larger number of typical days or an
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the stochastic optimization, both the maximum variation and the minimum variation
of the three scenarios are taken into account. The average demand variation in the
stochastic optimization is higher than in the average deterministic scenario (S2), because
the extreme variations of S3 are also included.
Table 5.7: Hourly variation of residual demand - maximum, minimum and average
values [MW]
S1 S2 S3 stochastic
Max variation 10128 31026 53581 53581
Min variation 128 2 126 2
Average variation 2213 3646 6265 4254
Results of the power plant fleet optimization for the different residual demand curves
are depicted in Table 5.8. The table shows the investment decisions for each of the
three scenarios given perfect information about their realizations and the stochastic
solution given uncertainty concerning RES-E penetration in period 1. In addition, uti-
lization times are depicted. Table 5.9 depicts the power balances under deterministic
and stochastic planning and provides information on the electricity demand of storage
units and on the curtailed RES-E generation.
Table 5.8: Investments [GW] and utilization times [h] with deterministic and stochas-
tic planning
deterministic stochastic
S1 (0%) S2 (25%) S3 (50%) S1-S3 S1 S2 S3
GW h GW h GW h GW h
Coal 83 6969 61 6811 41 6469 50 7111 6985 5393
CCGT 11 3321 9 3057 4 4096 36 6455 2792 230
OCGT 2 124 26 74 46 51 13 2248 0 0
Storage 8 1191 7 1163 15 1189 5 1280 647 581
Table 5.9: Power balances with deterministic and stochastic planning [TWhel]
deterministic stochastic
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
End consumer electricity demand 611 611 611 611 611 611
Electricity consumption in storage units 14 11 25 8 4 4
Gross electricity demand 625 622 636 619 615 615
Generation of non-RES-E plants 625 452 298 619 445 279
Generation of RES-E plants - 170 340 - 170 340
RES-E curtailment - - 2 - - 4
Gross electricity generation 625 622 636 619 615 615
8760h approach, would lead to a lower average variation of hourly residual demand than depicted in
Table 5.7.
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It can be clearly seen that the optimal deterministic power plant mixes vary significantly
between the scenarios. In scenario S1, without RES-E infeed, the capacity mix is domi-
nated by coal capacities, while in scenario S3, with a 50% RES-E share, OCGT plants
make up the largest share of capacities.59 Storage capacities are deployed to the largest
extent in scenario S3, characterized by the most volatile residual load.60 Taking into
account these uncertainties using a stochastic optimization approach, resulting invest-
ments yield more CCGT plants than in all deterministic scenarios.61 Investments into
coal, OCGT and storage capacities are lower than on average within the deterministic
scenarios. As discussed above, the optimal capacity mix under stochastic optimization
should comprise a large share of CCGT capacities because the stochastic residual load
duration curve is relatively steep between h∗M and h
∗
B (Figure 5.2). But why is it cost-
optimal to optimize for the stochastic residual load curve and thus build a large share of
CCGT capacities when it is uncertain whether S1, S2 or S3 will be realized? Under the
assumed investment, fuel and CO2 prices, CCGT plants have a medium capital/operat-
ing cost ratio compared to coal and OCGT plants. When investment decisions are made
under uncertainty and a high RES-E penetration (S3) is realized, CCGT plants have
a low utilization and replace a part of the OCGT plants built under the deterministic
planning of S3. In this case, additional total costs of CCGT plants are relatively low
compared to additional costs arising if coal plants would be build and only run few hours
per year. When a low RES-E penetration (S1) is realized, CCGT plants have a high
utilization and substitute a part of the coal generation, which would be cost-efficient un-
der the deterministic planning of S1. In this case, additional generation costs of CCGT
plants are relatively low compared to additional costs arising if a large part of demand
would have to be met by OCGT generation.
Investment decisions for storage units are driven by differences in electricity prices be-
tween periods of high and low (residual) demand. Electricity price volatility is high
if (residual) demand is volatile and if differences in marginal generation costs of the
price-setting technologies during high and low demand periods are large. Given perfect
information, investments into storage units are highest in Scenario S3. Residual demand
in S3 comprises, on the one hand, hours with negative residual demand during which
electricity can be pumped into storage units for free. On the other hand, it comprises
hours during which demand is relatively high and electricity generation from storage
59A large part of these OCGT capacities is only required to ensure security of supply, i.e., to meet
demand in the peak demand hour if renewable infeed is not available. However, even if RES-E infeed
would be 100% secure, 15 GW OCGT would be build in S3 - a significantly larger amount than in S1.
60It may seem surprising that the optimal storage capacities in Scenario S2 are lower than in S1 even
though the RES-E share is higher. The reason is that a large part of the RES-E infeed in S2 matches
demand and even flattens demand peaks at noon due to photovoltaic infeed.
61In the stochastic optimization approach, 36 GW CCGT capacities are built in period 0. In period
1, 2 GW CCGT are decommissioned in S2 and S3 in order to save fix operation and maintenance costs
for capacities which are neither required for meeting demand nor for ensuring security of supply.
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units can avoid high variable production costs by substituting generation from OCGT
plants. Under uncertainty concerning the realization of S1, S2 or S3, a comparatively
low amount of storage units is built. In combination with an - under uncertainty -
optimally large deployment of CCGT plants, the value of storage units is, especially in
S3, rather low. Under stochastic planning, the optimal capacity mix comprises more
coal and CCGT plants than in the deterministic S3 scenario, and OCGT plants are not
dispatched at all, when S3 is realized. Thus, under stochastic planning, the value for
storage units is low in S3 because electricity prices have a lower volatility than under
deterministic investment planning.62 In addition, it is important to note that the model
incorporates the option for cost-efficient RES-E curtailment. Thus, a smaller amount
of storage units installed under uncertainty does not necessarily increase the ramping
requirements for thermal power plants. In this example, RES-E curtailment in Scenario
S3 is 4 TWh in the stochastic solution, while a curtailment of 2 TWh is cost-efficient
in the case of deterministic investment planning. Furthermore, flexibility can be pro-
vided by part-load operation in addition to, or instead of, ramping procedures. In fact,
the option of part-load operation is substantially used in Scenario S3, when investment
decisions are made under uncertainty.
It should be noted that the setting of this illustrative scenario is rather extreme. First,
the difference in RES-E infeed between the two extreme scenarios S1 and S3 is rather
large. Second, only three scenarios are taken into account to represent this uncertainty.
Increasing the number of scenarios representing an RES-E infeed between the two ex-
tremes of 0% and 50% flattens the stochastic residual load duration curve, as extreme
values are taken into account with decreasing probabilities (see Figure D.1 in Appendix
D). Consequently, the effect that technologies with a medium capital/operating cost
ratio have a higher value under uncertainty is - although robust - less pronounced when
the number of scenarios is increased. Table 5.10 depicts the optimal investment choice
under uncertainty of RES-E infeed between 0% and 50% - either represented by three
scenarios (0%, 25%, 50%) or represented by 50 scenarios (0%, 1%, 2%, ..., 50%). In
addition, the result for the average scenario (25%) is shown again. It can be seen that
the result from the stochastic optimization differs less from the optimal capacity mix in
the average scenario if uncertainty is represented by 50 instead of 3 scenarios. However,
the optimal capacity mix under uncertainty will never be identical to the optimal ca-
pacity mix for the average scenario. As shown in Figure 5.2, the residual load duration
curve of S1 (with 0% RES-E infeed) consists of many high load levels, which never occur
in the average S2 scenario. Furthermore, the residual load duration curve of S3 (with
50% RES-E infeed) consists of many low load levels, which never occur in the average S2
62In contrast, in Scenario S1, stochastic planning leads to a high OCGT generation compared to the
deterministic case. Electricity prices have a higher volatility than under deterministic planning and the
5 GW storage capacity, installed under uncertainty, consequently has the highest utilization time in S1.
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scenario. In the stochastic residual load duration curve, however, all load levels occuring
in at least one of the scenarios are taken into account, also those that are higher or lower
than in S2.
Table 5.10: Investments under uncertainty (3 vs 50 scenarios) and under average
planning [GW]
stochastic average
3 scenarios 50 scenarios 25% RES-E
Coal 50 54 61
CCGT 36 26 9
OCGT 13 19 26
Storage 5 5 7
In addition, it is important to note that the value of midload plants under uncertainty,
compared to perfect foresight modeling, depends on the relative steepness of the stochas-
tic residual load duration curve in the area h∗M - h
∗
B compared to the steepness of the
deterministic residual load duration curves in the same area. Thus, given a higher steep-
ness of, e.g, the average deterministic residual load duration curve in the area h∗M - h
∗
B,
the difference between the stochastic solution and the average deterministic solution
(shown in Table 5.10) would ceteris paribus be smaller.63 Steeper deterministic residual
load duration curves in the area h∗M - h
∗
B could for example result from different RES-E
infeed patterns than those represented in our typical days (e.g, if a situation of several
weeks of calm wind would be additionally taken into account). Using hourly historical
data for RES-E infeed and demand on an 8760h basis instead than a typical day ap-
proach for constructing residual load duration curves (see Figure D.2 in Appendix D),
we find that the curves with RES-E infeed (S1 and S2) are steeper in the area h∗M -
h∗B compared to the curves which have been constructed on the basis of the typical day
RES-E infeed structure (see Figure 5.2). Thus, also the relative difference in the steep-
ness of the stochastic compared to the average residual load duration curve decreases.
Thus, both using a typical day approach and using hourly historical data for RES-E
infeed and demand on an 8760h basis, we find that in the area h∗M - h
∗
B, the stochastic
residual load duration curve is steeper than the average deterministic residual load du-
ration curve. The magnitude of this effect, however, is smaller when using the historical
8760h RES-E infeed structures.
63 A higher steepness of the deterministic residual load duration curves in the area h∗M - h
∗
B would also
affect the stochastic residual load duration curve, however, not necessarily for utilization times of h∗M or
h∗B and even not necessarily in the area h
∗
M - h
∗
B . More specifically, if the steepness of a deterministic
residual load duration curve changes in an area, where the level of the deterministic curve is lower than
the value of the stochastic residual load duration curve in h∗B , the stochastic residual load duration curve
is affected by these changes only in the area of utilization times which are higher than h∗B .
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Against this background, a further investigation of the drivers for the steepness of the
stochastic residual load duration curve is interesting. As described in Section 5.4.1, un-
certainty concerning the RES-E penetration in an electricity system leads to uncertainty
about the level and the slope of the residual load duration curve and about the hourly
variability of residual demand. Thus, the amount of capacities needed to meet demand
and the optimal capacity mix, in terms of utilization times and flexibility requirements,
is uncertain. In order to further investigate the drivers for the steepness of the stochastic
residual load duration curve, we compare the stochastic residual load duration curves
if i) only the level of demand is uncertain or if ii) the level and the structure of the
residual demand are uncertain. In Figure 5.3, the two stochastic and three deterministic
(residual) load duration curves are depicted. The deterministic curves correspond to a)
no RES-E infeed or a high demand level (≡ S1), b) to a RES-E infeed that makes up
approximately 50% of yearly demand (≡ S3) and c) a demand level that corresponds
to 50% of the highest demand level (assuming the same hourly demand pattern of the
different yearly demand levels). The stochastic (residual) load curves take into account
either uncertainty about the level of demand only (high versus low demand) or uncer-
tainty about the level and the structure of residual demand (0% RES-E versus 50%
RES-E).
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Figure 5.3: The influence of demand level uncertainty on the steepness of the stochas-
tic load duration curve
Remark:Note that the load duration curve approach only provides an approximation of the
optimal capacity mix. In addition, the optimal capacity mix is influenced by hourly demand
variability.
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However, both stochastic curves are quite similar except for the area of very high uti-
lization times. In the area of very low utilization times, the two curves are overlapping
because highest demand arises in the deterministic (a) scenario, which is taken into ac-
count in both stochastic curves.64 The deterministic scenarios with a low demand (c) and
with a high RES-E share (b) have significantly different slopes (- although their yearly
(residual) demand levels are identical). These different slopes of the (residual) load du-
ration curves have a high impact on the optimal capacity mix given perfect foresight.65
However, in the area h∗M - h
∗
B, the effect of these different slopes of the deterministic
curves on the slopes of the stochastic curves is rather low (in fact, the stochastic load
duration curve given RES-E uncertainty lies only slightly above the stochastic load du-
ration curve given demand uncertainty). The effect of a higher value of midload plants
under uncertainty is thus mainly driven by the uncertainty about the level of the de-
mand, while the additional uncertainty about the slope of the demand even slightly
attenuates this effect. Furthermore, with increasing demand level differences between
the scenarios, the steepness of the stochastic residual load duration curve increases (see
Figure D.3 in Appendix D).
Moreover, the effect that midload plants have a higher value under uncertainty depends
on the distance between h∗M and h
∗
B, i.e. the utilization time for which midload plants
(here: CCGT plants) are cost-efficient. For example if we would include the possibility
to invest into lignite in addition to OCGT, CCGT and hardcoal plants, the distance be-
tween h∗M and h
∗
B would approximately be divided in half (given our cost assumptions).
Thus, in general, the magnitude of the effect that technologies with a medium capital/-
operating cost ratio have a higher value under uncertainty first depends on the steepness
of the stochastic residual load duration curve between h∗M and h
∗
B (in comparison to the
steepness of the deterministic load duration curves). This steepness is essentially driven
by the uncertainty about the level of demand (Figure 5.3) and by the probability with
which the ‘extreme’ scenarios are taken into account (Table 5.10/ Figure D.1). Second,
the magnitude of the effect depends on the distance between h∗M and h
∗
B, which is in-
fluenced by the choice of technologies considered in the modeling and the assumptions
on investment, fuel and CO2 costs.
64The stochastic load duration curves in Figure 5.3 have been calculated based on twelve scenarios that
represent the range of demand or residual demand between the deterministic a and the deterministic b
or c scenarios. Twelve scenarios, instead of only three scenarios, have been chosen because the scenario
with the highest demand(/lowest RES-E infeed) is identical in both stochastic (residual) load duration
curves. Thus, in order to limit the influence of this scenario on the slopes of the stochastic residual load
duration curves, twelve scenarios have been chosen.
65For example, the optimal deterministic capacity mixes in the high and low demand scenarios in
Figure 5.3 comprise the same shares of base-, mid- and peakload capacities. In contrast, the optimal
deterministic capacity mixes with high and low RES-E shares differ significantly, as shown in Table 5.8.
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5.4.2.2 Effects of uncertainty on system costs
Table 5.11 depicts system costs (excluding costs for RES-E generation) arising in this
illustrative scenario when the future is perfectly known (deterministic planning), in the
case of uncertainty under stochastic planning and in the case of uncertainty when the
uncertainty is not taken into account within the investment planning process (average
planning).
In this scenario setting, average planning principally refers to an optimization of in-
vestment capacities for Scenario S2, characterized by an average RES-E infeed. This
capacity mix is then fixed in all scenarios and only the dispatch of these capacities can be
optimized according to the actual RES-E infeed. Due to the peak-capacity constraint
(and the simplifying assumption in this illustrative scenario that the contribution of
RES-E to security of supply requirements is zero), capacities built in Scenario S2 are
sufficient to meet peak demand in all scenarios. However, due to different structures of
the residual load curves and thus different ramping requirements, it is not guaranteed
that these capacities are sufficient to meet demand in all scenarios in every single hour.
Thus, we optimize capacities for the average residual load (S2) under the additional
constraint that demand also needs to be met in all other possible scenarios.66 This opti-
mization results in a slightly different capacity choice compared to the original Scenario
S2. Thus, costs in S2 are slightly higher with average planning than with deterministic
planning.
Table 5.11: System costs (excluding costs for RES-E generation) in Mio EUR, EVPI
and VSS
deterministic stochastic average
planning planning planning
S1 (0% RES-E) 41,166 42,040 43,966
S2 (25% RES-E) 31,253 31,736 31,285
S3 (50% RES-E) 21,960 23,269 23,105
average costs 31,460 32,348 32,785
EVPI 889
EVPI (% of det costs) 2.82%
VSS 437
VSS (% of det costs) 1.39%
In all scenarios, total system costs are higher under stochastic planning than under
deterministic planning (given perfect foresight). In scenarios S1 and S2, a lower coal
generation than under deterministic planning leads to increasing variable generation
66In this auxiliary optimization of S2, only dispatch costs arising in S2 are taken into account. However,
chosen capacities have to be sufficient in order to meet demand in all scenarios.
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costs. However, capital costs are lower, such that in sum total system costs increase
by 1.5 - 2%. In Scenario S3, total system costs under uncertainty are 6% higher than
given perfect foresight because lower variable costs do not outweigh additional capital
costs. The EVPI, corresponding to the probability weighted additional costs arising
in all scenarios under stochastic compared to deterministic planning, amounts to 889
Mio EUR and to 2.82%, expressed as percentage of average deterministic system costs.
The VSS evaluates the benefit of solving the stochastic solution and corresponds to
the probability weighted additional costs arising in all scenarios under average planning
compared to stochastic planning. The VSS amounts to 437 Mio EUR, representing 1.39%
of average deterministic system costs. Expressed differently, system costs are higher by
1326 Mio EUR compared to a situation of perfect foresight, if RES-E deployment paths
are uncertain and investment decisions are made for an average realization of the residual
load. These additional costs can be reduced by approximately one third, by taking into
account the existance of uncertainty by a stochastic investment planning approach.67
5.5 Analysis of uncertain RES-E deployment paths in Ger-
many and neighboring countries
In the previous chapter, we have shown how uncertainty about future RES-E deployment
paths changes optimal investment plans for thermal power plants and storage units and
that this uncertainty induces additional costs. However, the remaining question is how
significant these effects are in real-world electricity systems. In this context, it is im-
portant to exactly define the source of uncertainty to be analyzed and to determine the
possible bandwidth of realizations of the uncertain parameters according to this defini-
tion. Specifically, uncertain future RES-E deployment paths have two potential sources:
political uncertainty and uncertainty about the implementation of political plans. Polit-
ical uncertainty arises when political targets are unclear or when it is uncertain, whether
targets will be changed, e.g., after governmental elections. The implementation of polit-
ical plans can be uncertain even if reliable targets exist, for four principal reasons. First,
many RES-E technologies are relatively new technologies, implying that technological
and cost developments are uncertain and/or that limited experiences exist for construc-
tion and maintenance. Second, favorable RES-E sites are often located far from demand
centers and therefore the electricity network has to be adapted. Third, local opposition
may hinder the construction of new sites or transmission lines due to visual or environ-
mental concerns. Fourth, when RES-E is supported by a price-based promotion system,
67As shown in Table 5.10, when uncertainty is represented by a larger number of scenarios, the
stochastic investment solution is closer to the optimal capacity mix under average planning. Thus, the
cost advantage of the stochastic compared to the average planning (i.e., VSS) also depends on the specific
representation of uncertainty in the model.
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such as by a feed-in-tariff system, resulting RES-E quantities are inherently uncertain.
In the following, we try to quantify effects of uncertainty concerning the implementation
of reliable long-term political RES-E targets for Germany and its neighboring countries.
We assume that a continuous increase of RES-E until 2050 is a politically agreed and
reliable target for Germany and its neighboring countries.68 Thus, we assume that the
RES-E share increases within each model year and that only the magnitude of the in-
crease is uncertain because the progress of necessary infrastructure investments, public
acceptance, cost and technological developments of renewable energy technologies can-
not be perfectly foreseen.
In this chapter we describe the scenario tree representing uncertainty about the im-
plementation of political RES-E targets (Section 5.5.1) and present model results with
regard to investment decisions, electricity generation and system costs (Section 5.5.2).
5.5.1 Representation of the RES-E implementation risk
In order to represent the RES-E implementation risk in the model, we estimate possi-
ble bandwidths of RES-E deployments within the next decades based on the targeted
growth rates indicated in the National Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAP)69,
the actual trends regarding the achievement of these targets, the possible obstacles to
RES-E deployment and the space potential restrictions per technology and country.
The first model year considered in the analysis is 2015, when investment decisions have
to be made for power plants commissioning in 2020. The model year 2020 is represented
by three nodes, taking into account that the NREAP can be exactly reached but also be
surpassed or not be reached. Lower RES-E deployments than targeted represent a case
in which slow progress in grid and plant construction, local opposition to new power
plant construction and/or a lack of funds hinders RES-E deployment. In particular,
the achievement of offshore wind targets has been questioned recently because of slow
progress in grid and plant construction. In contrast, higher than targeted RES-E de-
ployments represent a case in which there exist hardly any obstacles to plant and grid
construction and/or cost degressions of RES-E plants are higher than foreseen. For ex-
ample, photovoltaic targets are easily surpassed in price-based RES-E support systems
68It is important to notice that political uncertainty about future RES-E deployment paths also exists.
Binding RES-E targets on a European level have only been formulated until 2020. In Germany, RES-E
targets until 2050 have been additionally formulated (Energiekonzept (2010)). Not all other European
countries have long-term RES-E strategies yet. In addition, changes in political targets could occur with
some probability. These risks are not incorporated in our model calculations.
69Within the National Renewable Energy Action Plans, the member states of the European Union
defined how the national 2020 RES targets, according to the 2009 EU Directive on the promotion of
renewable energy sources, are broken down into targets for the transporting, the heating and cooling
and the electricity sectors.
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except for very low promotion payment levels, because the support of the local popula-
tion is often high and the space potential is vast.
Table 5.12 depicts the RES-E capacities in 2010, the foreseen deployment in GW between
2010 and 2020 (according to the NREAP) and the installed RES-E capacities in 2020
(when the NREAP is exactly reached, surpassed or not reached). Historical capacities
in 2010 are based on the NREAP documents (Beurskens et al. (2011)), EURELECTRIC
(2009) and BMU (2011).
Table 5.12: RES-E capacities in 2010 and 2020 [GW]
Region Technology 2010 growth NREAP > NREAP < NREAP
NREAP 2020 2020 2020
Germany wind onshore 27 9 36 40 30
wind offshore 0 10 10 12 3
photovoltaics 17 34 52 60 35
biomass 7 2 9 10 8
geothermal 0 0 0 1 0
Benelux wind onshore 3 8 10 12 6
wind offshore 0 5 5 7 2
photovoltaics 0 2 2 4 1
biomass 2 3 5 6 5
geothermal 0 0 0 0 0
France wind onshore 6 13 19 25 10
wind offshore 0 6 6 8 1
photovoltaics 1 4 5 10 2
biomass 1 2 3 4 2
geothermal 0 0 0 0 0
CH + AT wind onshore 1 2 3 4 2
wind offshore 0 0 0 0 0
photovoltaics 0 0 0 1 0
biomass 1 0 1 2 1
geothermal 0 0 0 0 0
CZ+ PL wind onshore 1 5 6 9 3
wind offshore 0 1 1 1 0
photovoltaics 2 0 2 2 2
biomass 0 3 3 4 0
geothermal 0 0 0 0 0
Denmark wind onshore 3 0 3 3 3
wind offshore 1 1 1 2 1
photovoltaics 0 0 0 0 0
biomass 1 2 3 4 2
geothermal 0 0 0 0 0
For the time-frame after 2020, we estimate possible bandwidth for a high or a moderate
RES-E deployment pace based on the same considerations. For the case of favorable in-
vestment conditions, we assume that the deployment between 2010 and 2020 (according
Chapter 5. Optimization of power plant investments under uncertain renewable energy
deployment paths: a multi-stage stochastic programming approach 135
to the NREAP) is carried forward in the coming decades, while in the presence of obsta-
cles to RES-E deployment, the deployment is assumed to be one half of this growth. For
offshore wind, we deviate slightly from this procedure, because experiences with offshore
plants are few and unused space potential is still vast in all considered countries. Thus,
for offshore wind, the deployment at a high pace is assumed to be twice the development
in the NREAP between 2010 and 2020, while a deployment at moderate pace is assumed
to be the same as within the NREAP. In addition, we take into account that (space or
fuel) potential restrictions (see Table D.1 in Appendix D) need to be respected and that
the maximal yearly RES-E production of all RES-E technologies reaches at most 90%
of the annual country-specific electricity demand.
Figure 5.4 recaptures the resulting structure of the scenario tree representing the RES-E
implementation risk for Germany and its neighboring countries. We assume that fac-
tors favoring and factors hindering a high RES-E deployment pace are realized with the
same probability such that all nodes depicted in Figure 5.4 have the same occurrence
probability. Also, with the chosen approach, we implicitly assume that different risks
associated with the deployment of different RES-E technologies are positively correlated
in all model regions.70 In addition, we assume that most uncertainties about technolog-
ical and cost developments and about grid construction progress are resolved from 2040
onwards.71
70Possible negative correlations could both increase or attenuate the effects of the RES-E implementa-
tion risk. For example, the combination of high offshore wind and low photovoltaic penetration can lead
to a more volatile residual load than high penetration of both technologies. Thus, including paths with
high offshore and low photovoltaic penetrations may even increase the possible bandwidth of residual
load curves captured in the scenario tree and increase effects of uncertainty. On the other hand, includ-
ing paths with high offshore and low onshore wind penetrations and vice versa may lead to increasing
probabilities for these ‘medium’ paths such that effects of uncertainty may decrease to some extent.
71In our analysis, we focus on investments decisions until 2020 and the corresponding dispatch decisions
until 2025. In order to include effects of long-term uncertainties on investment decisions with long
amortization times and technical lifetimes, we however include nodes until 2060. Overall, the chosen
scenario tree consists of 24 branches and 94 nodes.
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Figure 5.4: Structure of the scenario tree representing the RES-E implementation
risk
Resulting RES-E capacities per node for the model years 2030 and 2050 can be found
in Appendix D. For example, in Germany in the year 2030, RES-E capacities vary
between 109 GW and 187 GW (see Table D.2 in Appendix D). In terms of RES-E
generation, bandwidths are between 225 TWh and 383 TWh, which make up 37% and
63%, respectively, of the assumed electricity demand in 2030. In 2050, the maximum
assumed bandwidths for Germany are between 141 GW and 244 GW (see Table D.3
in Appendix D), resulting in RES-E shares of 47% and 78%, respectively, given our
assumed demand development.72
5.5.2 Model results
In the following, we analyze the effects of the RES-E implementation risk on investment
and dispatch decisions (Section 5.5.2.1) as well as on system costs (Section 5.5.2.2). In
addition, we compare the results for the European power system with the results of the
illustrative example in Section 5.4.2 (Section 5.5.2.3).
72For Germany, an estimation of possible bandwidths of RES-E generation in a 5-year period can
also be found in the medium-term RES-E generation forecast (IE Leipzig (2011)). As a lower bound
for promoted RES-E generation in 2016, about 130 TWh are indicated and as a higher bound about
210 TWh. Although this bandwidth is based on both possible ranges for RES-E deployment and for
different wind and water infeed assumptions, it clearly confirms that even within a short time horizon,
RES-E developments can be quite uncertain.
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5.5.2.1 Effects of RES-E implementation risks on investment and dispatch
decisions
Table 5.13 depicts investment decisions made in 2015 for the sum of all modeled coun-
tries. Within branch 1, characterized by the highest possible RES-E penetration in all
model years (surpassed NREAP in 2020 and fast-pace growth in each following period),
only lignite and OCGT plants are constructed. In branch 24, with the lowest possible
RES-E generation, coal and CCGT plants are also chosen. Lignite investments are iden-
tical in all branches because lignite generation is characterized by very low variable costs
and is also restricted to local fuel potentials. Note that nuclear is not an investment
option in the first model year.
Table 5.13: Investments in 2015 in all model regions [GW]
deterministic stochastic
Max RES-E Min RES-E average of
Branch 1 Branch 24 branches 1-24
Lignite 3 3 3 3
Coal 10 2
CCGT 3 2 3
OCGT 18 12 18 23
CHP-Coal
CHP-Gas
Nuclear
Storage
sum 21 28 25 29
Under uncertainty, no investments into coal plants take place. In contrast, CCGT and
especially OCGT investments are higher than on average under certainty. The result of
lower coal and higher CCGT investments reflects the effect discussed in the illustrative
modeling example (Section 5.4): As coal is only cost-efficient in some scenarios, invest-
ments with lower capital/operating cost ratios are chosen under uncertainty in order
to hedge against the risk of high investment expenditures for plants that may only run
for few hours. In contrast, higher OCGT investments under uncertainty are only cost-
efficient because of an existing power plant fleet. In the illustrative modeling example,
lower OCGT investments are chosen under uncertainty because a high utilization of
these capacities, in the case of low RES-E penetration, would induce high costs. Due
to the existing power plant fleet of the Central European power market (now taken into
account), the additional OCGT capacities built under uncertainty are not needed to
meet demand in 2020. Even in the scenario with the lowest RES-E penetration (branch
24), demand can be met by a different dispatch of existing power plants such that the
additional OCGT plants built under uncertainty only serve as backup capacities in all
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scenarios. Specifically, the utilization of existing CCGT plants in branch 24 is higher
under uncertainty. In addition, generation in lignite-CHP plants is reduced such that
generation in non-CHP lignite plants can be increased (due to the lignite fuel bound,
only a limited amount of lignite can be used per year). CHP generation from lignite
plants is replaced by a higher utilization of gas-CHP and coal-CHP plants. In addition,
the utilization of pump storage plants is higher than under investment planning given
perfect foresight. Due to a higher utilization of pump storage plants, the utilization of
existing baseload plants can be increased compared to the deterministic case, in which
more investments into baseload plants are made in 2015. In branch 1, characterized by
the highest RES-E penetration, the different optimal investment plan under uncertainty
leads to a higher amount of total installed capacities and to a larger share of CCGT
capacities in 2020. Consequently, a larger share of demand in 2020 is met by CCGT
plants instead of old coal plants, which have higher variable costs than new built CCGT
plants due to low efficiency values.
These generation differences are recaptured in Figure 5.5. Interestingly, although in
branch 1 and 24 uncertainty leads to a replacement of coal by CCGT generation, this
generation difference leads to lower variable costs in branch 1 compared to the determin-
istic case, while variable costs in branch 24 are comparatively higher. Whereas in branch
1, CCGT generation replaces coal generation in old existing coal plants, differences in
branch 24 occur because new efficient coal plants built in the deterministic case are not
available under uncertainty.
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Figure 5.5: Generation differences in 2020 between the deterministic and the stochas-
tic case [TWh]
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Investment choices in 2020 differ between the stochastic and the deterministic solu-
tions, mainly because the power plant fleet in the stochastic approach is adapted to
newly available information about future RES-E deployments. Table 5.14 depicts in-
vestment decisions in branches 1 and 24, given perfect foresight, the average values
for all eight deterministic branches passing through node n1 and node n3, respectively,
and the stochastic values for nodes n1 and n3. Nuclear investments are identical in all
deterministic and stochastic cases because generation costs are comparatively low and
investments are restricted (see Section 5.3). Lignite investments are also identical in all
branches passing through the same 2020 node such that investments into lignite plants
are not subject to uncertainty.
Table 5.14: Investments in 2020 in all model regions [GW]
Branch 1 av (n1) stoch (n1) Branch 24 av (n3) stoch (n3)
Lignite 7 7 7 10 10 10
Coal
CCGT 13 17 13 35 31 42
OCGT 34 31 28 15 17 8
CHP-Coal
CHP-Gas
Nuclear 6 6 6 6 6 6
Storage
sum 60 61 54 66 64 66
Considering node n1 (characterized by a surpassed NREAP), it can be seen that under
uncertainty, less investments in CCGT and OCGT plants are made compared to the
average investments in the deterministic scenario calculations. Lower investments are
cost-efficient because under uncertainty, more CCGT and OCGT plants are constructed
in the period before 2020. Considering branch 1, CCGT investments in 2020 are identi-
cal in the stochastic and deterministic case. Thus, due to the higher CCGT investments
in 2015 under uncertainty, installed CCGT capacities in 2025 are higher than in the
deterministic case. Consequently, in branch 1, differences in the dispatch decisions be-
tween the deterministic and the stochastic optimization in 2025 hardly differ from those
in 2020. Under uncertainty, a larger part of demand is met by CCGT plants, while
generation from coal plants is lower than under perfect foresight.
Node n3 (low RES-E share) is characterized by substantially larger CCGT investments
under uncertainty. OCGT investments are, in contrast, lower than in the determinis-
tic case. Additional CCGT capacities are built in order to compensate for lower base-
and midload plant investments (coal and CCGT) made in 2015. CCGT, rather than
coal plants, are chosen to compensate for lower baseload investments because increasing
CO2 prices and RES-E shares over time lead to an increasing relative value of CCGT
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plants compared to coal plants. Fewer investments in OCGT plants are cost-efficient un-
der uncertainty in 2020 because the capacity mix already comprises larger OCGT shares
than under certainty due to the 2015 investments. Resulting dispatch decisions (branch
24) in 2025 are again characterized by higher CCGT and pump storage generation and
by lower coal generation than under certainty. Results for later model years generally
reflect the same effects and are thus not discussed in more detail.
5.5.2.2 Effects of RES-E implementation risks on system costs
Figure 5.6 depicts additional capital costs, additional variable costs and additional total
costs arising in each of the 24 branches due to the uncertainty about the magnitude and
the pace of future RES-E deployments in Germany and its neighboring countries. De-
picted costs are discounted with a 5 % rate and accumulated until 2060. In branches with
high RES-E shares, such as branch 1, investment planning under uncertainty induces
additional capital costs (+ 9 bn EUR2010 by 2060 in branch 1) because many mid- and
baseload plants built under uncertainty are not cost-efficient for these branches. How-
ever, variable generation costs decrease due to the availability of generation options with
low variable costs (- 4 bn EUR2010). In contrast, in branches with low RES-E shares,
such as branch 24, additional variable costs are high (+ 11 bn EUR2010 by 2060 in branch
24), while capital costs are lower than in the deterministic case (- 9 bn EUR2010).
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Figure 5.6: Additional costs induced by the RES-E implementation risk (per branch)
[bn EUR2010]
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Total additional costs induced by uncertainty amount to 4 bn EUR2010 on average.
Compared to total average deterministic costs, these costs however represent only 0.3%.
One reason is that investment requirements are low in those periods when uncertainty
is highest.73 Investment decisions are exposed the most to uncertainty in 2015, when
RES-E penetration levels up to 2060 are unknown. Besides exogenous commissions of
power plants that are already in the construction process today, investment requirements
to meet demand in 2020 are low. Endogenous investment decisions in 2015 amount to
between 21 and 29 GW - representing approximately 7% of total installed capacities.
In addition, due to an existing power plant fleet, not all of the new investments are
necessarily needed to meet demand. For example, in branch 24, stochastic investment
planning in 2015 does not lead to a higher OCGT generation in 2020; although from a
capacity point of view, some of the OCGT plants replace coal plants, built under perfect
foresight. Thus, the existing power plant fleet permits some investment decisions to be
postponed to a period when more information is available. Another reason for relatively
low additional costs is that not all capacity investments are exposed to risk. Lignite and
nuclear plants are built in all paths either nearly (lignite) or exactly (nuclear) to the
same amount. Both technologies have low variable costs and are additionally restricted
by natural resource or political constraints.
5.5.2.3 Comparison of findings for the European power system with findings
in the illustrative modeling example (Section 5.4.2)
In the illustrative modeling example (Section 5.4.2), we find that CCGT plants, char-
acterized by a medium capital/operating cost ratio compared to hard coal and OCGT
plants, have a higher value under uncertainty than given perfect foresight about future
RES-E penetration levels. Given higher investments in CCGT plants under uncertainty,
optimal investments in storage units are lower than under perfect foresight. In the case
of the European power system, the finding that investments in CCGT plants are higher
under uncertainty is confirmed. The magnitude of this effect is, however, rather small
in comparison to the illustrative scenario. One major reason is that the difference be-
tween the highest and the lowest possible realization of RES-E penetration is very large
in the illustrative scenario (0% versus 50% RES-E). Indeed, the difference between the
assumed minimum and maximum realizations of RES-E shares in the European power
system for 2050 is also large (e.g., for Germany: 47% versus 78%). However, investment
decisions relevant for 2050 do not have to be made all in 2015. The difference in the
73In a quite different context, Manne (1974) finds that the expected value of perfect information
about the time at which nuclear breeder technology becomes available is very low (0.04% of average
deterministic costs), because decisions can be defererred to periods when uncertainty is at least partly
resolved. In his calculation, a sufficient amount of old power plants exists, such that only few investments
are required in the period when uncertainty is highest.
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possible RES-E penetrations from one investment period to the next, in contrast, are
comparatively small, because we assume that a long-term increase in the RES-E share is
reliable and that only the magnitude and the pace of the increase are uncertain. Further-
more, as described above, investment requirements in the short term, when uncertainty
is highest, are rather small. The result of lower investments in storage units, found in
the illustrative example, can be neither confirmed nor disproved by the modeling results
for the European power system. In the European power system, a large amount of pump
storage units exist already and other storage options are not cost-efficient in the short
and medium term. Analogue to the smaller magnitude of the effects, uncertainty has
on the optimal capacity choice, also the impact of uncertainty on system costs of the
European power system is comparatively small.
5.6 Conclusions
Uncertain future RES-E deployment paths induce uncertainty about the level and the
slope of the residual load that needs to be met by dispatchable power plants and storage
units. We find that uncertainty about the achievement of RES-E targets significantly
affects optimal investment and dispatch decisions. Under plausible assumptions, plants
with a medium capital/operating cost ratio have a higher value under uncertainty. Fur-
thermore, given higher investments in plants with a medium capital/operating cost ratio
under uncertainty, optimal investments in storage units are lower than under perfect
foresight. Finally, the impact of uncertain RES-E deployment paths on system costs is
rather small if we assume that a long-term increase in the RES-E share is reliable and
that only the magnitude and the pace of the increase are uncertain.
Based on our analysis, the following implications can be drawn for optimal investment
planning and policy: Firstly, it is important to take into account possible implemen-
tation risks associated with RES-E targets because a different technology choice or a
different point of time may be beneficial for the investment. Secondly, many old power
plants, whose decommissioning may seem cost-efficient based on deterministic optimiza-
tion models, are valuable under uncertainty. Thirdly, reliable long-term political targets
are crucial in order to limit uncertainty. Fourthly, the effects of RES-E implementation
risks need to be considered in the ongoing debate concerning the necessity of capac-
ity payments in the context of an increasing RES-E share. From deterministic model
calculations, it is known that an increasing RES-E share requires a large amount of
backup capacities, which however only run for very few hours. The capacity payment
debate focuses on the question, as to whether investment incentives for these plants are
high enough without additional payments (e.g., Cramton and Ockenfels (2012), Joskow
(2008), Cramton and Stoft (2008), Cramton and Stoft (2005)). Our analysis shows
that under uncertainty about the pace of future RES-E deployments, power plants are
needed that are only dispatched if RES-E deployment plans progress slowly. We analyze
the effects of RES-E implementation risks from the perspective of a risk-neutral central
planner, who recovers all costs on average. However, in some scenarios, electricity prices
are not sufficient to cover investment expenditures. Whether risk-averse investors would
invest within this uncertain environment without additional incentives is an interesting
area of further research. Moreover, we have focused on only one source of uncertainty
associated with the envisaged transformation process towards a low-carbon and mainly
renewable-based European electricity system. However, this transformation process re-
lies on three pillars: an increasing share of renewable energy, increasing energy efficiency
and a reduction of CO2 emissions. In this context, future CO2 prices and the progress
of energy efficiency measures are additional sources of uncertainty about the optimal ca-
pacity mix of conventional power plants and storage units. A combined analysis of these
uncertainties provides an interesting area of further research and would contribute to a
better understanding of optimal power plant investment planning within the context of
the envisaged transformation process.
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Table A.1: RES-E shares in 2010 and 2020 (according to NREAPs) and assumed
RES-E targets for 2030 in the scenarios ‘Equal Share’, ‘Extrapolation’ and ‘Flatrate
Growth’
2010 2020 2030
(NREAP) (NREAP) Equal Extra- Flatrate
Share polation Growth
[%] [%] [%] [%] [%]
Austria 73 71 71 76 91
Belgium 5 21 55 42 41
Bulgaria 11 21 55 36 41
Czech Republic 7 14 55 26 34
Denmark 34 52 55 75 72
Estonia 2 5 55 13 25
Finland 26 33 55 45 53
France 16 27 55 44 47
Germany 17 39 55 65 59
Greece 13 40 55 71 60
Hungary 7 11 55 20 31
Ireland 20 43 55 70 63
Italy 19 26 55 39 46
Latvia 45 60 60 80 80
Lithuania 8 21 55 39 41
Luxembourg 4 12 55 25 32
Netherlands 9 37 55 70 57
Poland 8 19 55 36 39
Portugal 41 55 55 74 75
Romania 27 43 55 63 63
Slovakia 19 24 55 34 44
Slovenia 32 39 55 51 59
Spain 29 40 55 56 60
Sweden 55 63 63 76 83
United Kingdom 9 31 55 58 51
Switzerland* 55 n/a 57 57 57
Norway* 90 n/a 100 100 100
*2010 share according to Eurostat
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Proof of Welfare effects in case 1 (‘copper plate’)
In the first case, it is assumed that the two countries form a copper plate, implying that
the common wholesale electricity market price is not affected by cross-border trading of
green certificates.
Country A (certificate importing country):
• Effects on producers:
Producer profits are defined as:
piCA =q · yA − C(yA) (B.1)
piRA =[q + sA][zA − T ]− hA(zA − T ) (B.2)
A marginal increase of T changes producer profits as follows:
dpiCA
dT
=0 (B.3)
dpiRA
dT
=
dsA
dT
[zA − T ]− q − sA + h′A(zA − T ) (B.4)
The first order condition of profit maximization of RES-E producers (
dpiRA
dgA
with
gA = zA − T ) implies that the certificate price corresponds to the additional
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marginal costs of renewable energy compared to the wholesale electricity price
(see also Amundsen and Nese (2009)) sA = h
′
A(zA − T )− q. It follows that:
dpiRA
dT
=
dsA
dT
· [zA − T ] ≤ 0 (B.5)
with
dsA
dT
=− h′′A(zA − T ) ≤ 0 (B.6)
• Effects on consumers:
Due to the assumption of an inelastic electricity demand, changes in consumer rents
correspond to the changes in expenses for consumers in meeting their electricity
demand (eq. (B.7)), multiplied by (-1). Thus, the effects of cross-border trading
of green certificates on consumer rents is defined by Equation (B.8).
Consumer expeditures = CEA = q · xA + sA · αA · xA (B.7)
dCRA
dT
= −dCEA
dT
=− dsA
dT
· αAxA = −dsA
dT
· zA ≥ 0 (B.8)
• Effects on total welfare in country A:
dWA
dT
=
dpiA
dT
+
dCRA
dT
= −dsA
dT
· T ≥ 0 (B.9)
Country B (certificate exporting country):
• Effects on producers:
Producer profits are defined as:
piCB =q · yB − C(yB) (B.10)
piRB =[q + sB][zB + T ]− hB(zB + T ) (B.11)
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A marginal increase in T changes producer profits as follows:
dpiCB
dT
=0 (B.12)
dpiRB
dT
=
dsB
dT
[zB + T ] + q + sB − h′B(zB + T ) (B.13)
Using sB = h
′
B(zB + T )− q, changes in producer profits correspond to:
dpiRB
dT
=
dsB
dT
· [zB + T ] ≥ 0 (B.14)
with
dsB
dT
=h
′′
B(zB + T ) ≥ 0 (B.15)
• Effects on consumers:
CEB = q · xB + sB · αB · xB (B.16)
dCRB
dT
= −dCEB
dT
= −dsB
dT
· αBxB = −dsB
dT
· zB ≤ 0 (B.17)
• Effects on total welfare in country B:
dWB
dT
=
dpiB
dT
+
dCRB
dT
=
dsB
dT
· T ≥ 0 (B.18)
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Proof of Welfare effects in case 2 (‘limited interconnection’)
In the second case, it is assumed that the two countries are not perfectly physically
interconnected. Either, an interconnector exists which is congested, or the two regional
electricity systems are not physically interconnected at all. In both cases, the trading
of green certificates also influences the regional wholesale electricity markets. Note that
setting the interconnector capacity M=0 corresponds to the case of no interconnection.
Country A (certificate importing country):
In the following, it is first assumed that country A is not only a certificate, but also an
electricity importing country.
• Effects on producers:
Producer profits are defined as:
piCA =qA · [xA − zA + T −M ]− CA(xA − zA + T −M) (B.19)
piRA =[qA + sA] · [zA − T ]− hA(zA − T ) (B.20)
A marginal increase in T changes producer profits as follows:
dpiCA
dT
=
dqA
dT
· [xA − zA + T −M ] + qA − C ′A(xA − zA + T −M) (B.21)
dpiRA
dT
=
dqA
dT
· [zA − T ] + dsA
dT
· [zA − T ]− qA − sA + h′A(zA − T ) (B.22)
Again, the certificate price corresponds to the additional marginal costs of renew-
able energy compared to the wholesale electricity price (sA = h
′
A(zA−T )−qA) and
the wholesale electricity price corresponds to the marginal costs of meeting resid-
ual demand (=total electricity demand - RES-E production - electricity imports)
with electricity from conventional energy sources (C
′
A(xA − zA + T −M) = qA).
It follows that:
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dpiCA
dT
=
dqA
dT
· [xA − zA + T −M ] ≥ 0 (B.23)
dpiRA
dT
=[
dsA
dT
+
dqA
dT
] · [zA − T ] ≤ 0 (B.24)
dpiA
dT
=
dsA
dT
· [zA − T ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+
dqA
dT
· [xA −M ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
(B.25)
with
dsA
dT
=− h′′A(zA − T )− C
′′
A(xA − zA + T −M) ≤ 0 (B.26)
and
dqA
dT
=C
′′
A(xA − zA + T −M) ≥ 0 (B.27)
• Effects on consumers:
CEA = qA · xA + sA · αA · xA (B.28)
dCRA
dT
= −dCEA
dT
= −dsA
dT
· zA︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
−dqA
dT
· xA︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
(B.29)
• Effects on total welfare in country A:
dWA
dT
=
dpiA
dT
+
dCRA
dT
= − dsA
dT
· T︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
−dqA
dT
·M︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
(B.30)
If country A is a certificate importing as well as an electricity exporting country, the
profits gained from conventional generation and total producer profits in country
A change as follows:
piCA =qA · [xA − zA + T +M ]− CA(xA − zA + T +M) (B.31)
dpiCA
dT
=
dqA
dT
· [xA − zA + T +M ] ≥ 0 (B.32)
dpiA
dT
=
dsA
dT
· [zA − T ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+
dqA
dT
· [xA +M ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
(B.33)
Thus, if country A is a certificate importing as well as an electricity exporting
country, welfare in country A changes as follows:
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dWA
dT
= −dsA
dT
· T + dqA
dT
·M ≥ 0 (B.34)
Country B (certificate exporting country):
In the following, it is first assumed that country B is not only a certificate but also an
electricity exporting country.
• Effects on producers:
Producer profits are defined as:
piCB =qB · [xB − zB − T +M ]− CB(xB − zB − T +M) (B.35)
piRB =[qB + sB] · [zB + T ]− hB(zB + T ) (B.36)
A marginal increase in T changes producer profits as follows:
dpiCB
dT
=
dqB
dT
· [xB − zB − T +M ]− qB + C ′B(xB − zB − T +M) (B.37)
dpiRB
dT
=
dqB
dT
(zB + T ) +
dsB
dT
(zB + T ) + qB + sB − h′B(zB + T ) (B.38)
Using that sB = h
′
B(zB − T )− qB and C
′
B(xB − zB − T +M) = qB, we find that:
dpiCB
dT
=
dqB
dT
· [xB − zB − T +M ] ≤ 0 (B.39)
dpiRB
dT
=[
dsB
dT
+
dqB
dT
] · [zB + T ] ≥ 0 (B.40)
dpiB
dT
=
dsB
dT
· [zB + T ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+
dqB
dT
· [xB +M ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
(B.41)
with
dsB
dT
= h
′′
B(zB + T ) + C
′′
B(xB − zB − T +M) ≥ 0 (B.42)
and
dqB
dT
= −C ′′B(xB − zB − T +M) ≤ 0 (B.43)
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• Effects on consumers:
CEB = qB · xA + sB · αB · xB (B.44)
dCRB
dT
= −dCEB
dT
= −dsB
dT
· zB︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
−dqB
dT
· xB︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
(B.45)
• Effects on total welfare in country B:
dWB
dT
=
dpiB
dT
+
dCRB
dT
=
dsB
dT
· T︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+
dqB
dT
·M︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
(B.46)
If country B is a certificate exporting as well as an electricity importing country, the
profits which can gained from conventional generation and total producer profits
in country B change as follows:
piCB =qB · [xB − zB − T −M ]− CB(xB − zB − T −M) (B.47)
dpiCB
dT
=
dqB
dT
· [xB − zB − T −M ] ≤ 0 (B.48)
dpiB
dT
=
dsB
dT
· [zB + T ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+
dqB
dT
· [xB −M ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
(B.49)
(B.50)
Thus, if country B is a certificate exporting as well as an electricity importing
country, welfare in country B changes as follows:
dWB
dT
=
dsB
dT
· T − dqB
dT
·M ≥ 0 (B.51)
Congestion rents:
If the interconnector is congested, congestion rents, corresponding to the price difference
between the two regions multiplied by the amount of electricity traded, are also affected
by certificate trading.
• If country A is an electricity importing country and country B an electricity ex-
porting country, congestion rents increase in T. Country A (B) imports (exports)
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electricity (even in the absence of certificate trading) if the wholesale electricity
price in A is higher than in B. With an increasing T, the wholesale electricity price
in A increases further, while the wholesale electricity price in B decreases. Thus,
the price difference, and thereby the congestion rent, increases. If electricity trades
are zero in the absence of certificate trading, congestion rents are also zero. In this
case, the price difference also increases once certificate trading is introduced and
congestion rents increase from zero to a positive value.
dEA,B
dT
= [
dqA
dT
− dqB
dT
] ·M ≥ 0 (B.52)
• If country A is an electricity exporting country and country B an electricity im-
porting country, congestion rents decrease in T. Country A exports electricity if
the wholesale electricity price in A is lower than in B. When certificate trading
is possible and wholesale electricity prices in A (B) increase (decrease), the price
difference decreases.
dEA,B
dT
= [
dqB
dT
− dqA
dT
] ·M ≤ 0 (B.53)
Overall welfare:
• If country A is an electricity importing country and country B an electricity ex-
porting country, the increasing congestion rent compensates exactly for the sum
of the negative components in the change in welfare in countries A and B, such
that system-wide welfare increases and only depends on the changes in certificate
prices.
dW
dT
=
dWA
dT
+
dWB
dT
+
dEA,B
dT
=− dsA
dT
· T︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
−dqA
dT
·M︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+
dsB
dT
· T︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
(B.54)
+
dqB
dT
·M︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+ [
dqA
dT
− dqB
dT
] ·M︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
=[−dsA
dT
+
dsB
dT
] · T ≥ 0
• If country A is an electricity exporting country and country B an electricity im-
porting country, the decreasing congestion rent compensates exactly for the sum
of the wholesale price effects in the changes in welfare of country A and B (which
in this case are positive).
dW
dT
=
dWA
dT
+
dWB
dT
+
dEA,B
dT
=− dsA
dT
· T︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+
dqA
dT
·M︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+
dsB
dT
· T︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
(B.55)
−dqB
dT
·M︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+ [
dqB
dT
− dqA
dT
] ·M︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
=[−dsA
dT
+
dsB
dT
] · T ≥ 0
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Table C.1: Generation and capacity differences between cooperative and national
RES-E support in the year 2020 [TWh and GW] in the largest certificate importing
countries (in the TYNDP and in the ‘w/o TYNDP’ scenario)
Generation differences Capacity differences
TYNDP w/o TYNDP TYNDP w/o TYNDP
FI non RES-E -4.3 -0.3 0.9 0.1
biomass -3.5 0.1 -0.5 0.0
onshore wind -4.9 -4.9 -2.6 -2.6
offshore wind 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
pv/csp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
DE non RES-E 40.1 49.3 -0.1 -0.6
biomass -30.5 -30.5 -4.1 -4.1
onshore wind -26.0 -26.0 -15.1 -15.1
offshore wind -32.2 -32.2 -10.0 -10.0
pv/csp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
GR non RES-E 5.1 3.0 0.5 0.3
biomass -0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.0
onshore wind -0.7 -0.7 -0.4 -0.4
offshore wind 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
pv/csp -4.8 -1.2 -2.8 -0.3
IT non RES-E 12.8 8.3 0.0 0.9
biomass 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
onshore wind -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1
offshore wind 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
pv/csp -8.8 -8.8 -6.1 -6.1
SE non RES-E 2.2 1.8 0.8 0.7
biomass -7.6 -7.1 -0.5 -0.5
onshore wind -0.7 -0.7 -0.3 -0.3
offshore wind 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
pv/csp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
UK non RES-E -1.4 3.5 0.3 0.0
biomass -0.6 -0.5 0.0 0.0
onshore wind 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
offshore wind -3.4 -3.4 -0.9 -0.9
pv/csp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Positive (negative) values indicate that generation levels or capacities are higher (lower) once
cooperation is introduced.
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Table C.2: Generation and capacity differences between cooperative and national
RES-E support in the year 2020 [TWh and GW] in the largest certificate exporting
countries (in the TYNDP and in the ‘w/o TYNDP’ scenario)
Generation differences Capacity differences
TYNDP w/o TYNDP TYNDP w/o TYNDP
CZ non RES-E -0.6 0.4 0.2 0.2
biomass 1.0 1.4 0.0 0.0
onshore wind 8.2 7.8 3.8 3.6
offshore wind 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
pv/csp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
DK non RES-E 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.0
biomass 2.0 1.8 0.0 0.0
onshore wind 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
offshore wind 19.2 2.8 4.5 0.6
pv/csp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
IE non RES-E -2.2 -5.5 -0.2 -0.5
biomass 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
onshore wind 6.4 6.1 2.5 2.7
offshore wind 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
pv/csp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
NO non RES-E -0.1 -1.1 0.0 -0.1
biomass 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
onshore wind 5.9 5.9 2.4 2.4
offshore wind 45.0 14.9 10.0 3.3
pv/csp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
PL non RES-E -21.6 -16.8 0.3 0.3
biomass 2.0 2.0 0.3 0.3
onshore wind 17.0 17.0 6.8 6.8
offshore wind 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
pv/csp 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
ES non RES-E -14.3 -29.4 -1.4 -1.7
biomass 2.2 2.1 0.3 0.3
onshore wind -0.7 -1.2 -0.4 -0.6
offshore wind 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
pv/csp 21.8 34.4 9.3 17.6
Positive (negative) values indicate that generation levels or capacities are higher (lower) once
cooperation is introduced.
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Appendix D
Supplemental data for Chapter 5
Table D.1: Assumed potential restrictions [based on EWI and energynautics (2011)]
Technology Germany Benelux France CH + AT CZ + PL Denmark
Wind Onshore [km2] 2174 497 3215 252 2429 300
Wind Offshore [km2] 7200 11054 4050 - 1410 8520
Biomass [TWhth] 177 44 356 42 141 34
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Table D.2: RES-E capacities in 2030 [GW]
Region Technology n1 n2 n3 n4 n5 n6 n7 n8 n9 n10 n11 n12
Germany wind onshore 48.5 46.4 46.4 44.3 44.3 42.2 42.2 40.0 38.5 36.4 36.4 34.3
wind offshore 31.7 26.8 26.8 21.9 29.7 24.8 24.8 19.9 22.7 17.8 17.8 12.9
photovoltaics 94.4 85.8 85.8 77.2 86.2 77.6 77.6 69.0 69.4 60.8 60.8 52.2
biomass 11.7 11.2 11.2 10.6 11.0 10.5 10.5 9.9 10.2 9.7 9.7 9.1
geothermal 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
Benelux wind onshore 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 14.0 13.5 11.7 11.7 9.8
wind offshore 17.2 14.7 14.7 12.1 15.6 13.0 13.0 10.5 12.2 9.7 9.7 7.1
photovoltaics 5.7 5.3 5.3 4.9 3.9 3.5 3.5 3.0 2.7 2.3 2.3 1.9
biomass 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
geothermal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
France wind onshore 38.5 35.1 35.1 31.7 32.5 29.1 29.1 25.7 23.5 20.1 20.1 16.7
wind offshore 20.0 17.0 17.0 14.0 18.0 15.0 15.0 12.0 13.0 10.0 10.0 7.0
photovoltaics 14.4 13.3 13.3 12.2 9.2 8.1 8.1 7.0 6.4 5.3 5.3 4.2
biomass 6.0 5.5 5.5 5.0 5.0 4.5 4.5 4.0 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.0
geothermal 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
CH + AT wind onshore 5.6 5.2 5.2 4.8 4.2 3.8 3.8 3.4 3.6 3.2 3.2 2.8
wind offshore 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
photovoltaics 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4
biomass 3.3 3.0 3.0 2.6 2.6 2.2 2.2 1.9 2.3 2.0 2.0 1.6
geothermal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CZ+ PL wind onshore 14.0 12.8 12.8 11.5 11.3 10.1 10.1 8.8 8.0 6.8 6.8 5.5
wind offshore 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.5
photovoltaics 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
biomass 6.3 5.6 5.6 4.9 5.8 5.1 5.1 4.4 3.1 2.4 2.4 1.7
geothermal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Denmark wind onshore 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.5
wind offshore 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2
photovoltaics 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
biomass 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.0 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.7
geothermal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
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Figure D.1: The influence of representing uncertainty by a different number of sce-
narios
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Figure D.2: Residual load duration curves - deterministic and stochastic (using 8760h
of demand and RES-E infeed data instead of a typical day approach as in Figure 5.2)
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Figure D.3: The influence of demand level uncertainty on the steepness of the stochas-
tic load duration curve II
163

Bibliography
Agnolucci, P. (2007). The effect of financial constraints, technological progress and
long-term contracts on tradable green certificates. Energy Policy, 35:3347–3359.
Amundsen, E. and Mortensen, J. B. (2001). The Danish Green Certificate System: some
simple analytical results. Energy Economics, 23:489–509.
Amundsen, E. and Nese, G. (2009). Integration of tradable green certificate markets:
What can be expected? Journal of Policy Modeling, 31:903–922.
Aune, F., Dalen, H., and Hagem, C. (2012). Implementing the EU renewable target
through green certificate markets. Energy Economics, 34:992–1000.
Bartels, M. (2009). Cost efficient expansion of district heat networks in Germany. PhD
thesis, Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universita¨t zu Ko¨ln.
Bauer, N., Edenhofer, O., Jakob, M., Ludig, S., and Lu¨ken, M. (2008). Electricity trade
among world regions. Trade theoretic foundation of energy-economy models. Working
Paper. Potsdam-Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK).
Beurskens, L., Hekkenberg, M., and Vethman, P. (2011). Renewable Energy Projections
as Published in the National Renewable Energy Action Plans of the European Member
States. Technical report, ECN.
Bhagwati, J., Panagariya, A., and Srinivasan, T. (1998). Lectures on international trade.
Cambridge: MIT Press, 2nd edition.
Billette de Villemeur, E. and Pineau, P.-O. (2010). Environmentally Damaging Elec-
tricity Trade. Energy Policy, 38:1548–1558.
Birge, J. R. (1997). Introduction to Stochastic Programming. Peter Glynn and Steve
Robinson (Springer-Verlag).
BMU (2011). Erneuerbare Energien in Zahlen - Internet-Update ausgewa¨hlter Daten.
Technical report, Bundesministerium fu¨r Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reakorsicherheit
(BMU).
165
BMU (2012). Erneuerbare Energien in Zahlen - Nationale und internationale Entwick-
lung. Technical report, Bundesministerium fu¨r Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktor-
sicherheit.
BMU (2013). Erneuerbare Energien in Zahlen - Nationale und internationale Entwick-
lung. Technical report, Bundesministerium fu¨r Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktor-
sicherheit.
BMWi/BMU (2010). Energiekonzept fu¨r eine umweltschonende, zuverla¨ssige und
bezahlbare Energieversorgung. Technical report, Bundesministerium fu¨r Wirtschaft
und Technologie and Bundesministerium fu¨r Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicher-
heit.
Booze & Company, Newberry, D., Strbac, G., Pudjianto, D., Noel, P., and LeighFisher
(2013). Benefits of an integrated European energy market. Prepared for Directorate-
General Energy, European Commission. Technical report.
Breyer, F. (2004). Mikroo¨konomik. Springer Berlin.
BSW (2011). Preisindex Photovoltaik.
Buijs, P. (2011). Transmission Investments: Concepts for European Collaboration in
Planning and Financing. PhD thesis, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
Bye, T. (2003). On the Price and Volume Effects from Green Certificates in the Energy
Market. Discussion Papers No.351; Statistics Norway, Research Department.
Capros, P., Mantzos, L., Parousos, L., Tasios., N., Klaassen, G., and Ierland, T. V.
(2011). Analysis of the EU policy package on climate change and renewables. Energy
Policy, 39:1476–1485.
Capros, P., Mantzos, L., Tasios., N., DeVita, A., and Kouvaritakis, N. (2010). Energy
Trends to 2030 — Update 2009. Technical report, Institute of Communication and
Computer Systems of the National Technical University of Athens.
Conejo, A. J., Carrio´n, M., and Morales, J. M. (2010). Decision Making Under Uncer-
tainty in Electricity Markets. Springer.
Cramton, P. and Ockenfels, A. (2012). Economics and design of capacity markets for
the power sector. Zeitschrift fu¨r Energiewirtschaft, 36:113–134.
Cramton, P. and Stoft, S. (2005). A Capacity Market that Makes Sense. Electricity
Journal, 18:43–54.
Cramton, P. and Stoft, S. (2008). Forward reliability markets: Less risk, less market
power, more efficiency. Utilities Policy, 16:194–201.
166
Dantzig, G. B. (1955). Linear programming under uncertainty. Management Science,
1:197–206.
De Jonghe, C., Delarue, E., Belmans, R., and D´haeseleer, W. (2011). Determining
optimal electricity technology mix with high level of wind power penetration. Applied
Energy, 88:2231–2238.
de Miera, G. S., del R´ıo Gonza´les, P., and Vizca´ıno, I. (2008). Analysing the impact of
renewable electricity support schemes on power prices: The case of wind electricity in
Spain. Energy Policy, 36:3345–3359.
Del R´ıo, P. (2005). A European-wide harmonized tradable green certificate scheme for
renewable electricity: is it really so beneficial? Energy Policy, 33:1239–1250.
Dena (2008). Planning of the grid integration of wind energy in Germany onshore and
offshore up to the year 2020 (Dena grid study). Technical report, German Energy
Agency.
Dena (2010). Integration of renewable energy sources into the German power supply
system in the 2015-2020 period with outlook to 2025 (Dena grid study II). Technical
report, German Energy Agency (Dena).
EC (2009). Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23
April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending
and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC.
EC (2010). National renewable energy action plans.
EC (2011a). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the
Regions: A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050. Tech-
nical report, COM(2011) 112 final. European Commission.
EC (2011b). Communication from the commission to the European parliament, the
council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the
Regions. Energy Roadmap 2050 - Impact assessment and scenario analysis. Technical
report, European Commission.
EC (2012). Commission Working Document accompanying the document ”Communi-
cation from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Renewable en-
ergy: a major player in the European energy market”. Technical report, European
Commission.
167
EC (2013). Commission Staff Working Document ”Guidance on the use of renewable
energy cooperation mechanisms”, accompanying the document ”Delivering the inter-
nal electricity market and making the most of public intervention” (SWD(2013) 440
final). Technical report, European Commission.
Energiekonzept (2010). Energiekonzept fu¨r eine umweltschonende, zuverla¨ssige und
bezahlbare Energieversorgung. Technical report, BMWi/BMU.
ENTSO-E (2010). Ten Year Network Development Plan 2010. Technical report, Euro-
pean Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E).
Erdmann, G. and Zweifel, P. (2008). Energieo¨konomik. Springer.
EREC (2011). Mapping Renewable Energy Pathways towards 2020. EU Roadmap.
Technical report, European Renewable Energy Council.
EU (2001). Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
27 September 2001 on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy
sources in the internal electricity market. Official Journal of the European Communi-
ties, L 283/33.
EURELECTRIC (2008). Statistics and prospects for the European electricity sector;
36th edition. Technical report, Eurelectric.
EURELECTRIC (2009). Statistics and prospects for the European electricity sector;
37th edition. Technical report, Eurelectric.
EuroWind (2011). Database for hourly wind speeds and solar radiation from 2006-2010
(not public). Technical report, EuroWind.
EWI (2010). European RES-E policy analysis - a model based analysis of RES-E de-
ployment and its impact on the conventional power markt. Technical report, Institute
of Energy Economics at the University of Cologne.
EWI and energynautics (2011). Roadmap 2050 - a closer look. Cost-efficient RES-E
penetration and the role of grid extensions. Technical report, Institute of Energy
Economics at the University of Cologne and energynautics.
EWI/Prognos/GWS (2010). Energieszenarien fu¨r ein Energiekonzept der Bun-
desregierung. Technical report, Study on behalf of the German Federal Ministry
of Economics and Technology.
Fischer, C. (2010). Renewable Portfolio Standards: When do they lower energy prices?
The Energy Journal, 31:101–120.
168
Fu¨rsch, M., Hagspiel, S., Ja¨gemann, C., Nagl, S., Lindenberger, D., and Tro¨ster, E.
(2013a). The role of grid extensions in a cost-efficient transformation of the European
electricity system until 2050. Applied Energy, 104:642–652.
Fu¨rsch, M. and Lindenberger, D. (2013). European RES-E policy post 2020 - the eco-
nomic benefit of cooperation (Working Paper 13/16) Institute of Energy Economics
at the University of Cologne.
Fu¨rsch, M., Lindenberger, D., Malischek, R., Nagl, S., Panke, T., and Tru¨by, J. (2012).
German Nuclear Policy Reconsidered: Implications for the Electricity Market. Eco-
nomics of Energy and Environmental Policy, 1:39–58.
Fu¨rsch, M., Nagl, S., and Lindenberger, D. (2013b). Optimization of power plant invest-
ments under uncertain renewable energy deployment paths: A multistage stochastic
programming approach. Energy Systems, Published online on link.springer.com: 30.
August 2013.
Gabriel, S. A., Conejo, A. J., Fuller, J. D., Hobbs, B. F., and Ruiz, C. (2013). Comple-
mentarity Modeling in Energy Markets. Springer.
Gardner, D. and Rogers, J. (1999). Planning electric power systems under demand
uncertainty with different technology lead times. Management Science, 45:1289–1306.
Gardner, D. T. (1996). Flexibility in electric power planning: Coping with demand
uncertainty. Energy, 21:1207–1218.
Grave, K., Paulus, M., and Lindenberger, D. (2012). A method for estimating security
of electricity supply from intermittent sources: Scenarios for Germany until 2030.
Energy Policy, 46:193–202.
Gravelle, H. and Rees, R. (2004). Microeconomics. Pearson Education Limited, 3rd
edition edition.
Hinkley, J., Curtin, B., Hayward, J., Wonhas, A., Boyd, R., Grima, C., Tadros, A.,
Hall, R., Naicker, K., and Mikhail, A. (2011). Concentrating solar power - drivers and
opportunities for cost-competitive electricity. Technical report, CSIRO.
Hirth, L. and Ueckerdt, F. (2012). Redistribution Effects of Energy and Climate Policy:
The Electricity Market. Working Paper. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
Hobbs, B. F. and Maheshwari, P. (1990). A decision analysis of the effect of uncertainty
upon electric utility planning. Energy, 15:785–801.
Huang, A., Joo, S.-K., and Kim, J.-H. (2005). Impact of Inter-regional Energy Trade
on the Net Welfare of an Individual Market. In Proceedings of the 13th International
Conference on Intelligent Systems Application to Power Systems, 2005.
169
IE Leipzig (2011). Mittelfristprognose zur deutschlandweiten Stromerzeugung aus re-
generativen Kraftwerken bis 2016. Technical report, Leipziger Institut fu¨r Energie
GmbH.
IEA (2011). World Energy Outlook 2011. Technical report, International Energy Agency.
IRENA (2012). Renewable energy technologies: cost analysis series. Concentrating Solar
Power. Working Paper.
Jansen, J. (2011). Do we need a common support scheme for renewables-sourced elec-
tricity in Europe? And if so, how could it be designed? ECN Working Paper.
Jensen, S. and Skytte, K. (2002). Interactions between the power and green certificate
market. Energy Policy, 30:425–435.
Ja¨gemann, C., Fu¨rsch, M., Hagspiel, S., and Nagl, S. (2012). Decarbonizing Europe’s
power sector by 2050 - Analyzing the implications of alternative decarbonization
pathways. Workingpaper 12/13; Institute of Energy Economics at the University
of Cologne.
Ja¨gemann, C., Fu¨rsch, M., Hagspiel, S., and Nagl, S. (2013). Decarbonizing Europe’s
power sector by 2050 - Analyzing the economic implications of alternative decar-
bonization pathways. Energy Journal, 40:622–636.
Joskow, P. (2008). Capacity payments in imperfect electricity markets: Need and design.
Utilities Policy, 16:159–170.
Kapff, L. and Pelkmans, J. (2010). Interconnector Investment for a well-functioning
Internal Market - What EU regime of Regulatory Incentives? Bruges European Eco-
nomic Research Papers no. 18, Department of European Economic Studies, College
of Europe.
Klessmann, C., Lamers, P., Ragwitz, M., and Resch, G. (2010). Design options for
cooperation mechanisms under the new European renewable energy directive. Energy
Policy, 38:4679–4691.
Krugman, P. R. and Obstfeld, M. (2009). International Economics. Theory & Policy.
Pearson International.
Laffont, M. and Sand-Zantman, W. (2012). Promoting Renewable Energy in a Common
Market. Working Paper.
Lamont, A. D. (2008). Assessing the long-term system value of intermittent electric
generation technologies. Energy Economics, 30:1208–1231.
170
Lauber, V. (2004). REFIT and RPS: options for a harmonised Community framework.
Energy Policy, 32:1405–1414.
Liejesen, M. G. (2007). The real-time price elasticity of electricity. Energy Economics,
29:249–258.
Manne, A. and Richels, R. (1978). A decision analysis of the U.S. breeder reactor
programm. Energy, 3:747–767.
Manne, A. S. (1974). Waiting for the breeder. Review of Economic Studies Symposium,
0:47–65.
Mej´ıa, J. F. (2011). Export Diversification and Economic Growth. An Analysis of Colom-
bia’ s Export Competitiveness in the European Union’ s Market. Physica-Verlag.
Menanteau, P., Finon, D., and Lamy, M.-L. (2003). Prices versus quantities : choosing
policies for promoting the development of renewable energy. Energy Policy, 31:799–
812.
Minot, N. (2009). Using GAMS for agricultural policy analysis.
Mondiano, E. (1987). Derived demand and capacity planning under uncertainty. Oper-
ations Research, 35:185–197.
Munoz, M., Oschmann, V., and Ta`bara, J. (2007). Harmonization of renewable electric-
ity feed-in laws in the European Union. Energy Policy, 35:3104–3114.
Murphy, F. H., Sen, S., and Soyster, A. L. (1982). Electric utility capacity expansion
planning with uncertain load forecasts. IIE Transactions, 14:52–59.
Nabe, C. (2006). Effiziente Integration erneuerbarer Energien in den deutschen Elek-
trizita¨tsmarkt. PhD thesis, TU Berlin.
Nagl, S. (2013). The Effect of Weather Uncertainty on the Financial Risk of Green Elec-
tricity Producers under Various Renewable Policies (Working Paper 13/15) Institute
of Energy Economics at the University of Cologne.
Nagl, S., Fu¨rsch, M., Ja¨gemann, C., and Bettzu¨ge, M. O. (2011a). The economic value
of storage in renewable power systems - the case of thermal energy storage in concen-
trating solar plants (Working Paper No. 11/08) Institute of Energy Economics at the
University of Cologne.
Nagl, S., Fu¨rsch, M., and Lindenberger, D. (2013). The costs of electricity systems
with a high share of fluctuating renewables - a stochastic investment and dispatch
optimization model for Europe. The Energy Journal, 34:151–179.
171
Nagl, S., Fu¨rsch, M., Paulus, M., Richter, J., Tru¨by, J., and Lindenberger, D. (2011b).
Energy Policy Scenarios to Reach Challenging Climate Protection Targets in the Ger-
man Electricity Sector until 2050. Utilities Policy, 19 (3):185–192.
Neuhoff, K., Bach, S., Diekmann, J., Beznoska, M., and El-Laboudy, T. (2013). Distri-
butional Effects of Energy Transition: Impacts of Renewable Electricity Support in
Germany. Economics of Energy and Environmental Policy, 2:41–54.
Neumann, K. and Morlock, M. (2002). Operations Research. Hanser.
Newberry, D. (2009). Predicting market power in wholesale electricity markets. EUI
Working Paper.
Nicolosi, M. (2012). The Economics of Renewable Electricity Market Integration. An
Empirical and Model-Based Analysis of Regulatory Frameworks and their Impacts on
the Power Market. PhD thesis, Universita¨t zu Ko¨ln.
Nordpool Spot (n.a.). Information on the calcula-
tion of congestion rents in the Nordpool market; URL:
http://www.nordpoolspot.com/Global/Download%20Center/TSO/How-to-calculate-
the-TSO-Congestion-rent.pdf.
Pade, L.-L., Jacobsen, H., and Nielsen, L. S. (2012). Cost-efficient and sustainable
deployment of renewable energy sources towards the 20Mechanism options. . Technical
report, RES4less Project.
Patino-Echeverri, D., Fischebeck, P., and Kriegler, E. (2009). Economic and environ-
mental costs of regulatory uncertainty for coal-fired power plants. Environmental
Science and Technology, 43:578–584.
Paulus, M. and Borggrefe, F. (2011). The potential of Demand-Side Management in
Energy-Intensive Industries for Electricity Markets in Germany. Applied Energy, 88
(2):432–441.
Portuguese Republic (2010). National Renewable Energy Action Plan in accordance
with Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable
sources.
Prognos/EWI/GWS (2010). Energieszenarien fu¨r ein Energiekonzept der Bun-
desregierung; Study on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology.
Technical report, Prognos/EWI/GWS.
Ragwitz, M., Held, A., Resch, G., Faber, T., Haas, R., Huber, C., Coenraads, R.,
Voogt, M., Reece, G., Morthorst, P., Jensen, S., Konstantinaviciute, L., and Heyder,
172
B. (2007). Assessment and Optimization of Renewable Energy Support Schemes in
the European electricity market (OPTRES). Final Report. . Technical report, Project
supported by the European Commission.
Reinelt, P. S. and Keith, D. W. (2007). Carbon capture retrofits and the cost of regu-
latory uncertainty. Energy Journal, 28:101–128.
Richter, J. (2011). DIMENSION - A Dispatch and Investment Model for European
Electricity Markets. Working Paper No. 11/03; Institute of Energy Economics at the
University of Cologne.
Roques, F. A., Nuttall, W. J., Newbery, D. M., de Neufville, R., and Connors, S. (2006).
Nuclear power: A hedge against uncertain gas and carbon prices? Energy Journal,
27:1–24.
Saguan, M. and Meeus, L. (2012). Modeling the cost of achieving a renewable energy
target: Does it pay to cooperate across borders? EUI Working Papers.
Sauma, E. E. and Oren, S. S. (2005). Alternative Economic Criteria and Proactive
Planning for Transmission Investment in Deregulated Power Systems. Working Paper.
So¨derholm, P. (2008). Harmonization of renewable electricity feed-in laws: A comment.
Energy Policy, 36:946–953.
Sen, S. (2001). Stochastic Programming: Computational Issues and Challenges. Book
Chapter in Encyclopedia of OR/MS, S. Gass and C. Harris (eds.).
Simmons-Su¨er, B., Atukeren, E., and Busch, C. (2011). Elastizita¨ten und Substi-
tutionsmo¨glichkeiten der Elektrizita¨tsnachfrage. Literaturu¨bersicht mit besonderem
Fokus auf dem Schweizer Strommarkt. Technical report, Konjunkturforschungsstelle,
ETH Zu¨rich.
Skiba, M. and Reimers, B. (2012). Offshore-Windkraftwerke - Marktentwicklung und
Herausforderungen. Energiewirtschaftliche Tagesfragen, 62:31–35.
Stoft, S. (2002). Power System Economics - Designing Markets for Electricity.
IEEE/Wiley.
Stro¨bele, W. and Wacker, H. (1995). Außenwirtschaft. Oldenbourg.
Sun, N., Ellersdorfer, I., and Swider, D. J. (2008). Model-based long-term electrictity
gerneration system planning under uncertainty. In Int. Conference on Electric Utility
Deregualtion and Re-structuring and Power Technologies (DRPT 2008).
173
Sun, Y. (2012). The optimal percentage requirement and welfare comparisons in a
two-country electricity market with a common tradable green certificate system. Job
Market Paper; Department of Economics, Oklahoma State University.
Swider, D. J. and Weber, C. (2007). The Costs of Wind’s Intermittency in Germany: ap-
plication of a stochastic electricity market model. European Transactions on Electrical
Power, 17:151–172.
Turchi, C., Mehos, M., Ho, C., and Kolb, G. J. (2010). Current and future costs for
parabolic trough and power tower systems in the US market. Conference Paper,
presented at SolarPACES conference 2010 in Perpignan.
U¨bertragungsnetzbetreiber (2000-2012). EEG-Jahresabrechnungen; vero¨ffentlicht
auf der Informationsplattform der deutschen U¨bertragungsnetzbetreiber
(http://www.eeg-kwk.net/de/index.htm).
Unteutsch, M. (2014). Redistribution effects resulting from cross-border cooperation in
support for renewable energy. (Working Paper 14/XX) Institute of Energy Economics
at the University of Cologne.
Voogt, M., Uyterlinde, M., de Noord, K., Skytte, L., Nielsen, M., Leonardi, M., Whiteley,
M., and Chapman, M. (2001). Renewable energy burden sharing - REBUS - effects
of burden sharing and certificate trade on the renewable electricity market in Europe.
Technical report, ECN-C-01-030.
Weber, C. (2005). Uncertainty in the electric power industry - methods and models for
decision support. Springer New York.
Weigt, H. (2009). Germany´s wind energy: The potential for fossil capacity replacement
and cost saving. Applied Energy, 86:1857–1863.
Wissen, R. (2011). Die O¨konomik unterschiedlicher Ausbaudynamiken Erneuerbarer En-
ergien im europa¨ischen Kontext - eine modellbasierte Analyse. PhD thesis, University
of Cologne.
Zweifel, P. and Heller, R. H. (1992). Internationaler Handel - Theorie und Empirie.
Physica-Verlag, 2nd edition edition.
174
CURRICULUM VITAE
Michaela Unteutsch (ne´e Fu¨rsch)
PERSONAL DETAILS
Date of birth: August 21th, 1983
Place of birth: Go¨ttingen, Germany
EDUCATION
Ph.D. student 2009 - 2013
University of Cologne Cologne, Germany
Student of Economics 2003 - 2008
University Mainz Mainz, Germany
University Paris-Nanterre (German-French double-diploma program) Nanterre, France
University Entrance Examination (Abitur) 2003
Landrat-Lucas Gymnasium Leverkusen Leverkusen, Germany
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
Research Associate 2009 - 2013
Institute of Energy Economics, University of Cologne Cologne, Germany
175
REFEREED JOURNAL PUBLICATIONS
Fu¨rsch, M., Nagl, S., Lindenberger, D. (2013). Optimization of power plant investments under
uncertain renewable energy development paths - A multistage stochastic programming approach.
Energy Systems, 10.1007/s12667-013-0094-0 .
Fu¨rsch, M., Hagspiel, S., Ja¨gemann, C., Nagl, S., Lindenberger, D., Tro¨ster, E. (2013). The
role of grid extensions in a cost-efficient transformation of the European electricity system until
2050. Applied Energy, 104:642-652.
Nagl, S., Fu¨rsch, M., Lindenberger, D. (2013). The costs of electricity systems with a high share
of fluctuating renewables – a stochastic investment and dispatch optimization model for Europe.
The Energy Journal, 34:151-179.
Ja¨gemann, C., Fu¨rsch, M., Hagspiel, S., Nagl, S. (2013). Decarbonizing Europe’s power sector
by 2050 - Analyzing the economic implications of alternative decarbonization pathways. Energy
Economics, 40:622-636.
Fu¨rsch, M., Lindenberger, D., Nagl, S., Panke, T., Tru¨by, J. (2011). German nuclear power
reconsidered: implications for the electricity market. Economics of Energy and Environmental
Policy, 1:39-58.
Nagl, S., Fu¨rsch, M., Paulus, M., Richter, J., Tru¨by, J., Lindenberger, D. (2011). Energy policy
scenarios to reach challenging climate protection targets in the German electricity sector until
2050. Utilities Policy, 19:185-192.
NON-REFEREED PUBLICATIONS & WORKING PAPERS
Fu¨rsch, M., Lindenberger, D. (2013). Promotion of Electricity from Renewable Energy in Europe
post 2020 - the Economic Benefits of Cooperation. EWI Working Paper 2013/16, Institute of
Energy Economics, University of Cologne, Cologne.
Fu¨rsch, M., Malischek, R., Lindenberger, D. (2012). Der Merit-Order-Effekt der erneuerbaren
Energien - Analyse der kurzen und langen Frist. EWI Working Paper 2012/14, Institute of
Energy Economics, University of Cologne, Cologne.
Nagl, S., Fu¨rsch, M., Ja¨gemann, C., Bettzu¨ge, M. (2011). The economic value of storage in
renewable power systems – the case of thermal energy storage in concentrating solar plants.
EWI Working Paper 2011/8, Institute of Energy Economics, University of Cologne, Cologne.
Seeliger, A., Perner, J., Riechmann, C., Trahl, N., Fu¨rsch, M., Nagl, S., Lindenberger, D (2011).
Energy costs in Germany – developments, drivers and international comparison. Zeitschrift fu¨r
Energiewirtschaft, 35:43-52.
Nicolosi, M., Fu¨rsch, M. (2009). The Impact of an Increasing Share of RES-E on the Conven-
tional Power Market. The Example of Germany. Zeitschrift fu¨r Energiewirtschaft, 33:246-254.
176
